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ABSTRACT 
METROPOLITAN BATTLEFIELDS: 
URBAN TOPOGRAPHY AND THE WEAPONIZATION OF GOVERNANCE 
IN BAGHDAD 
 
Daniel Charles Bisbee, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2021 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, challenges to the US-led reconstruction escalated into 
a complex conflict over control of the capital city of Baghdad. The Battle for Baghdad involved 
military combat, mass-casualty terrorism, extreme criminality, and communal strife, as well as 
welfare provision, civic outreach, economic development, and local politics. State and nonstate 
actors used bullets, bombs, and their ability to control the provision and denial of city services to 
residents in their attempts to achieve a range of strategic aims. During this battle, the city provided 
both the location for the conflict and the means to wage it – an arena and an arsenal. 
This study constructs a theoretical framework for analyzing both the spatial and 
instrumental aspects of urban environments during conflict, demonstrating how governance 
operates across networks of physical installations and political institutions. Exploiting 
vulnerabilities to governance systems, combatants pursue organizational aims, compete against 
rivals, and challenge state authority.  
The trajectory of the Battle for Baghdad was shaped by dynamic relationships among its 
belligerents and a complex urban topography of territorial, demographic, and infrastructural 
features. A three-part analysis of the Battle for Baghdad evaluates how the reconstruction policies 
of the US-led Coalition converged with the insurgencies of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Jaish al-
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Mahdi (JAM) to produce a complex conflict in which these combatants weaponized governance 
to assert control over Baghdad’s urban topography. Evaluation of combatant tactics produces a 
typology for categorizing efforts as catastrophic or concentrated denial, and legitimate, illicit, or 
alternative provision of services.   
Reflecting new approaches to the analysis of urban environments and political violence, 
this study aims to build bridges between those who understand cities and those who understand 
conflict. Concluding with recommendations for future research, this study aims to inform 
discussions on order, conflict, and violence, by highlighting how systems of urban infrastructure 
influence complex conflict on a metropolitan battlefield. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
“War is the continuation of politics by other means.”  
Carl von Clausewitz 
 
“All politics is local.”  
Tip O’Neill 
 
Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, challenges to the US-led reconstruction escalated into 
a complex conflict over control of the capital city of Baghdad. The Battle for Baghdad involved 
military combat, mass-casualty terrorism, extreme criminality, and communal strife, as well as 
welfare provision, civic outreach, economic development, and local politics. State and nonstate 
actors used bullets, bombs, and their ability to control the provision and denial of city services to 
residents in their attempts to achieve a range of strategic aims. During this battle, the city provided 
both the location for the conflict and the means to wage it – an arena and an arsenal. This study 
examines how the combatants of the Battle for Baghdad used control over the city’s infrastructural 
systems to weaponize governance in their efforts to challenge the state, fight against rivals, and 
support organizational goals.  
The trajectory of the Battle for Baghdad was shaped by dynamic relationships among its 
belligerents and a complex urban topography of territorial, demographic, and infrastructural 
features. Reflecting new approaches in academic and policymaking studies to the study of urban 
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environments and political violence, this study is positioned to build bridges between those who 
understand cities and those who understand conflict.  
Significant trends are driving new approaches to contemporary conflict, animating the 
search for new paradigms to better understand the shifting realities of contemporary conflict.1 
Episodes in which multiple modes of conflict, including conventional combatants and irregular 
forces as well as terrorism and widespread criminality, have been categorized as hybrid wars2 by 
some and new wars3 by others. Urbanization also factors prominently in discussions on global 
insecurity. Analysts looking at future trends in political instability continue to focus on cities where 
critical infrastructures are unable to meet the demands of citizens.4  
This study presents my effort to improve the understanding of conflicts a) in cities, b) 
involving different types of actors, and c) in which the actors use governance to achieve their aims. 
In this project I sought to make the most meaningful contribution to the conversations happening 
in academic and policymaking communities looking at trends in urbanization, governance, and 
security. I found myself navigating a very busy intersection where all three trends converge – on 
a metropolitan battlefield.     
 
1 David Kilcullen, “New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict,” Small Wars Journal (June 23, 2007).  
2 Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, 
1. 
3 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 3rd Edition. Stanford. 2012, 2.  
4 National Intelligence Council (US), ed. Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2013), 51. 
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1.1 War in cities and cities in war 
What are the conversations at this intersection? Among the many approaches to conflict 
studies, a notable strand involves placing greater attention on its spatial attributes. Recently, there 
has been a call for more research “to investigate the interconnectedness between space, peace, and 
conflict.”5 The major contention underlying this is a shift from considering space as a purely 
material condition to understanding it as a social product.6 Reflecting postmodernist and critical 
approaches across a number of academic fields, a strong critical strand within geography has 
offered reassessments “on the links between space and violence, moving from a classical 
geopolitical understanding towards a multidirectional perspective on space and violent conflict.”7 
Doreen Massey sees spaces not as containers with a fixed, dehistoricized nature but as permeable 
structures contingent upon social relations.8 Space is not simply concrete and material, it is also 
“ideological and subjective.”9 Spatial approaches to peace and conflict studies are also questioning 
 
5 Annika Bjorkdahl and Susanne Buckley-Zistel, “Spatializing Peace and Conflict: An Introduction,” in Spatializing 
Peace and Conflict, ed. Annika Björkdahl and Susanne Buckley-Zistel, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 1. 
6 Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory (Brooklyn, NY: 
Verso, 1989). 
7 Bjorkdahl and Buckley-Zistel, 5.  
8 Doreen B. Massey, World City (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007), 154.  
9 Barney Warf and Santa Arias, The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Routledge: 2009), 3.  
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the value of seeing war and peace as a dichotomy, instead seeking to explore conflict as a 
continuum across an assemblage of social processes.10 
Elements of this broader conceptual shift in spatial analysis are reflected in works that 
focus on urban environments. Michael Batty asserts that nothing less than a new science of cities 
needs to be constructed based:  
on the notion that to understand place, we must understand flows, and to understand flows 
we must understand networks. In turn, networks suggest relationships between people and 
places, and thus the central principles of our new science depend on defining relations 
between the objects that comprise our system of interest…What you see is not what you 
get when it comes to cities. The idea that it is relations—or, rather, networks—between 
places and spaces, not the intrinsic attributes of place and space, that condition our 
understanding, is the first principle that we will use in our new science”11    
 
Batty’s suggestion to investigate the relationships between the various elements of an urban 
environment leads to a related construct for understanding cities. Bill Hillier proposes viewing 
them as complex socio-technical systems that consist of physical and human subsystems.12 
Understanding urban complexity means finding ways to link these technical systems of buildings 
and streets to the social activities involving movement, interaction, and activity. Hillier makes a 
crucial distinction between two basic processes in urban complexity. He contrasts spatial processes 
 
10 Colin Flint, “Intertwined Spaces of Peace and War: The Perpetual Dynamism of Geopolitical Landscapes.” In: 
Kirsch S and Flint C (eds.), Reconstructing Conflict: Integrating War and Post-War Geographies. (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2011), 31–48. 
11 Michael Batty, The New Science of Cities (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), 2. 
12 Bill Hillier, "The City as a Socio-Technical System: A Spatial Reformulation in the light of the Levels Problem and 
the Parallel Problem" in Digital Urban Modeling and Simulation, ed. Stefan Arisona, Gideon Aschwanden, Jan 
Halatsch, and Peter Wonka (Berlin: Springer, 2012), 24-48. 
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from functional processes. A vertical process reflects the emergence of a network of space by 
aggregating buildings to create the physical, or spatial, element of a city. Lateral interactions of 
this pattern with different types of economic and social activity creates the functional attributes of 
a city.13  
Instead of looking at a city as a static environment of structures with a population, this 
perspective highlights the dynamic relationships between the material and functional attributes of 
an urban landscape. It offers a unique and powerful way to influence the broader conversation on 
conflict and governance in cities, along with new ideas shaping other fields.  
One of the most significant characteristics of contemporary conflict is an inversion of the 
traditional model of warfare. Traditional, or Clausewitzian, warfare is a contest between the 
military forces of states who fight to determine the political order providing governance of the 
territory under dispute.14 Contemporary conflicts are inverting this model, making politics an 
embedded component of the contest. In other words, governance serves as a means of 
contemporary conflict, not just its end. Armies are using local politics to win wars.      
In recent decades, trend lines for contemporary conflict put a focus on cities as the most 
likely locations for the emergence of an insurgent challenge to the state instead of the countryside, 
identifying another key inversion in conflict studies.15 Whereas a traditional view of insurgency 
 
13 Hillier, 26. 
14 Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up: Twenty-first Century Combat as Politics (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2018), 4. 
15 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 104.  
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envisions a rebellion born in the hinterlands and culminating in the capture of the nation’s cities, 
our contemporary globalized and urbanized world is more likely to see eruptive challenges to 
political order emerging first from our cities.16  
Intersecting trends in urbanization and political conflict increase the likelihood of conflict 
within cities, and the hybridization of those conflicts to involve terrorism, extreme criminality, 
militia factionalism, and other forms of violence. Urban populations are particularly vulnerable to 
disruptions of public service networks and the institutions that govern them.17 Therefore control 
over governance has major ramifications for conflicts in densely populated areas.  
Thus, we arrive at the formulation of this research project. Traditionally, a battlefield is 
understood as a spatial dimension of conflict, or where it takes place. Yet in cases where factions 
are seeking to attack the authority of a state or control a population, they often seek to disrupt, 
corrupt, or coopt systems of governance. Considering how these systems of governance form a 
part of the environment in which these conflicts take place, they should also be seen as an 
instrumental aspect of conflict. Governance is used like a weapon against rivals. Aiming to 
examine both spatial and instrumental dimensions of complex contemporary urban conflict 
simultaneously, I focused on the Battle for Baghdad. 
In the following sections, I introduce the major concepts that feature in the academic and 
policymaking literature that I am trying to bring together. There are many overlaps in this 
literature, and this section reflects that complexity. I review the literature from disparate fields like 
 
16 Ibid. 
17 Stephen Graham, "When Infrastructures Fail," in Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructure Fails, ed. Stephen Graham 
(New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 1-10.  
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military strategy, conflict studies, and public policy to identify the intersections where they can 
best help us understand episodes of complex conflict on a metropolitan battlefield.     
1.2 Fighting over places and people, in cities   
Traditional studies on urban warfare focus on how an urban landscape influences the ways 
and means that belligerents find and kill their enemies to assert ultimate authority over a city and 
its population. The presence of civilians is generally seen as just another complicating attribute of 
the terrain for belligerents to deal with, instead of producing a fundamentally different kind of 
conflict. This approach to urban warfare has been the dominant mode of thinking for the analysis 
of conflict in cities, particularly among military historians. The traditional paradigm for thinking 
about urban warfare is that cities are places that make it more difficult to command and control 
friendly units, identify and kill enemy forces, and avoid the killing of non-combatants. Fighting in 
a city impacts the types of weapons and vehicles that can be used, creates unique challenges for 
the provisioning and resupplying of forces, and allows a clever enemy many places to hide. 
According to this paradigm, fighting in a city is like fighting anywhere else, just harder.  
New studies on urban warfare aim to reconcile these traditional views with a greater 
understanding of how the governance of a population may play a role in conflicts that feature 
insurgencies and other political conflicts. Works within this field engage with concepts pulled from 
traditional military studies, conflict studies focused on insurgency and other forms of political 
violence, and a growing body of literature on urban infrastructure. To build a conceptual 
framework that involve cities, fighting, and governance, we must review a few studies that deal 
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with only two of these concepts at a time – either cities and fighting or fighting and governance. 
Some of these works reflect a generalized view of conflict, and some are specific about urban 
terrain which is defined by a higher density of people and manmade structures.18  
There are two basic ways to approach urban terrain’s influence in conflict. On one hand, 
urban terrain is a spatial aspect of the conflict. Terrain features function as a set of conditions that 
eases or complicates a belligerent’s attempts to defeat an enemy through the direct application of 
force. In military parlance, this is about “line-of-sight” or the ability to identify, shoot, and kill 
your enemy. Alternatively, terrain is an instrumental aspect of the conflict, providing a set of 
resources that can be used, either as a carrot or a stick, to shape a population to achieve strategic 
aims against your enemy. Gaining an advantage in influencing a population to support your efforts 
and stymie those of your opponent is a method of gaining “leverage” against an enemy on a 
battlefield.  
These viewpoints reflect the most salient differences reflected in important recent debates 
about counterinsurgency as a mission for the US Army (discussed in more detail later). In the 
Army’s counterinsurgency debates, there are two major perspectives about how military force 
should be used. These perspectives animate debates that focus on whether military forces need to 
be more interested in defeating the enemy through line-of-sight dominance or by leverage. In other 
words, to what degree should the Army care about governance? This is one of the major points of 
contention between two major factions concerned with this question, the enemy-centric and 
population-centric camps. Those in the enemy-centric camp prioritize the application of deadly 
 
18 Gian Gentile, et al., Reimagining the Character of Urban Operations for the US Army: How the Past Can Inform 
the Present and Future (Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 2017), 9. 
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force (kinetic operations) against an enemy over concerns about the governance of the population. 
Those in the population-centric camp prioritize support for political, social, and economic 
programs (non-kinetic operations) as the way to secure a more lasting victory. Neither side believes 
that ultimate victory rests on purely kinetic or non-kinetic operations, but when weighed in the 
balance the primary focus should be on one or the other. While debates over counterinsurgency 
(COIN) doctrine found recent relevance due to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, they represent 
underlying issues that have been a part of military operations and conflict studies for a very long 
time. 
A classic work in the field of urban conflict studies is Viollet-le-Duc’s Annals of a Fortress, 
which takes a fictional approach to tracing the evolution of siege craft from ancient times to the 
late-nineteenth century conflicts of the Franco-Prussian War by imagining the history of a single 
fortress changing over time.19 A typical recent example of the genre provides a broad survey of 
military sieges from ancient times to the 1990s conflict in Sarajevo.20 Greater specifics on the 
operational and tactical concerns of modern urban combat are provided by Louis DiMarco in a 
series of case studies from the Second World War to Iraq.21 The common thread connecting these 
 
19 Eugène-Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc, Annals of a Fortress: Twenty-Two Centuries of Siege Warfare (Mineola, NY: 
Dover Publication, Inc., 2012). 
20 Paul K. Davis, Besieged: 100 Great Sieges from Jericho to Sarajevo (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press on 
Demand, 2003). 
21 Louis DiMarco, Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare from Stalingrad to Iraq (London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, 
2012), 15-26. 
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works is that the focus is on how, in the historical examples provided by each case, a military force 
dealt with the challenges of a conflict over an urban terrain with an organized enemy opponent.  
The difficulty fighting in and over cities is commonly described in terms of how military 
performance in key areas was affected (and overcome if victory was achieved). Alec Wahlman’s 
explicitness in his methodology for his case study review of US military performance is useful 
here, as it provides a solid overview to the essential military components of warfare. In each of his 
cases, he reviews how the specific urban environment affected US military performance in a) 
command, control, and communications; b) intelligence and reconnaissance; c) firepower and 
survivability; d) mobility and counter-mobility; e) logistics; and f) dealing with the population.22 
These categories represent a prioritization of the spatial attributes of conflict.   
Following the Second World War, the concept of “dealing with the population” moved up 
in concerns about armed conflict not involving nuclear weaponry. This era of decolonization and 
Cold War proxy conflicts produced several civil wars and insurgencies, leading to a reappraisal of 
the role of a population in warfare. This reappraisal is commonly presented as the classic 
dichotomy that pits the perspective of Mao Zedong, the Chinese revolutionary, against David 
Galula, a French military officer during the Algerian War. While Chairman Mao’s writings23 
argued how a revolutionary insurgency can move from a nation’s hinterlands to challenge the 
governance of its capital cities,24 Galula’s four laws of counterinsurgency proposed how Western 
 
22 Alec Wahlman, Storming the City: US Military Performance in Urban Warfare from World War II to Vietnam 
(Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2015), 9.  
23 Mao, Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, Champaign, Ill: First Illinois Paperback, 2000. 
24 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 16. 
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governments can use military power counter this process. Paraphrased, these laws are stated as 1) 
the aim of the war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory; 2) most 
of the population will be neutral in the conflict, support of the masses can be obtained with the 
help of an active friendly minority; 3) support of the population may be lost, so the population 
must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the opposite 
party; and 4) enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed 
opponents, then gaining support of the population, and eventually strengthening positions by 
building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done 
area by area, using a pacified territory as a basis of operation to conquer a neighboring area.25     
Galula’s ideas on population-centric warfare formed an important part of the COIN debates 
that factor into the conduct of US policy during the Battle for Baghdad, but also speak more 
broadly to how governance is viewed as an important component of contemporary conflict. A 
state’s legitimacy is based, in part, upon its ability to provide certain services to its population. Its 
inability to do so effectively is a major element of impending state failure, as is a turn towards 
coercive and predatory behaviors by a regime towards its population.26 Providing services to a 
population, either in the absence of the state or in competition to the state, is an effective technique 
used by some nonstate actors seeking to de-legitimize the state.27  
 
25 Brett Reeder, "Book Summary of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice by David Galula"  
Crinfo.org, https://www.beyondintractability.org/bksum/galula-counterinsurgency. 
26 Robert H. Bates, "State failure," Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 1-12. 
27 Alexus Grynkevich, "Welfare as Warfare: How Violent Non-State Groups use Social Services to Attack the 
State," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008): 350-370. 
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Insurgent groups may be described as pursuing state-consolidating or state-subverting 
strategies. A group may aim to win a rebellion and achieve its own statehood status, or just carve 
out a territorial space devoid of state interference.28 This distinction forms the basis for debates 
about a supposed difference between old and new civil wars.29 In this debate, an older model of 
ideologically and politically motivated civil wars is giving way to a new era of civil conflicts that 
instead feature greater predatory criminal violence. Taking the argument one step further, David 
Kilcullen argues that these new civil conflicts will largely take place within cities.30  
A proponent of population-centric COIN, Kilcullen was influential in shaping US policy 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, serving as Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to MNF-I leadership in 
Baghdad. Kilcullen has written widely on irregular conflicts, and the need for Western militaries 
to focus more on the challenges of urban environments.31 In Out of the Mountains, Kilcullen 
presents his theory of competitive control to explain outcomes in irregular conflicts. He states that 
the “local armed actor that a given population perceives as best able to establish a predictable, 
consistent, wide-spectrum normative system of control is most likely to dominate that population 
and its residential area.”32  
 
28 Zachariah Cherian Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War, Cornell 
University, 2011.  
29 Stathis Kalyvas, "‘New’ and ‘Old’ Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?," World Politics 54, no. 1 (2001): 99-118.  
30 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 5. 
31 Ibid., 263. 
32 Ibid., 126.  
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Kilcullen lays out how this control is exerted across three major realms: the physical, the 
institutional, and the behavioral. Groups garner legitimate political authority, acquire resources to 
support their operations, maintain dominance over a specific neighborhood, or seek to completely 
destabilize the city and undermine the current regime to secure a stake in any subsequent political 
arrangement. All actions should be seen, in some way, as an effort to express control in that 
environment.  
But what does it mean to create a system of control? To what degree does such a system 
consist of coopting legitimate government institutions versus replacing them with the informal 
impositions of a rebel group? Kilcullen’s formulation challenged me to expand on this concept of 
control and look more closely at how systems may be constructed using components that may be 
formal or informal, licit or illicit, and either coercive or voluntary. What tactics are most effective 
for groups pursuing either state-subverting or state-consolidating strategies? Do we see obvious 
differences, or are there some general similarities in their behaviors?   
In this section I presented a very brief sketch of the main concepts driving this study. 
Academic and policymaking fields looking at political conflict and military operations 
demonstrate a variety of perspectives on episodes that involve urban environments and urban 
populations. Differences among many of these perspectives involve urban governance and the 
debates about how systems of control are produced or disrupted by state and nonstate actors.  
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1.3 Governance and infrastructure, in cities 
What is governance? Like most terms in the social sciences, governance is used in a variety 
of ways by different communities for different purposes. As this study brings together a range of 
different literatures, the definitional problems for using governance and other key terms are 
compounded. This section explores some of the main ways these terms are used in relevant 
literatures and offers some clarification on how I use them in this study. I start with governance 
and relate usages of that term to infrastructure, another term widely used in many contexts. Both 
terms are used to describe overlapping systems of control: of resources, of behaviors, and of the 
delivery of public goods and services. This conceptual and definitional review sets up later 
discussions on the utility of these terms in my analysis. I explain what governance is in order to 
demonstrate how it is weaponized.    
An initial note of clarification seems in order about the adjective urban. Using terms like 
urban infrastructure or urban governance is not meant to imply that I am differentiating those 
concepts from non-urban or rural versions of infrastructures or governance. It is a modifier that 
aims to provide additional description, and not an entirely divergent category. It indicates that 
those services, systems, bureaucracies, and technical resources are located in, or serve the 
population of, a specific city.  
Turning to the usage of the term governance, the primary debate is about whether it 
includes government or not. I favor a usage that does, and encompasses formal, legitimate systems 
of government as well as informal institutions. This position has all the advantages of relying on 
a broadly constructed, very inclusive concept, as well as its drawbacks.    
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According to Francis Fukuyama, governance is a “government’s ability to make and 
enforce rules, and to deliver services,”33 relying upon a model of Weberian bureaucracy as the 
ideal form from which to measure how actual governments may be achieving their aims. Another 
broad rendering of governance defines it as “the means by which to infuse order, thereby to 
mitigate conflict and realize mutual gain.”34 The Institute on Governance provides another 
phrasing: “the process whereby societies or organizations make important decisions, determine 
whom they involve and how they render account.”35  
Why a distinction between governance and government? Eugene McCann notes the 
relative novelty of the term governance, identifying its emergence in the 1980s and 1990s within 
urban studies literatures (and the Urban Studies journal) as a product of the neoliberal 
institutionalization of the Global North, and most evident in a number of trends reflecting new 
relationships between the public sector and a range of non-elected or non-governmental 
organizations.36 He emphasizes a contrast between government by highlighting Erik 
Swyngedouw’s definition of governance as “an arrangement of governing beyond-the-state (but 
often with the explicit inclusion of parts of the state apparatus)… organized as [apparently] 
 
33 Francis Fukuyama, “What is Governance?” (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, Working Paper 
Series 314, 2013), 3. 
34 Oliver E. Williamson, "Transaction Cost Economics." In Handbook of new institutional economics, eds. Claude 
Ménard and Mary M. Shirley (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 41-65.  
35 Institute on Governance, https://iog.ca/what-is-governance/ 
36 Eugene McCann, “Governing Urbanism: Urban Governance Studies 1.0, 2.0 and beyond,” Urban Studies 54, no. 2 
(2017): 313.  
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horizontal associative networks of private (market), civil society (usually non-government 
organizations (NGO) and state actors.”37  
While it may serve the agendas of both critics and proponents of neoliberalism, the term’s 
flexibility to include legitimate state activity as well as other constructions of control provides 
utility in several other fields. Key strands of academic and policy prescriptive work concerning 
contemporary conflict scenarios include discussions about state and nonstate forms of governance, 
and the security implications of failed, fragile, and weak states. Stewart Patrick positions weak 
states as among the most significant challenges to global security.38 Thomas Risse acknowledges 
the extent to which governments may be involved in the de facto governance of their populations 
in fragile and failed state environments39 while Elinor Ostrom provides numerous examples of 
communal governance and situations where rules are enforced and services delivered that exist 
outside of direct state action, and through the agency of both formal and informal institutions.40 
An emergent theme that deserves more attention is metropolitan governance, and the 
degree to which weak cities are at the root of the weak state problem driving global instability. 
 
37 Erik Swyngedouw, "Governance Innovation and the Citizen: The Janus Face of Governance-Beyond-The-
State." Urban Studies 42, no. 11 (2005): 1991-2006. 
38 Stewart Patrick, Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, And International Security (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
39 Thomas Risse, ed., Governance without a State?: Policies and Politics in Areas Of Limited Statehood (New York, 
NY: Columbia University Press,  2011), 9. 
40 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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Notable theorists of state formation like Charles Tilly argued persuasively as to the crucial role 
urban areas served in the consolidation of the state. Concentrations of coercive power and capital 
wealth accrued in cities have been channeled by sovereigns into their state-making projects.41 This 
suggests that those looking at the phenomenon of state failure might be served by a greater focus 
on the role urban governance may be playing in the breakdown of these states. Saskia Sassen 
investigates the ramifications of how globalization trends are producing a new era of urban 
governance likely to challenge the dominance of the nation-state as the primary unit of 
international relations.42  
The study of nonstate governance in urban areas lags its study in other conditions.  
Variations on predatory behavior in the absence of state authority is found in the literature on 
warlordism, with debates about the degree to which these self-interested actors provide public 
goods (mainly security) to local inhabitants.43 Yet another formulation of insurgency characterizes 
several areas of counter-state sovereignty where rebel groups perform extensive service provision 
embedded within the governance system of the de jure state.44 
Arguing that state weakness does not inevitably lead to governance by warlords, Jennifer 
Murtazashvili provides an argument for rethinking relationships between traditional and state 
 
41 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). 
42 Saskia Sassen, “Urban Capabilities: An Essay on our Challenges and Differences,” Journal of International 
Affairs (2012): 85-95. See also Jon Pierre, The politics of urban governance (Macmillan International Higher 
Education, 2011).  
43 Kimberly Marten, "Warlordism in Comparative Perspective," International Security 31, no. 3 (2007): 41-73.  
44 Mampilly, Rebel Rulers. 
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governance, specifically in the case of Afghanistan. 45 Governance may be derived from a variety 
of local arrangements mediated through a range of institutions. While the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan differs in many ways from the case of Iraq, there are many reasons to make 
informative comparisons between the two. Major points that Murtazashvili makes in critique of 
institutional innovation in Afghanistan will be largely echoed in this study on Iraq. Murtazashvili 
effectively questions the necessity, utility, and ultimate viability of the novel institutions brought 
into being through foreign implementation without due regard for preexisting governance 
arrangements in the nation-building exercise undertaken in Afghanistan,46 a theme of inquiry in 
this study focused on Iraq.  
My view on the concept of governance echoes those found above, working in the fields 
that deal primarily with situations in which governments are facing unusual circumstances brought 
on by political violence. Governance starts with government but may encompass other forms of 
authority, brought on by competitors to the state. This is a broad definition, but a few additional 
concepts provide some refinement for its use in this study.  
Steven Globerman and Daniel Shapiro define governance infrastructure as “public 
institutions and policies created by governments as a framework for economic and social 
relations.”47 In their work, they aim to distinguish their use of the term governance infrastructure 
from other concepts such as physical infrastructure and human capital. They offer the conventional 
 
45 Murtazashvili, Jennifer Brick. Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan (Cambridge, 2016), 7.  
46 Ibid., 247.  
47 Steven Globerman and Daniel Shapiro, "Global Foreign Direct Investment Flows: The Role of Governance 
Infrastructure." World Development 30, no. 11 (2002): 1899-1919. 
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perspective of physical infrastructure consisting of investments in the construction and 
maintenance of communications, transportation, and utility networks. Human capital entails “less 
tangible investments in people, mainly in the form of education and health;” however they concede 
that “to the extent that education and health are provided by government or influenced by public 
policy, human capital may be thought of as human infrastructure.”48 Similarly, scholars who make 
distinctions between governance infrastructure and social capital, or the networks and shared 
values that encourage social interaction, may find overlaps because social capital “can involve 
public organizations such as schools or government agencies,” and thus also span across different 
systems of physical infrastructure.49  
Reacting to an “ongoing and expanding convolution of the concepts of democracy and 
governance by academics, international institutions and policymakers,” Ryan G. Baird offers a 
stricter definition of governance infrastructure as “the core domestic institutions that facilitate 
government competency and economic efficiency” in order to rectify a situation in which 
governance “is a somewhat nebulous and very extensive concept, with no agreed-upon definition, 
while also being conceptualized in a mainly ad-hoc manner.”50 
I found the concept of governance infrastructure very compelling but have problems with 
the restrictive definitions presented above. Governance goes beyond institutions. It must include 
material aspects. Governance is conducted at physical installations and provides actual, tangible 
 
48 Ibid., 1901.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Ryan G. Baird, "Unpacking Democracy and Governance: Conceptualizing Governance Infrastructure." Social 
Science Information 51, no. 2 (2012): 263. 
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resources in many cases. Turning to definitional discussions about infrastructure strengthens my 
argument.       
The term infrastructure refers to any underlying framework or foundation of a system. 51 It 
therefore can be used in an extraordinarily vast set of circumstances. The broadness of its use 
across different literatures and in different contexts allows for it to both draw very compelling 
comparisons between apparently diverse phenomena and bedevil instances when sharp distinctions 
are needed. It is a better term for lumpers than for splitters.52 Traditionally, infrastructure systems 
describe large-scale physical resources that provide for public needs. Commonly understood 
infrastructures include systems such as highway networks, communication systems, and electrical 
grids.53 That this definition has redundancies is not lost on those who define the term. In some 
cases, it is clearly seen how infrastructure conveys resources for consumption while in other cases 
the infrastructure itself is considered a resource.54  
A broad categorization scheme of infrastructure types includes transportation systems 
(highways, railways, airports, etc.), communications systems (telephone, internet, postal services, 
etc.), legal systems (courts, police, political bodies, etc.), and basic public services (sewer, water, 
 
51 Brett Frischmann, “Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 3. 
52 Referring to historian Peter Novick’s essential classification of social scientists as those who generally find 
similarity among different things to ‘lump’ them into a few broad categories, versus those who see differences among 
similar things in order to ‘split’ them up [Peter Novick, That Noble Dream, Cambridge (1988).]   
53 Frischmann, 3-4. 
54 Ibid., 4. 
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trash, power, etc.).55 There is no definitive categorization of infrastructure types, and examples 
used across a variety of government and international institutions provide an array of variations. 
For example, the Department of Homeland Security classifies 16 categories of critical 
infrastructure systems.56 The European Union provides a different organizational scheme.57  
These systems are comprised of both material and institutional components. Highway 
networks are made of concrete and asphalt, but also include the bureaucracies that build and repair 
them and enforce the rules of their use. Such traditional infrastructures are quite easily grasped as 
having a physical aspect with an institutional overlay. However, many infrastructure systems are 
largely institutional in nature and have very little presence in physical reality. Understanding how 
all these elements interact demonstrates my view of understanding what governance infrastructure 
means. I use the term to encompass the entirety of a complex set of institutions and installations 
that control resources, behaviors, and services for a population. This is not a static framework, but 
a dynamic set of relationships that constantly evolve as legal, political, bureaucratic, social, 
economic, and technological conditions change. I aim to make distinctions between the tangible, 
physical, constructed elements of a system, versus the rules-based, institutional systems that, 
overlaid upon the physical systems, provide for the delivery of goods and services within a political 
or economic system. This is a more holistic view than other perspectives presented in this study, 
 
55 Ibid. 
56 Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, Critical Infrastructure Sectors. 2020, 
https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors. 
57 Resilens, About CI Resilience, European Union, http://resilens.eu/about-resilience/critical-infrastructures/. 
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but I believe this effort to pull together ideas about the dual nature of governance as having both 
institutional and material components enables it to make a novel contribution.    
Typically, military planners make a distinction between “hard” and “soft” infrastructures, 
with the former referring to the large physical networks or capital assets of a state, and the latter 
referring to those services which are primarily institutional in nature. Military planners commonly 
refer to a package of critical infrastructure systems with the acronym SWET (sewer, water, 
electricity, trash) referring to the key services necessary for a population. In some cases, this 
concept is expanded to SWEAT-MSO to include more systems (sewer, water, electricity, 
academics, trash, medical services, safety, and other considerations).58 The category of electricity 
commonly refers to energy production in its broadest sense. In Iraq, this included a focus on the 
production and distribution of oil and other petroleum products through the nation’s extensive 
infrastructural systems.    
This hard-versus-soft dichotomy is something largely unexplored within these military 
discussions on infrastructure and governance, but something I intend to drill down on within this 
study. I assert that all infrastructures consist of both hard and soft elements, involving both 
installational and institutional components. Understanding the vulnerabilities of these systems to 
nonstate actors seeking to disrupt the governance infrastructure of a city requires a better 
knowledge of the overall degree to which a specific system is reliant upon its installational or 
institutional attributes, and how those installational or institutional networks are structured. 
 
58 John A. Nagl, James F. Amos, Sarah Sewall, and David H. Petraeus, The US Army/Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008), Chapter 1-27.  
   
 
 23 
To understand the US military perspective on infrastructure, we turn to the manual. Joint 
Publication 3-06, the doctrinal manual for US military urban operations, provides this overview 
on how an urban infrastructure may shape a conflict in an urban area, stating that a city’s 
infrastructure: 
 
 …may include a transportation network, utilities, government buildings, hospitals, 
schools, food processing and distribution centers, and communications facilities. The 
infrastructure may be relatively simple, or it may be highly complex and sophisticated. For 
example, transportation infrastructure in one city may be a simple network of streets; in 
another city, it may consist of sophisticated port facilities, rail networks, airports, large 
highways, subways, bus systems, taxis, and other modes of public transportation…59 
 
This brings us back to the intersection of cities, conflict, and governance. When looking 
into questions of how urban infrastructure plays a role in political conflict, there are three main 
fields to consider: public policy studies, urban studies, and conflict studies. The first is the public 
policy realm, primarily interested in the technical aspects of infrastructural systems and their 
relationship to political systems and social life. Beginning in the early 2000s and instigated largely 
by concerns after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, public policy discussions 
surrounding disruptive attacks or natural disasters in major urban areas started to crystallize into a 
literature on critical infrastructures. Identifying vulnerabilities capable of producing mass 
disruption to urban life, these works focus on the interactions of local, state, and federal 
governments to prepare for, mitigate the damage of, and develop resilience to extraordinary 
emergency disruptions. Louise Comfort highlights the confluence of New Orleans’ physical 
environment, its aging infrastructure, and declining economic and social structure in exacerbating 
 
59 Joint Publication 3-06, Joint Urban Operations (JP 3-06), I-2. 
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Hurricane Katrina’s damage to illustrate the need for greater focus on building vital, resilient 
communities that can withstand extreme shock.60 Todd LaPorte focuses on the unpleasant 
possibility of surprise facing our national and local institutions as they react to emergencies, both 
natural and intentional.61 The attention paid to both the regular and irregular threats (natural and 
manmade) to critical infrastructure systems shaped my thinking on both types of vulnerabilities in 
this project.  
The second realm reaches across the fields of critical geography and urban studies. A 
primary focus of authors writing in this vein is to critically examine what Martin Coward states as 
the “reciprocal dynamic of security being urbanized and urbanity being securitized” or the 
urbanization of security.62 Coward posits a conceptual argument that presents the willful 
destruction of buildings by a belligerent as an assault on urbanism, or the heterogeneity and 
diversity that urban life represents.63 In more concrete terms Stephen Graham excoriates what he 
sees as the new urban militarism found amongst the militaries and foreign policy establishments 
of the West, seeing the challenges of urbanization within the cities of the Global South as a new 
colonial frontier from which new threats to the neoliberal world order will emerge.64 Graham states 
 
60 Louise K. Comfort, “Cities at Risk: Hurricane Katrina and the Drowning of New Orleans,” Urban Affairs Review 
41, no. 4 (2006): 501-516.  
61 Todd R. LaPorte, "Critical Infrastructure in the face of a Predatory Future: Preparing for Untoward 
Surprise," Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 15, no.1 (2007): 60-64. 
62 Martin Coward, "Network-centric violence, critical infrastructure and the urbanization of security," Security 
Dialogue 40, no. 4-5 (2009): 399-418. 
63 Martin Coward, Urbicide: The Politics of Urban Destruction, Vol. 66 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 51.  
64 Stephen Graham, Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism (Brooklyn, NY: Verso Books, 2011), 1. 
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that his book Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructure Fails “is motivated by a paradox: studying 
moments when infrastructures cease to work as they normally do is perhaps the most powerful 
way of really penetrating and problematizing those very normalities of flow and circulation to an 
extent where they can be subjected to critical scrutiny.”65  
He asserts that his volume provides the first systematic social scientific study of the 
practicalities, politics, and implications of events where the circuits sustaining flows of energy, 
water, waste, sewerage, transportation, or communications within or between cities break down, 
are deliberately attacked, or become infused with malign infiltrations. 66 Revealing how the politics 
of city life respond to such crises, and how these crises can be manipulated for political ends, 
Graham intends for his book to raise major questions about the challenges of intensifying 
urbanization and an “ever-growing reliance on urban infrastructures to provide for the essentials 
of humanity.”67 The focus on the vulnerabilities of urban populations to the disruptions of critical 
infrastructures paralleled my concerns about understanding the challenges faced during a post-
conflict crisis like Iraq; however, Graham’s work and others within this field yielded little insight 
into formulating practical remedies for the situations described.     
The third realm includes conflict studies and those within or intending to reach a more 
mainstream policymaking community audience with insights into understanding urban 
environments for managing contemporary conflicts. Paul Staniland addresses a need for theorists 
to start reevaluating assumptions about urban insurgency, seeing different ways that social 
 
65 Stephen Graham, "When Infrastructures Fail," 1.  
66 Stephen Graham, Disrupted Cities, 3. 
67 Ibid., 3. 
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mobilization takes place in cities that previous civil conflict theories would discount.68 Alice Hills 
cogently explains the many reasons Western militaries are ill-prepared to cope with a future 
involving more instances of urban conflict: 
the characteristics and tactical constraints or urban operations have remained remarkably 
consistent over the past 60 years. They emphasize that cities have a critical effect on the 
military activities taking place within them, influencing the conduct of operations to a 
greater extent than any other type of terrain…As a result, cities represent the most complex 
and challenging environment in which military actions occur.69  
 
What the West lacks, according to Hills, is a strategic logic for dealing with urban warfare. 
Instead, it treats various instances of urban warfare as a series of purely tactical challenges. Hills 
notes that even though the Desert Storm campaign of 1991 brought coalition forces to within 60 
miles of Baghdad, the 1990s did not see “sustained or systematic attention to the military-strategic 
implications of cities.”70 However, Hills provides effective case analyses of the three major 
contingencies faced by Western (and Russian) militaries in cities during the 1990s: policing, 
enforcement, and warfighting. From the relatively low-intensity policing of Kosovo to the 
enforcement of peacekeeping arrangements in Bosnia to the full-scale urban warfare on the streets 
of Grozny, the 1990s should have impressed upon policymakers the importance of treating urban 
conflict as a clear and present danger for future operations. Notably, in some corners the multi-
faceted nature of urban conflict took hold. Based on a comment made in a 1997 speech by USMC 
 
68 Paul Staniland, “Cities on Fire: Social Mobilization, State Policy, and Urban Insurgency,” Comparative Political 
Studies 43, no. 12 (2010): 1624. 
69 Alice Hills, Future War in Cities: Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma (London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), 243. 
70 Ibid., 244. 
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Commandant General Krulak the phrase “three block war” took on a life of its own for how the 
Marines saw themselves preparing for future warfare:  
In one moment of time, [USMC] members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees 
– providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring 
tribes apart – conducting peacekeeping operations. Finally, they will be fighting a highly 
lethal mid-intensity battle. All on the same day, all within three city blocks. It will be what 
we call the three-block war.71  
 
The need for contemporary warfighters to possess an understanding of the flexibility 
required to operate in different modes for different missions strongly influenced a newer 
generation of military leaders like General David H. Petraeus. Tasked with writing a new 
counterinsurgency manual for the Army, Petraeus incorporated much of this thinking into the new 
FM 3-24. Influencing this manual is Krulak’s concept of the strategic corporal, encompassing the 
idea that relatively low-level non-commissioned officers and soldiers would find themselves in 
crucial situations where their tactical interactions with locals on a contemporary battlefield may 
reverberate with strategic implications.72 
The RAND Corporation has issued many reports focused on urban operations, often using 
historical or more recent case studies to pull out relevant lessons to inform a policymaking 
audience on the growing importance of urban operations in foreign policy. Russell Glenn and Gina 
Kingston, working on the challenges of modern urban operations, note the gaps between military 
doctrine and the reality of recent complex operations in which a commander might cope with both 
 
71 Charles C. Krulak, The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War (Leavenworth KS: Center for Army 
Lessons Learned Fort Virtual Research Library, 1999), 18-22.  
72 Ibid.  
   
 
 28 
a hostile, thinking enemy and a natural or societal calamity concurrently.73 Most military-centric 
writings on urban conflict are, naturally, focused on a relatively narrow set of conditions that 
influence normal military operations. These include the difficulty of telling friend from foe, 
communicating with subordinates, and using violence to achieve ends – all constrained by the 
density of urban terrain.74 While most RAND authors refer to these issues as mere challenges, 
Hills sees a fundamental paradox facing Western militaries: that war, or the use or threat of lethal 
destruction to achieve a political aim, often undermines the very values that Western interventions 
are intended to promote.75  
Joint Publication 3-06 presents the concept of the urban triad, defining urban areas as 
having three major characteristics: a complex man-made physical terrain superimposed upon a 
natural terrain, a population of significant size and density, and an infrastructure upon which the 
area depends.76 It illustrates the many ways these three elements – terrain, people, and 
infrastructure – shape military operations in an urban area, from warfare to peacekeeping to post-
conflict reconstruction.  
Building on Kilcullen’s research, analysts looking to provide a comprehensive mapping of 
the urban operational environment expanded on the concept of the urban triad to identify the 
networked nodes (institutions and structures) through which crucial flows (people, products, 
 
73 Russell W. Glenn and Gina Kingston, Urban Battle Command in the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 
Corporation, 2005), 14.  
74 Ibid., 23. 
75 Hills, Future War, 245. 
76 JP 3-06, I-2.  
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resources, etc.) serve a city.77 This approach uses the urban triad concept to demonstrate how 
understanding threats and vulnerabilities within an urban environment must include a 
consideration of a city’s natural geographical features and built environment of structures, its array 
of institutions that govern resources and behaviors in formal and informal ways, and the 
demographic qualities of its population. It follows recent trends that engage with the concept of 
urban topography as a systemic environment, and not merely one of spatial qualities.78 A city 
consists of physical, institutional, and demographic attributes that must be approached in an 
organized method to make threats to its governance intelligible.  
Along these lines, an important strand of military thinking has emerged around the concept 
of “megacities” (population greater than 10 million) as a key theater of conflict for future 
operations. Whether or not forces of the US Army should prepare for conflict brought on by 
instability within the rapidly growing and densely populated cities of the Global South is the source 
of a major ongoing debate with the policymaking community, with proponents and opponents 
arguing vociferously in many professional journals over the past few years. Proponents of better 
preparedness for and understanding of these potential flashpoints of conflict have led the way in 
encouraging a serious look at the complexity of urban environments.79     
 
77 Mark Lodemico and Elizabeth M. Bartels, “City as a System Analytical Framework: A Structured Analytical 
Approach to Understanding and Acting in Urban Environments,” Small Wars Journal (2015). 
78 Ibid. 
79 Phil Williams and Werner Selle, Military Contingencies in Megacities and Sub-megacities (Strategic Studies 
Institute and U.S. Army War College Press: December 2016).  
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Each of the above fields has its strengths, weaknesses, and blind spots. Public policy 
literature often highlights the problem-solving aspects of harnessing political aims for societal 
benefit through comparative cases of successes and failures across polities, yet generally steers 
clear of how and why malign actors exacerbate these problems. Critical urban studies tend to fixate 
on the ideological implications of the misuse of power and authority, rather than discuss any 
pragmatic or productive applications of power or authority. Political science conflict literature 
often lacks an understanding of the technical aspects of urban life. Military studies have been 
constrained by thinking that posits, in its most simplistic rendering, that fighting in a city is like 
fighting elsewhere, just harder. In the next section I will tease out what I see as the fundamental 
debate underlying these viewpoints, review ways key works have started to reconcile the gaps I 
have identified, and how this study aims to build bridges between various communities.  
In conducting this study, I aimed to follow Kilcullen and Simpson’s examples of bridging 
the gap between practitioners in the field and the broader academic community. For both, personal 
experience in conflict situations yielded deep insights for ongoing discussions about contemporary 
warfare. This study starts with direct observations made while I was conducting military and 
diplomatic missions serving US counterinsurgency aims in Baghdad.80  
 
80 My first tour in Iraq (2005-2006) was as an Army officer assigned to the civil affairs unit that formed the basis for 
the Baghdad Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). I was directly involved in the PRT’s initial establishment and 
development as the interagency unit tasked to unify Army, State Department, and USAID efforts in Baghdad. In 2007, 
I returned as a State Department political officer and served until mid-2008 in leadership positions within the PRT, 
responsible for coordinating diplomatic and development efforts between Coalition forces, the US Embassy, and 
Baghdad’s political leadership across national, provincial, municipal, and local institutions. 
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Over a period of months in 2007 and 2008, I participated in Operation Clean Delivery, a 
joint US- Government of Iraq (GoI) effort to ensure the effective operation of one Iraqi government 
service: the delivery of one product, kerosene, to one neighborhood, Karkh, without the 
interruptions of terrorists, the interventions of militias, or the interference by corrupt officials.  
The campaign coordinated Coalition efforts with Iraqi officials within national, provincial, 
and local levels of government to successfully deliver a shipment of kerosene cooking oil to a 
Baghdad neighborhood where residents could purchase this commodity at the stated government 
price. While seemingly simple, this hard-won success was the result of an arduous mapping out of 
all the potential vulnerabilities to this one service and executing a range of strategies to mitigate 
its many threats. Among these threats were terrorist attack on the convoy, militia cooption of the 
product by coercion of local officials, and the weaknesses of a bureaucracy facing incredible 
resourcing hardships.    
During the many sessions between US and GoI officials that led to this operation, a fellow 
State Department official confided to me his insight about the ongoing fight for Baghdad. He 
proposed that much of this conflict could be seen as an effort to control “stuff.” He expounded that 
terrorists “blow up stuff” so nobody could have it, and militias “steal stuff” so only a few could 
have it. Within this simplistic rendering of the chaos and violence engulfing Baghdad at the time 
resides the basic idea that animates this dissertation. Clearly, these factions were using governance 
– the ability to provide and deny goods and services – as a weapon in this conflict, but they were 
doing it in very different ways.  
My personal experience notwithstanding, the importance of the Iraq War in shaping 
academic and policymaking debates cannot be understated. Reacting to this event, many analysts 
have grappled with the complex issues faced in Iraq after 2003. The then-ongoing war in Iraq 
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looms over the edited volume in which Kalyvas, Shapiro, and Masoud direct students of politics 
to think critically about the relationship between conflict and order, and how “violence is employed 
by those who wish to upend an existing order and by those who want to sustain it.”81 Noting that 
scholars of order, conflict, and violence “rarely speak to each other,” the editors explained their 
efforts to bring together contributions from a range of perspectives and diverse methodologies as 
a corrective to this scholarly fragmentation.82 Taking inspiration from the diversity in perspective 
and content presented by this volume I embraced a somewhat esoteric approach in my own 
research, working on both the theoretical and pragmatic components that would enable me to 
grapple with the ways that order, conflict, violence, and urban topography combine to produce and 
alleviate instability.     
I admit here at the outset that my enthusiasm for ideas has sometimes outpaced my 
capability to harness them. This study represents a flag planted more than a territory conquered. 
As I proceed to articulate the boundaries and content of this project, I aim to be upfront in 
acknowledging that a few concepts I propose could not be effectively operationalized using the 
data I had at my disposal. There is a lot to say about how the effort to stabilize Baghdad should 
inform our understanding of contemporary complex conflict, but several restrictions currently 
prevent a more effective appraisal. As with any recent event, time will enable a more thorough 
reflection at some point. I am hoping that this early effort suggests a useful roadmap for future 
exploration.     
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This introductory chapter continues with the fundamental problems and research questions 
that propel this inquiry and lays out the agenda for the rest of the dissertation. To review, I intend 
to use the Battle for Baghdad to demonstrate an analysis of the interactions between an urban 
environment and a conflict between belligerents. Following the initial invasion of 2003, a period 
of uncertainty gave way to the emergence of a complex insurgency that saw multiple armed 
factions seeking to determine the direction of Iraq’s future.   
The Battle for Baghdad emerged as these factions pursued efforts to extract organizational 
resources from the population, fight against rivals, and challenge the new government’s authority 
as Iraq transitioned from occupational, to transitional, to full sovereignty. In this study I 
demonstrate how Baghdad’s governance infrastructure was disrupted, producing vulnerabilities 
that were exploited by state and nonstate actors for strategic aims.  
1.4 The Battle for Baghdad and the Surge debates  
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 commenced on March 19 with an airstrike campaign intending 
to decapitate the leadership of Saddam Hussein’s regime. While the term “shock and awe” 
generally accompanies any description of this initial wave of the Iraq War, in execution these 
initial phase attacks did not approach the degree of extensive demoralizing devastation of 
infrastructure systems envisioned by the original coiners of the term, Pentagon strategists Harlan 
K. Ullman and James P. Wade.83 In March 2003, the US intent was regime decapitation, targeting 
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high-ranking Ba’athist leaders but not seeking to cripple major infrastructure serving Baghdad, 
particularly oil fields.84 An intense barrage of cruise missile and piloted aircraft bombings proved 
American technological prowess in reconnaissance, communications, and precision weaponry, yet 
not a single one of the top 200 Iraqi regime leaders was killed by an airstrike.85 A ground invasion 
followed, and by April 10 Baghdad was in the hands of an occupying force. On May 1, President 
George W. Bush made his (in)famous “Mission Accomplished” declaration that major military 
operations in Iraq were over.      
A period of small-scale skirmishes with fedayeen forces loyal to the Saddam regime 
evolved into more significant conflict into 2004 as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
made plans to enable a transition back to sovereignty for a new Iraqi state. Local groups upset at, 
or taking advantage of, the breakdown of law and order emerged in both Shia and Sunni 
communities, challenging the legitimacy of the US occupation and the legitimacy of the 
transitional Iraqi government.      
Efforts to rebuild Iraq and form a new sovereign Iraqi government began to unravel as 
lawlessness in the aftermath of the invasion opened the door to the emergence of a complex 
insurgency with numerous militant groups attacking US forces, each other, and elements of the 
new Iraqi government. Any sense of optimism over the relatively successful election cycle of 2005 
vanished in early 2006 when the al-Askari mosque in Samarra, revered by the Shia community, 
was bombed by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), igniting sectarian warfare across the neighborhoods of 
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Baghdad. A wave of mass-casualty terrorist attacks perpetrated by AQI and predatory militia 
extremism under Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) pushed the nation towards civil war, forcing the US to 
consider either abandoning Iraq or shifting its strategic aims from immediate handover to a more 
robust and holistic counterinsurgency effort. The Battle for Baghdad began in earnest during this 
crucial time and accelerated with the Bush Administration’s decision to launch the New Way 
Forward (the Surge). The Surge supported the Baghdad Security Plan, or Operation Fardh al-
Qanoon, Arabic for “enforcing the law,” reflecting the joint MNF-I and Iraqi objective to secure 
Baghdad.  
The Surge brought in more forces to secure Baghdad in 2007 while headway was made 
with tribal leaders to turn the tide against the al-Qaeda insurgency in Sunni regions of Anbar 
province and many of Baghdad’s outlying rural areas. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s regime 
proved willing to take on JAM and militant extremism. A combination of factors led to a dramatic 
reduction in violence.  Yet significant sectarian problems remained unsolved in Iraqi society and 
politics. Political and military fatigue from the conflict and the veneer of stability in Baghdad drove 
the US to pursue a course leading to a significant withdrawal after 2009. 
As this brief overview of the war in Iraq illustrates, this conflict encompassed a wide range 
of conflict types. Academic and policymaking literature concerned with the Iraq War can be 
broadly categorized into the three major paradigms that delineate the most important strands of 
conflict studies, identified by combatant relationships: state versus state (war), state versus 
nonstate (e.g., rebellion, civil war, insurgency, terrorism, etc.), or complex substate conflict (e.g., 
weak state environments, militant factionalism, illicit power structures, extreme criminality, 
hybrid warfare, etc.). The most contentious debates in Iraq War literature involve the efforts to 
secure Baghdad.    
   
 
 36 
Baghdad is “the center of gravity for the country. Everybody knows that…” said General 
George Casey in 2006, when he was the commanding general in Iraq.86 Between 2003 and 2006, 
US troop levels deployed to Iraq hovered around 140,000. With the onset of the Surge strategy in 
2007, an additional five combat brigades, roughly 20,000 troops, were sent to Iraq, the majority 
going to secure Baghdad. US troop commitment hit a peak of over 166,000 by late 2007.87  
The importance of Baghdad as the nation’s largest metropolitan area and political and 
cultural capital cannot be overstated. The duration and intensity of the Iraq War produced seismic 
shifts in the region and in US politics. It will likely remain prominent in policy discussions 
regarding US military, diplomatic, and development debates for the near future, as well as 
academic study on insurgencies, post-conflict societies, terrorism, and the humanitarian impact of 
war and civil conflict. The selection of Baghdad as the focus for this dissertation stems from its 
outsize importance in revealing crucial insights to a conflict involving conventional combatants, 
irregular forces, terrorist cells, and intense criminality, producing the environment seen by many 
as the epitome of contemporary complex conflicts.88   
Every serious analysis of the Iraq War, from a policymaking or academic perspective, 
needs to address the dramatic changes in the level of violence in Baghdad and attempt to account 
for the significant rise and fall in lethality over its trajectory. The periodic violence from 2003 into 
2005 shifted into a major crisis in early 2006, following the bombing of the al-Askari mosque in 
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Samarra, an historic town to the north of Baghdad. This brazen attack by al-Qaeda operatives on 
a site revered by the Shia community unleashed a Sunni versus Shia communal conflict that 
quickly engulfed Baghdad. Upsetting the plans of a Bush Administration hoping to disengage from 
its occupational responsibilities as a new Iraqi regime was forming, this massive uptick in violence 
led Bush to recommit to security in Baghdad and launch the Surge. This marks the beginning of 
the Battle for Baghdad. 
In short, the Surge won the Battle for Baghdad. The enormous increase in sectarian 
violence hit a peak and then the general level of violence decreased to its earlier lower levels.89 
The standard interpretation of events attributes the arrest and decline of violence to the addition of 
US troops into Baghdad and a shift in strategy under General Petraeus towards population-centric 
counterinsurgency. Coalition forces focused on securing the population and supporting the 
rebuilding of governance institutions as major military objectives. But is this the most convincing 
interpretation?   
The Surge and its impact on violence in Baghdad during 2007-2008 are central to the 
research assessing the effectiveness of COIN strategy in Iraq.90 The widespread violence that 
erupted across Baghdad in early 2006 appeared to bring the nation close to all-out civil war and 
complete anarchy. The factors most commonly attributed to preventing this chaos are what are 
 
89 Michael E. O’Hanlon and Ian Livingston, “Iraq Index, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-
Saddam Iraq,” Brookings Institute, August 30, 2011, 3. 
90 Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob Shapiro, “Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 
2007?” International Security, V37, No.1 (Summer 2012), 38. 
   
 
 38 
generally referred to as the “new orthodoxy” narrative of the Surge.91 These factors include the 
addition of troops to Baghdad, the adoption of COIN strategy, and the leadership of General David 
Petraeus. This view represents the commonly accepted explanation for why Iraq got turned around 
by 2008.  
However, ongoing research continues to challenge or refine this orthodox narrative of the 
Surge. Alternatives are presented by researchers looking at one or more of the major variables 
identified above: either troops, strategy, or leadership. Other researchers look beyond US policy 
to highlight alternative factors.92  
The location and disposition of troops is one factor commonly assessed, and among the 
simplest to measure. Joshua Thiel demonstrates an absence of strong connection between US troop 
increases and security improvements in a geospatial and statistical study. This leaves room, Thiel 
argues, for “other variables” to prove more crucial in explaining the Surge. 93  
This gets to the heart of the debate over COIN, between its enemy-centric and population-
centric advocates. The enemy-centric approach puts a high value on a focus on troop levels and 
the more traditional elements of combat outcomes over insurgent forces and terrorist cells. If the 
population-centric COIN strategy was the more important variable leading to the success of the 
surge, what evidence should we look at? One measure is the amount of money spent on 
 
91 Douglas A. Ollivant, “Countering the New Orthodoxy Reinterpreting Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” New America 
Foundation, June 2011, 1.  
92 Bernard Stancati, “Tribal Dynamics and the Iraq Surge,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 4, no. 2 (Summer 2010), 89. 
93 Joshua Thiel, “The Statistical Irrelevance of American SIGACT Data: Iraq Surge Analysis Reveals Reality,” Small 
Wars Journal, April 2011.  
   
 
 39 
reconstruction projects, providing insight into the overall value of service provision as an element 
of COIN strategy. US reconstruction spending in Iraq between 2003 and 2007 exceeded $30 
billion, ranging from massive capital-intensive infrastructure projects to short-term labor projects. 
Of particular attention to surge researchers is the $2.9 billion spent by US Army and Marines units 
as Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. The CERP program empowered 
local unit commanders to initiate small-scale reconstruction projects in the zones under their 
authority. Focusing on the effect of labor intensive CERP projects on insurgent violence, Iyengar, 
Monten, and Hanson find that a greater fraction of spending dedicated to work projects (with 
meaningful local Iraqi employment) is associated with a slight decrease in violence.94 Asking “Can 
Hearts and Minds Be Bought?” Berman, Shapiro and Felter model a three-way contest among 
rebels, the government, and civilians and assert that “improved service provision reduces insurgent 
violence.”95 
Other research stresses the normative aspects of service provision improvements that can 
cement a local population’s support for either a counterinsurgent force, or their insurgent rival. 
Comparing the activities of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Sadrist Movement, Erik A. Claessen notes 
the powerful combination of Islamic belief structures based on zakat and jihad produced support 
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for these groups in their efforts to challenge state authority.96 Zakat refers to the pillar of the Islamic 
faith that sees donating wealth to the less fortunate as an act of purification and Muslim piety and 
justifies gifts to those engaged in jihad as being worthy of this assistance. Identifying the above 
groups as zakat-jihadist activist insurgencies (ZJAIs), Claessen assesses their effectiveness in 
shaping public perception and gaining support within local communities. Among the best 
strategies used by these groups were media campaigns stressing their purity and others’ corruption, 
surreptitiously blocking others’ attempts to provide relief, or taking credit for it when they do.97 
Debates over the Surge, and to what degree the role of service provision to the population 
should be a component of effective counterinsurgency strategy are likely to continue for some 
time. Arguments seeing no direct correlation between availability of essential services and 
violence98 continue to be countered by others stressing the absolute necessity for support for the 
population-centric reconstruction programs employed in Iraq.99 Others argue that viewpoints that 
focus primarily on US policy, whether enemy- or population-centric, are inadequate when 
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significant shifts in the conflict can be seen to have arisen despite, or independently of, American 
actions.100  
In this dissertation I do not intend to take a side on these Surge debates and merely, as 
Staniland would say, put a chalk mark in a “win, loss, or draw” column for this conflict.101 
However, my focus on governance as part of the conflict, and the ripple effects that the intense 
military and political clashes produced in the complex infrastructures of the city, enables me to 
make an argument that is not often voiced in these Surge debates. The Battle of Baghdad turned 
when the bureaucrats went back to work. The combination of security improvements and focus on 
governance effectiveness brought on by Fardh al-Qanoon operations provided space for 
Baghdad’s bureaucracies to stabilize and improve their performance in delivering services.   
Following the 2003 invasion, Baghdad’s bureaucrats faced enormous challenges. Regime 
change and de-Baathification induced a purge of many qualified civil servants. Iraq’s newly 
empowered political parties then sought to carve out their domains in the government with more 
focus on partisan loyalty than technical capability. Competent bureaucrats either kowtowed to 
these new parties, or faced elimination, by firing or other means.  
The shift in US policy that accompanied the Surge provided a boost of confidence to 
Baghdad’s mid-level and largely apolitical civil servants that they could get back to the unheralded 
and often mundane work of running the city. Specific projects aimed at facilitating Iraqi 
intergovernmental coordination, backed up by US military protection and supported by US 
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diplomatic and development efforts, gave Iraqi bureaucrats a degree of cover to go about the 
business of providing services to the residents of Baghdad in an environment of intense partisan 
rivalry and political uncertainty.   
This is the area where the specificity of this case study and its wider applicability is most 
pronounced. Examining the Battle for Baghdad, I aim to pinpoint crucial moments of inflection 
when the dynamic relationships between combatants and environment shaped its trajectory. In 
doing so, I aim to present a broader argument about the need to better understand the vulnerabilities 
inherent in complex infrastructure systems and how these vulnerabilities shape the behaviors of 
belligerents aiming to control a city and its population.   
1.5 Problems in contemporary conflict studies  
A recent work by Paul Staniland102 expresses the major problems motivating this study. 
His study is focused on examining situations where governance serves as a major point of 
contention between state and nonstate actors, but not in the manner of a traditional civil conflict. 
His perspective falls in with many others in academic and policymaking fields aiming to speak to 
the complexity of contemporary conflict, where recent episodes of conflict are not fitting into 
traditional categories. Staniland looks at the “diverse interactions between states and insurgents 
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that construct political authority and control”103 and broaden how civil conflict is studied and 
understood by “aggressively engaging” with other academic and policymaking subfields.104 
Staniland builds a typology of what he refers to as wartime political orders. These orders 
emerge as patterns of cooperation between states and insurgents over different distributions of 
territorial control by these groups. His study, like many others in the field, is primarily focused on 
the relationships between state and nonstate actors operating within a specific arena of conflict. 
His key insight is that civil conflict is not just a matter of a state at war with an insurgency but that 
there is an array of potential arrangements between belligerents, from competition to collusion to 
tacit coexistence. What Staniland’s analysis does not quite capture is a scenario like the Battle for 
Baghdad. What if the nonstate actor is also part of the state? Or, what if there is more than one 
competing nonstate actor?  
The first of these conundrums has been addressed within the policymaking community in 
a variety of ways. Michael Dziedzic is a proponent of using a model that identifies violent nonstate 
actor groups operating between licit and illicit governance as criminalized power structures (CPS) 
to explore problems in post-conflict scenarios and peacekeeping missions.105 The CPS model 
builds on studies concerned with spoiler problems that permeate in post-conflict scenarios.106 
However, there remains a number of challenges is capturing the full reality of a conflict zone where 
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nonstate actors play a significant role in legitimate state activity. The Battle for Baghdad is a 
scenario that does not conform to prevailing methodologies regarding the analysis of conflict 
involving one static, dyadic relationship between one state actor and one nonstate actor. 
The second problem is deeper and less readily solvable, but greatly informs the shape and 
scope of this project. Recent works such as those of Staniland and Enrique Desmond Arias107 
highlight the fluidity of relationships between factions in conflict zones. It is encouraging to see 
these actor-centric approaches to political conflict embrace the complexity of relationships ranging 
from collusion to conflict. However, these actor-centric approaches often leave out a crucial 
component: how the battlefield influences the battle. This creates another blind spot in mainstream 
political science conflict literature. Does a fixation on the relationships between actors leave out 
the influence of environments?   
In military studies, as well as the study of insurgency and terrorism, there are many 
reflections on the importance that geographical conditions have on the shaping of a conflict. The 
role of mountains in civil conflict has been explored,108 and the preponderance of terrorism in 
urban versus rural areas is well known.109 The field of geopolitics, premised largely on the idea 
that geography is a crucial driver of war and peace in world history, displays a predilection for 
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macro-scale issues and great-power politics instead of constrained arenas of conflict such as 
cities.110   
Lately, the most robust literature linking space and conflict in urban areas is seen in two 
fields. Critical studies offering postmodernist perspectives on issues of globalization, neo-
colonialism, and the securitization of problems facing societies of the Global South take trends in 
global urbanization seriously and question existing paradigms in political conflict. On the other 
hand, works for or about US military-doctrinal approaches to a new era of urban conflict also 
engage willingly with innovative approaches to how cities shape modern warfare.  
Yet both fields could be improved by an infusion of practical knowledge from public policy 
studies that deal more thoroughly with the day-to-day bureaucratic and technical issues involved 
with how cities actually operate. Recent US military manuals on counterinsurgency and urban 
operations discuss the need to unify military action with the delivery of good governance but could 
be improved with more understanding of critical infrastructure management.111  
Thus, the problems that motivate this study are that mainstream actor-centric paradigms of 
political conflict a) are not well suited to situations where nonstate actors are significant 
participants in the state,  and b)  avoid significant investigations of the places in which they take 
place. Furthermore, studies that do focus on urban spaces c) highlight critical, and/or macro-
political issues to the detriment of other concerns, or d) display an enthusiasm for engaging in 
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innovative approaches to a new era of cosmopolitan conflict, but often lose sight of some of the 
more mundane details of public services management necessary to understand the vulnerabilities 
facing governance in urban areas.    
1.6 Central research questions and policymaking concerns 
This study addresses each of these problems. First, in the chaotic post-conflict situation of 
Iraq, the boundaries between state and nonstate actors were fluid and permeable. Exploring the 
development of the factions most responsible for Iraq’s trajectory illuminates this liminality. 
Secondly, this study highlights how conflict is shaped by its environment. An assumption of binary 
relationships in dyadic conflicts is insufficient to explain outcomes in contemporary conflict. State-
versus-insurgent needs to give way to an entire spectrum of potential relationships. Secondly, 
understanding environmental conditions means moving beyond traditional geographical concepts 
and exploring a richer, more complex view of the potential structural factors that influence actor 
behaviors. Therefore, the relationships most pertinent to this study are not between actors in dyads 
but among actors and their environments. Lastly, there has to be a focus on the full complexity of 
an urban environment that encompasses a complete range of attributes including administrative 
law, political institutions, bureaucracies, technical installations, and delivery points for basic 
services.   
Thus, this study asks how one develops a new methodology for an old problem: 
understanding how environmental conditions influence the behaviors of actors seeking strategic 
goals. Can recent shifts in thinking about cities as systems provide new ways to understand urban 
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areas as arenas of conflict? Can a deeper knowledge of the governance institutions and technical 
infrastructure that operate across a city enable a better comprehension of how competing entities 
and factions seeking to influence its population choose their strategies and tactics? I propose that 
an examination of urban topography, from its most tangible physical attributes to its fully abstract 
and institutional aspects, will demonstrate the viability of this pursuit. Moving from the abstract 
to the specific, I also aim to provide an alternative analysis of the Battle for Baghdad that highlights 
the role of governance in the conflict. 
While I have framed this dissertation in terms of the problems and research questions found 
in the academic literature dealing with this topic, it is also fundamentally shaped by quite pragmatic 
concerns related to the on-the-ground experiences of those tasked with implementing policy in 
post-conflict Iraq, and how those policy decisions affected the day-to-day life of Baghdad’s 
citizens. Parallel to the academically directed research questions posed above, I seek solutions for 
the real-world conundrums that bedevil communities in the throes of violence and political 
upheaval. Why does some stuff get blown up and other stuff stolen? What are the vulnerabilities 
in the institutions and infrastructures that serve the governance of a population, and what are best 
ways to prevent the exploitation of those vulnerabilities by malign actors?    
The above academic and policymaking concerns that drive this study coalesce into two 
concrete research questions: 
1) What factors produce vulnerabilities in governance systems during complex conflict?  
2) How are these vulnerabilities exploited by actors pursuing different strategies?  
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1.7 Dissertation overview   
In the chapter above, I presented the major ideas driving this research project. New 
approaches to the understanding of urban environments are likely to improve our understanding 
of complex conflicts. These conflicts feature an array of different actors using their ability to 
provide or deny services to a population to pursue a range of strategic ends. The Battle for Baghdad 
provides an important test case for a theory-building exercise intending to improve our 
understanding of that conflict as well as make broader statements about trends in contemporary 
conflict scenarios likely to emerge in the near future.  
Chapter 2 starts with an in-depth introduction to the Battle for Baghdad as the case under 
study and provides the approach, methods, and theoretical perspective for an analysis of this case. 
Major military operations to invade and occupy Iraq commenced in March 2003 and concluded 
within a few weeks. However, the Iraq War continued to progress through several phases as 
combatants asserted themselves and reacted to their rivals. I first present an actor-centric view of 
the conflict and analyze how these groups, often labeled differently as interventionist, terrorist, 
and militia groups, can be situated within a traditional paradigm of insurgency. I then turn from an 
actor-centric perspective on the Battle for Baghdad to focus on its environmental characteristics. 
I demonstrate how analysis of crucial terrain features, demographic characteristics, and 
infrastructural systems enables a better understanding of the complex and dynamic battlefield upon 
which this conflict took place. I also present the argument for why governance lies at the center of 
complex conflicts such as the Battle for Baghdad. The third and final part of this chapter articulates 
the components of my methodology. 
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Chapter 3 is the first of the within-case studies, presenting the Coalition’s efforts to 
implement a radical reconstruction of the state of Iraq. These fundamental changes to the 
governance infrastructure of the state rippled out to impact the delivery of public goods and 
services at the local level to the residents of Baghdad. I demonstrate how major legal and political 
changes in the state of Iraq influenced the day-to-day operations of the most critical component of 
Baghdad’s governance infrastructure, the Amanat Baghdad, the institution mandated to provide a 
range of basic services to the residents of Iraq’s capital city and surrounding region.  
Chapters 4 and 5 provide evaluations of the other major nonstate belligerents of the Battle 
for Baghdad, AQI and JAM. Both chapters review how these groups exploited infrastructural 
elements of Baghdad’s governance to challenge the state, fight against rivals, and predate upon 
local communities. Each challenged the authority of the US occupation and Iraqi state apparatus 
through military action and major terrorist attacks or engaged in efforts to join and shape the 
legitimate political process. Each group also engaged in sectarian warfare and inter-factional 
rivalry to assert power across Baghdad. The tactical actions of each of these groups are categorized 
according to a typology that enables a better understanding of how governance is weaponized by 
different types of insurgencies.  
Chapter 6 provides a conclusion connecting the dots between the various elements 
presented in this study. The within-case studies of the three major factions enables a deeper 
understanding of how each of these actors interacted with each other and a complex urban 
topography to produce the trajectory of the Battle for Baghdad. In this conclusion I evaluate how 
the framework and methodology of this study enables a comprehensive evaluation of complex 
conflict in an urban area, providing a way to assess how the overarching strategies of the three 
major belligerents were pursued, and what elements of urban topography were most consequential 
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in shaping their tactical behaviors. The results of this analysis on the Battle for Baghdad are then 
utilized in a review of the Coalition’s reconstruction policies.               
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2.0 CASE AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter introduces the Battle for Baghdad as the case under study and provides the 
approach, methods, and theoretical perspective for an analysis of this case. Here I set the stage for 
an exploration of how the trajectory of the Battle for Baghdad was shaped by interactions between 
its belligerents and the city’s territorial attributes, demographic characteristics, and its 
infrastructural systems of governance operating across networks of bureaucratic institutions and 
physical installations. This analysis merges an academic approach to methodology with that of a 
military assessment technique, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), to produce a three-
part within-case study. 
The first section of the chapter introduces the case. Major military operations to invade and 
occupy Iraq commenced in March 2003 and concluded within a few weeks. However, the Iraq 
War continued to progress through several phases as combatants asserted themselves and reacted 
to their rivals. In early 2006, the bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra triggered an 
escalation in the conflict, widely referred to as the Battle for Baghdad. While a complex array of 
state and nonstate actors engaged in kinetic and non-kinetic operations across the capital, it can be 
largely broken down into a triad of major competitors. This triad included a) the military and 
diplomatic efforts of the Coalition, supporting the Government of Iraq to stabilize and secure the 
nation, and the two most significant nonstate actor rivals, b) al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and c) Jaish 
al-Mahdi (JAM). In this initial section I present an actor-centric view of the conflict and analyze 
how these groups, often labeled differently as interventionist, terrorist, and militia groups, can be 
situated within a traditional paradigm of insurgency. In doing so, we open a number of possibilities 
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in comparing their strategic aims and tactical behaviors. In their use of governance to achieve their 
aims, how do they differ and how are they similar? I present my argument for how I identify 
meaningful observations in the data collected for this study.    
In the second part of this chapter, I turn from an actor-centric perspective on the Battle for 
Baghdad to focus on its environmental characteristics, presented as an analysis of its urban triad 
components. In the previous chapter I introduced the relative novelty of the urban triad concept in 
US military doctrine, and efforts to harness its utility to improve thinking about complex conflict 
scenarios, both practically and theoretically. The intuitive logic that there is an obvious 
interconnectedness between efforts to control the terrain, population, and infrastructure of a city 
in a conflict is apparent. However, explaining how this interconnectedness functions continues to 
be a work in progress. I demonstrate how analysis of crucial terrain features, demographic 
characteristics, and infrastructural systems enables a better understanding of the complex and 
dynamic battlefield upon which this conflict took place. In the section reviewing Baghdad’s 
infrastructure I introduce several of the most significant government services under review for this 
study, and their utility in supporting my methodology.  
I also present the argument for why governance lies at the center of complex conflicts such 
as the Battle for Baghdad. This is presented as a corollary to Kilcullen’s theory of competitive 
control. I add another dimension to Kilcullen’s theory by making a distinction between singular 
and general control. Nonstate actors may seek to control one person’s behavior, or the behavior of 
an entire population. Making a distinction between acts intending either discriminate or 
indiscriminate control yields important benefits for analyzing complex conflicts. 
The third and final part of this chapter articulates the components of my methodology, 
connecting the dots between the major concepts I have introduced. I discuss my effort to 
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operationalize the complicated concept as governance and make aspects of it more observable and 
empirically measurable. Forces engaged in insurgency and counterinsurgency obviously try to 
influence the delivery of services to a population to pursue their aims, but how? Is all governance 
the same? How is controlling electricity provision in a neighborhood different from controlling 
the local hospital, or police checkpoint? In this study I pursue various ways to break down 
governance into meaningful categories to enable more fruitful research. 
One way involves turning to some basic economic principles of public goods provision to 
develop my variables. I explore the concept of excludability, or the intrinsic characteristics of a 
good or service that make it possible to deny its use, to examine how governance can be exploited 
in the pursuit of strategic aims. Economic theory in ideal conditions often differs from reality, 
where challenges to law and order undermine the perfect effectiveness of institutions. Major 
political conflicts, such as the Battle for Baghdad, produce non-ideal conditions that can 
dramatically affect the natural excludability of goods and services. I harness this insight to explore 
how the major disruptions to governance brought on by the Coalition’s policies of post-conflict 
reconstruction led to the behaviors of the major nonstate insurgent groups in attacking and 
coopting Baghdad’s services infrastructures. In some cases, they aimed to influence the provision 
of governance to a single individual, in other cases they intended to affect to the entire city. 
Assessing individual acts in the context of broader strategic goals enables me to produce a typology 
that reflects the main ways that governance was weaponized during the Battle for Baghdad.  
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2.1 The Battle for Baghdad as complex conflict  
In 2019, RAND published the public version of a report to capture key lessons and retain 
institutional knowledge from the US Army’s experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 to 
2016. A section discussing the Battle for Baghdad starts out by clarifying that unlike a typical 
historical example of combat in a major city, this episode consisted of “several sequential battles” 
with enemy and US forces adapting to each other’s changing repertoires of tactics, techniques, and 
objectives.112    
This report reflects broader trends in the literature on the Iraq war in several important 
ways. It is directed at a policymaking audience, it favors military strategy as the driving conceptual 
framework for its analysis, and its content was mainly derived from the experiences of US military 
and government personnel involved in the conflict. In writing this dissertation I have been mindful 
of defaulting to this perspective and have aimed to make points that might challenge, or at least 
round out an understanding of the conflict in Baghdad constructed from the dominant discourse 
regarding US policymaking debates on Iraq.  
This section continues by looking at the trajectory of the Iraq War as it progressed from 
the 2003 invasion to the February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra. This deadlier 
phase is generally recognized as the beginning of the Battle for Baghdad. Providing a brief 
 
112 David E. Johnson, Agnes G. Schaefer, Brenna Allen, Raphael S. Cohen, Gian Gentile, James Hoobler, Michael 
Schwille, Jerry M. Sollinger, and Sean M. Zeigler, The US Army and the Battle for Baghdad: Lessons Learned-and 
Still to be Learned (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), ix.  
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overview to the overall trajectory of this conflict, I introduce the most important groups involved 
in this conflict as a triad involving the Coalition, al-Qaeda in Iraq, and Jaish al-Mahdi.     
2.1.1 The emergence of a complex insurgency in Iraq 
The aftermath of the 2003 invasion and the collapse of law and order in Iraq brought on by 
the lack of post-conflict planning by the US and poor policy decisions of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA), have been well documented.113 However, it is worth noting that even amongst 
highly-placed officials responsible for the implementation of policy in Iraq, a clear-eyed 
retrospective evaluation of actions taken to ensure the proper policing of Iraq presents the enormity 
of miscalculations and wrongheaded decision-making at work.114 While the disbanding of the Iraqi 
Army by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer has often been cited as a trigger for the major breakdown in 
security, the US mismanagement of the Iraqi civilian police forces need also be highlighted. An 
incoherent approach to rule-of-law issues, with the State Department responsible for police forces, 
the Justice Department responsible for adjudication and confinement, and the Defense Department 
responsible for security, resulted in a bureaucratic “cacophony” while law and order in Iraq 
evaporated.115  
 
113 Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to 
Iraq, Times Books, 2005. 
114 James M. Dubik, LTG, US Army (Ret.), “Report 4: Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. Creating Police and Law 
Enforcement Systems,” Institute for the Study of War (2010).  
115 Dubik, “Creating Police”, 5. 
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Fundamental questions about the future of governance and politics in Iraq fostered a 
climate of unpredictability that gave rise to a perception amongst Iraq’s political factions that a 
zero-sum game was emerging. Shia groups with a long history of opposition to the Saddam regime 
suddenly found themselves in a position to gain political power. While experienced with 
opposition, they were largely unprepared to govern. A new Shia political class, reacting to 
injustices of the past, was suspicious of anyone associated with the previous regime. Retribution 
against former Ba’athists was widespread. This massive political upheaval, coupled with the 
overall breakdown in governmental authority and the humiliation of foreign occupation, led many 
to fight against the occupation and the fragile new government.116 
What emerged can be best described as a complex insurgency. This type of conflict 
involves several factions employing a variety of strategies using violence to achieve their aims. 
Insurgency is a method to fundamentally alter the status quo of existing government authority.117 
An insurgency consists of an armed, organized challenge to existing government authority and, as 
a faction, unwilling to participate in a meaningful way in legitimate politics until some set of 
conditions are met or they prevail in overturning existing order. 
 
116 Domenico Tosini, “Al-Qaeda’s Strategic Gamble: The sociology of suicide bombings in Iraq,” Canadian Journal 
of Sociology, 35(2) 2010: 292. 
117 US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (12 July 2007), 268.  
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Previously I have noted the wide-ranging terminology used in situations of sub-state 
conflict and debates over identifying combatant categories.118 Noting this complexity, I aim here 
to simplify the approach to belligerents in the Battle for Baghdad and position them in the context 
of insurgency. I build on Mohammed Hafez’s depiction of Iraq’s two “Sunni insurgencies” and 
add a third category to incorporate the challenge to the state presented by Jaish al-Mahdi, the Shia 
militia group serving the Sadrist faction.119   
The two Sunni insurgencies varied in their religious and nationalist sentiments. Some 
groups ascribed to avowedly Islamist aims while others were largely made up of remnants of the 
Ba’athist regime with little regard for anything other than regaining power in Iraq. Many of these 
groups cooperated tactically on the battlefield, even though their strategic aims differed. What 
Hafez describes as the most critical distinction between the groups is whether their final objective 
was what he calls system reintegration, or system collapse.120 Some insurgent groups fought to 
assert enough power to win back concessions from the new government and ensure a place in 
society for Sunnis left at a disadvantage after the political upheaval in Iraq. Other groups fought 
for nothing less than an all-out collapse of the existing order and the ability to forge a new regime 
of their own creation.  
 
118 Timothy B. McCulloh, The Inadequacy of Definition and the Utility of a Theory of Hybrid Conflict: Is the Hybrid 
Threat New? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2012), 59. 
119 Mohammed Hafez, Suicide bombers in Iraq: the strategy and ideology of martyrdom, United States Institute of 
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I refer to JAM and the Sadrists as a resistance insurgency due to their significant military 
and political challenges to the authority of the US occupation and nascent Iraqi state authority, at 
times working within licit bounds of social and political institutions yet also able to threaten 
significant military force against MNF-I and Iraqi security forces. 121 Commonly labeled a militia 
group, JAM was indeed such, and more.   
Within the Shia community, several militia groups emerged and used force to achieve their 
aims. Comparing JAM with other armed organized groups is useful seeing how they exceeded 
mere militia status. The Badr Corps (alternatively known as the Badr Army, Brigades, or 
Organization)122 served as the militia force supporting the agenda of a pro-Iranian Shia exile 
community that returned to Iraq to participate in shaping a future Iraqi state. Both groups had much 
in common, including support from Tehran, yet they sparred in the streets and smoky political 
backrooms of Baghdad jostling for control. However, JAM reached a threshold of armed 
opposition to existing state structures that Badr never did. I therefore put JAM in a separate 
category of resistance insurgency, reflecting their role as a faction that could challenge existing 
government authority while participating in it. I refer to the overall strategy pursued by this 
resistance insurgency as one of system cooption. Seeking to shape existing government authority, 
 
121 Patrick Cockburn, Muqtada: Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq, Scribner, 2008.  
122 The Badr Army was formed in Tehran in the 1980s as the Iranian revolutionary regime sought to unite Shia exiles 
from Iraq. Closely connected to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) as its auxiliary militia 
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rebranded as an Organization when it entered politics after 2005, whereas SCIRI dropped the ‘revolution’ from its 
name and became ISCI (Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq) in 2007.  
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the Sadrists used JAM’s militia force to back its agenda and credibly threaten to escalate from 
resistance to revolution.  Other militia groups like Badr never posed such a threat.  
In the following sections I provide a brief introduction to each of these groups and illustrate 
their approach to governance as seeking system reintegration, system collapse, or system cooption. 
I first discuss reactionary insurgents. These groups, made up of Saddam loyalists, opposed the 
formation of a new government and fought to re-establish themselves within a power structure that 
had pushed them out. As these groups realized their reactionary aims were likely to fail, many of 
them turned to cooperation with the revolutionary agenda of al-Qaeda in Iraq.  
The revolutionary insurgency, as pursued by AQI, was determined to fundamentally alter 
the status quo, and create something dramatically different from any pre-existing state. I 
intentionally steer away from labeling AQI as a terrorist group but instead see their use of 
terrorism, with catastrophic attacks against civilians, as a tactical method serving their greater 
strategy of system collapse.  
I then turn to Jaish al-Mahdi. This force combined political and militia power to coopting 
existing government structures to its own purposes. As a resistance insurgency, JAM proved 
extremely effective at resisting Coalition efforts to reconstruct Iraq and greatly shaped the 
trajectory of a newly reconstituted Iraqi government.  
Following this breakdown of the differences among nonstate actors involved in Iraq’s 
complex insurgency, I review crucial ways that many of their tactical behaviors appear similar. 
All insurgent groups have organizational needs, like funding and recruitment. They often fight 
against each other, as well as challenge state authority. In the study of conflict, it is the tactics that 
are generally the more observable phenomenon, as specific actions, or attacks. Strategic goals are 
harder to ascertain as an observer. I discuss my categorization scheme that reconciles my 
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observations on tactical behaviors with the logic of strategic aims through an inductive 
methodology. This categorization scheme provides a way to compare the tactical actions of AQI 
to JAM as they each pursued divergent strategies.      
2.1.2 A reactionary insurgency 
Violent opposition to the occupation began with “localized and decentralized efforts by 
nationalists, disenfranchised Ba’athists, disgruntled soldiers, Saddam loyalists, and foreign 
jihadists” and soon coalesced around several groups with organization and resourcing skills.123 
Reacting to the humiliation of foreign occupation and a massive political upheaval, many Iraqi 
army officers, soldiers, and security service members sought to put their skills to use in opposing 
the new order.  
Elements of the new Shia power structure put in place de-Ba’athification measures 
intended to punish members of the former regime as well as completely marginalize them from 
future political activity. These measures were wide-ranging and served to penalize not only high-
ranking members of Saddam’s regime, but also many of the rank-and-file. These efforts were 
largely perceived as vindictive acts targeting the Sunni community at-large instead of a few high-
placed individuals.  
Insurgent groups emerged to counter this Sunni political disenfranchisement and the US 
occupation that was enabling it. Fearing a diminished role for Sunni Arabs in a new power structure 
that would surely feature greater participation by Kurdish and Shia populations, these groups 
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opposed the ongoing reconstruction process. They saw the foreign intervention of the US and the 
rise of a Shia political class with strong ties to Iran as destructive to Iraq’s nationhood. They also 
opposed the federalism that would weaken the central state and leave the Sunni Arab population 
without access to the nation’s oil wealth.  
Groups such as the 1920 Revolution Brigades stressed their nationalistic and anti-
colonialist stance, while others such as the Islamic Army in Iraq presented their opposition in terms 
of Islamic ideology. Both groups were similar in that their main objective was to rebalance the 
political power structure in the new Iraq.  
Among the most committed insurgents in the early days of the occupation were the 
members of the Ba’athist regime who knew that they would never be permitted to return to active 
participation in a new Iraq. For them, the return to power was an all-or-nothing gambit. Their status 
as the inner circle of Saddam’s followers and commitment to the Baathist project drove their 
ambition to fight against the US occupation forces and do everything in their power to create 
enough chaos in Iraq to convince everyone that a return to Baathist rule would be preferable to any 
other outcome. Facing the threat of defeat by US and Iraqi forces, many of these insurgent groups 
shifted from merely trying to turn back the clock in Iraq, to the possibility of gaining their 
objectives by siding with those pursuing a more radical agenda: the revolutionary insurgency.   
2.1.3 A revolutionary insurgency 
Several groups emerged with revolutionary aims of bringing radical political and social 
change to Iraq. Among the most potent of these groups involved transnational Islamic groups, 
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seeking “to replace regional governments and establish a base for permanent jihad.”124 These 
Sunni jihadists are best represented by the actions of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) under the leadership 
of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. 
Operating in Afghanistan at the time of the US invasion there in 2001, Zarqawi made his 
way to Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion. In October 2004, he affiliated his group with al-Qaeda, 
despite several differences in approach with Osama bin Laden and other key leaders of the 
headquarters cell of the organization (AQ Central).   
Zarqawi espoused a salafi, or strict and traditionalist version of Sunni ideology, that was 
not only hostile to the American occupiers but also to Iraq’s Shia population. AQI went to great 
lengths to instigate sectarian civil war in Iraq, attacking coalition targets, journalists, foreign 
contractors, and anyone else deemed a collaborator with the occupation. Initially deeming the 
entire Shia population of Iraq as a legitimate target, AQI engaged in mass-casualty suicide attacks 
on public markets, city streets, and government institutions. The extreme anti-Shia sectarianism of 
Zarqawi’s agenda was a primary source of tension with AQ Central. Zarqawi adjusted tactics at 
times to bolster domestic support amongst other jihadist groups operating in Iraq.125    
To support its activities AQI turned to predation on local populations, using extortion, 
kidnapping, and other criminal acts. Yet AQI also presented themselves as providers of public 
goods to these communities, offering local security and sharia justice. In many cases, Sunni 
communities welcomed AQI presence as a stabilizing force amidst the uncertainty, but eventually 
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grew tired of the imposition. By 2006, many local tribal leaders in the largely Sunni province of 
Anbar turned against the foreign jihadists in their midst, marking the beginning of the Sahwa, or 
Anbar “Awakening.” The relationship between these insurgents and these local communities 
illustrates a defective version of a welfare-as-warfare strategy.126 An over-reliance on predatory 
tactics to gain resources and maintain safe havens within local Sunni communities undermined 
AQI’s support from these populations. Once seen as a source of protection against a new Shia-
dominated Iraqi state, AQI became a predatory burden and was rejected by these communities.   
Zarqawi was killed by a US airstrike on June 7, 2006. His successors faced setbacks trying 
to maintain operational momentum for the organization as it faced internal disagreements and 
external pressures. One of the major turning points of the Battle for Baghdad occurred when the 
Awakening expanded from Anbar to Baghdad’s urban neighborhoods. The events in the Ameriya 
neighborhood during the summer of 2007, discussed in more detail later, signaled this significant 
transition. US forces constructed barriers around many Sunni neighborhoods to control access and 
limit the ability of rogue Shia militants to engage in sectarian attacks. However, this lack of 
mobility also constrained the AQI cell that was operating in the area and forced them to increase 
their predation on the local population. This was the tipping point for local leaders to turn to the 
US forces stationed in the area and request that they cooperate to clear their neighborhood of an 
element that had overreached in its predatory behaviors.127 Successful operations in Ameriya set 
the stage for similar arrangements in other Sunni-majority neighborhoods across Baghdad.   
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2.1.4 A resistance insurgency 
The challenge of JAM and the Sadrists to the Iraqi regime presents the most dramatic 
example of an armed and violent group with a political agenda to serve as an alternative to the 
state, in both its predatory capacity to acquire revenue and in the provision of security as a public 
good. Engaged in a variety of activities across the spectrum from legitimate political participation 
to the conduct of extreme sectarian violence, Sadrists emerged as a virulent obstacle to the viability 
of the Iraqi state. This was due to a comprehensive strategy of system cooption, where forces 
aligned (either ideologically or conveniently) with the Sadr movement of Shia cleric Moqtada al-
Sadr used militia forces to secure and control territory as well as provide a variety of public 
services, often coopted directly from state resources, to serve a preferred constituency. In this way, 
the Sadrists were highly effective in using predatory practices—on both a population and the state 
itself—to further its aims of domination. Tactical victories over Jaysh al-Mahdi in 2008 allowed 
the regime of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to rebalance authority in Iraq, but not completely. In 
fact, one must acknowledge that the viability of the Iraqi regime since 2008 is not so much based 
upon a victory over the Sadrist challenge, but as an accommodation with it.  
Moqtada al-Sadr first gained prominence by giving voice to a Shia nationalist perspective 
in opposition to the US occupation of Iraq in 2003. Sadr’s followers formed Jaish al-Mahdi to fill 
the security vacuum in the vast Sadr City neighborhood of Baghdad and other Shia-majority 
neighborhoods across the communities of southern Iraq. During 2004, JAM launched a series of 
insurgent attacks against US military forces in Baghdad and elsewhere, but these failed to achieve 
long-lasting effects and resulted in the tactical defeat of the militants in most engagements. Turning 
away from direct military engagement, Sadr’s movement, which consisted of the extensive social 
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welfare system built during the final years of the Saddam regime, began focusing on expanding 
social services and positioning itself to take part in legitimate political activities. This shift proved 
extraordinarily successful, as the organization raised the quality of life in some of Sadr City’s 
worst slums, provided jobs, and doled out money to many needy Iraqis.128 Supporters gained 
positions in municipal offices and helped direct official support towards loyal Sadrist 
neighborhoods in Baghdad, Basra, and other cities with significant Shia populations.  
The Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS), the social service wing of the organization, served 
as the conduit for the distribution of largesse to needy constituents including payments to widows, 
jobs for young men, and other types of aid, in Sadr-controlled neighborhoods. JAM militants 
provided security, a public good not being adequately provided by either the Iraqi state or US 
occupation authorities. Sadrists were seen to be responsible for distributing a variety of other 
beneficial services to quiescent constituents. But in many cases, Sadrists went from merely filling 
a gap to actively trying to create that gap. Sadrists tried to undermine legitimate state institutions 
in many ways. They took control of local gas stations, controlled transport routes of goods and 
used official posts to collect extra fees from citizens in need of crucial documentation. Sadrists 
also resorted to kidnappings, theft, extortion rackets, and other predatory behaviors.129 The 
extraordinary degree of predation performed by Sadrists and Sadr-affiliated militant groups not 
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only served to raise revenue for continued operations but also threatened the viability of the Iraqi 
state.  
With JAM and Sadrist groups largely in control of Basra, the critical node in Iraq’s oil 
economy, after the announcement of the withdrawal of British forces from the city in 2007, Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki decided to act decisively in a bid to shore up his political authority and 
break the Sadrists’ corrupt grip on a lucrative stream of revenue for the state.130  
In March 2008, Maliki issued orders to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to seize control of 
Basra’s neighborhoods; clashes with JAM fighters erupted immediately. This assault, called 
Operation Knight’s Charge, was conducted independently of (and against the advisement of) 
MNF-I Commander General David Petraeus.131 After a rough beginning, ISF units stabilized the 
city and Sadr issued a call for his militia to stand down.  
This contest between rival factions played out on both military and political realms. Sadr, 
thinking Maliki had overplayed his hand and would face political repercussions for launching an 
assault against a popular movement, started to whip up support in Sadr City. But Maliki was just 
warming up. Within days, Maliki directed ISF units to move directly into Sadr City, an episode 
covered in greater detail later. In brief, a protracted battle pitted ISF and supporting MNF units 
against JAM. Sadr was forced to call a cease-fire on May 12.  
Methods used during operations conducted by US forces during the Battle of Sadr City 
differed greatly from those used in Fallujah in 2004, demonstrating a shift in US military thinking 
about urban warfare. Instead of conducting the block-by-block clearing operations that completely 
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alienated Fallujah’s population, coercive force was used to provide security for the local 
population and prevent predation by JAM.132 For example, barriers put in place by US forces and 
checkpoints manned by ISF disrupted JAM’s ability to run extortion rackets at Jamila Market, a 
significant source of income for their Sadr City operations.  
The actions in 2008 were a huge gamble for the Maliki regime that paid off. Maliki earned 
credibility in the eyes of much of the population, and US political leadership felt his actions 
fostered an environment in which US forces could credibly pull out without leaving a massive 
state collapse in the vacuum. Maliki’s political coalition performed well in the 2009 provincial 
elections, largely because of his ability to show strength in the face of the Sadrist challenge and 
make deals with rival Shia factions. 
2.1.5 Strategies aimed at profit, power, and authority  
The previous sections provided an overview to the major nonstate groups participating in 
the Battle for Baghdad, and a scheme for understanding their overarching objectives. In this 
section, I delve deeper into the behaviors intended to support the attainment of these objectives 
and how these behaviors can be categorized and harnessed to improve our understanding of 
complex conflicts like the Battle for Baghdad. I intend to demonstrate how a scheme presenting a 
nonstate actor’s pursuit of organizational resources, conflict with rivals, and challenges to state 
authority represents an effective way to comprehend the diverse tactical activities of these groups.  
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Staniland notes that “conventional approaches [in political science] seek to find correlates 
of wins and losses in civil war or to explain fine-grained local variation in patterns of violence. 
They overlook the diverse interactions between states and insurgents that construct political 
authority and control.”133 Aiming to rectify the weaknesses of these approaches, I pursued a path 
seeking to understand the cooperative and conflictive relationships that “shape patterns of violence 
against civilians, governance and economics, and post-war politics,” hoping to bridge the gap 
between large-N and small-N studies on political violence.134 As stated before, a dyadic conflict 
between the state and a rebel is not the case for the Battle for Baghdad, so I intend to look deeper 
into the patterns of violence and conflict to produce a better analysis.  
I was influenced by Joel Migdal’s analysis of post-colonial states and his methodology for 
exploring the state’s strength over a society to show how various competing factions behave to 
gain profit, power, or authority.135 Both the state and nonstate factions may aim to penetrate and 
regulate a population, or they may aim to extract and allocate resources within that population. A 
faction may conduct a significant terror campaign to cow local leaders, and then enforce rigid code 
of public behavior to penetrate and regulate a village. With that power they can extort taxes from 
that village and then provide social welfare services to those showing the appropriate degree of 
loyalty to this quasi-regime. I adapted these concepts to explore the conflict in Iraq.    
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During this conflict, a wide variety of actors used violence to achieve their aims. In many 
cases, similarity in tactical behaviors diverged widely from strategic achievements. Groups like 
AQI pursued mass-casualty attacks to destabilize the state and challenge the occupation, but also 
sought territorial control and engaged in the kind of criminal racketeering commonly seen by JAM. 
I aim to explore these tactical behaviors as serving three overall strategies: profit, power, 
and authority. At a basic level, groups need to fund themselves to maintain organizational integrity 
or enrich their leaders. Both JAM and AQI engaged in a variety of fundraising activities from 
foreign patronage to predatory criminal enterprises. Both groups sought to establish what Arias 
refers to as micro-level armed regimes136 or self-enclosed neighborhoods where the groups could 
replace state authority with their own system of resource extraction and allocation. These groups 
often maintained an armed presence in a neighborhood or coopted local services like gas stations 
to exert power over a population, outside the bounds of licit governance.   
These groups also engaged in turf wars against one another, in bids for power over different 
elements of Baghdad’s urban topography. Various neighborhoods with critical demographic or 
territorial value served as arenas for conflict between these nonstate group rivals. In some cases, 
this rivalry entailed armed skirmishes, and in other cases it took place within institutions of 
governance. Both scenarios often involved degrees of violent thuggery as factions vied for power 
over Baghdad.         
Lastly, I look at how both AQI and JAM launched significant challenges to the authority 
of the US occupation and its nation-building efforts with the GoI. These challenges involved fully 
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kinetic operations that used military-level tactics and weaponry to undermine the objectives of the 
MNF-I mission and bring chaos to the newly reconstructed Iraqi state apparatus represent 
challenges to state authority.  
Challenges to authority are also reflected in the decisions of factions to engage in the 
legitimate political process. While at times JAM pursued kinetic operations against state authority, 
the political wing of the Sadrist Movement simultaneously made moves to achieve legitimate 
authority within the state at the local, provincial, and national levels.   
These three strategies are interlinked, and indeed sometimes they worked like 
steppingstones, as factions gaining power on the street converted the support of local populations 
into political loyalty. However, it is also important to note that not every tactical action perpetrated 
by individual members of a group reflected the overarching strategy of the group’s leadership. 
Rogue operators, splinter cells, and entrepreneurial criminals complicate any effort to identify 
complete unity in these groups’ behaviors. The trajectory of Jaish al-Mahdi is particularly 
instructive, as the organization evolved with a variety of internal factions at odds with each other, 
some pursuing profit and power, while others aiming for authority.  
2.2 The Battle for Baghdad and the metropolitan battlefield   
This section focuses on the underlying environmental factors that played a role in shaping 
the trajectory to the Battle for Baghdad. I use the military concept of the urban triad to break down 
Baghdad’s crucial territorial, demographic, and infrastructural elements to identify the most useful 
variables for the case study analysis that follows. Reviewing these elements as the major 
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components of a metropolitan battlefield enables a better understanding of how these attributes 
were exploited by the combatants fighting the Battle for Baghdad.  
I start by exploring the physical features that demarcate zones of residential, commercial, 
and government activity. This is followed by a discussion of its diverse population of ethnic, 
sectarian, tribal, socioeconomic, occupational, gendered, political, and individual identities. I then 
turn to Baghdad’s governance infrastructure as the central arena of significant interactions for 
understanding the conflict. 
Baghdad consists of a central metropolitan hub of several districts built on and expanding 
from its original historical setting and several outlying rural communities more recently 
incorporated to form the province, or governorate, of Baghdad. Home to the national government, 
Baghdad serves as the capital of Iraq and thus has a unique overlay of local, provincial, and 
national governance institutions. Legal ambiguity over Baghdad’s status and jurisdictional 
boundaries between these institutions after 2003 provided opportunities for entrepreneurial 
political actors to exploit this uncertainty. At various times, those actors sought advantage over 
others by promoting Baghdad’s urban, provincial, or capital identity. These legal distinctions led 
to conflicts affecting the delivery of services to Baghdad’s population.  
Aiming to provide solutions to the theoretical and practical challenges of operationalizing 
governance, I demonstrate my framework to produce a set of variables for this study. I re-introduce 
the concept of governance infrastructure and how it presents a way to evaluate and assess how the 
major upheavals brought on by post-conflict reconstruction policies in Iraq rippled through 
Baghdad’s institutions and installations of service provision. Expanding this framework, I present 
a selection of crucial government services across an array of sectors to serve my methodology of 
analyzing the weaponization of governance during the Battle for Baghdad.     
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2.2.1 Urban topography: A conceptual framework for complex conflict        
At the outset of this dissertation, I stated my overall aim for making this research project 
relevant to wider debates within academic and policymaking fields looking at the intersection of 
conflict and governance in urban areas. In this section I present my fundamental theoretical 
approach to complex conflict that undergirds this specific study and opens pathways for future 
research. Many of the ideas I present here form components of the methodology used in this study, 
while others represent a broader set of concepts that I intend to pursue more fully in later research.  
I start by considering a city in its totality. If we want to think about a city as a battlefield in 
which every conceivable element may shape a conflict in some way, how would we do so? Then, 
having considered every element as a potential factor, how do we assess the relative relevance of 
each of these elements?     
Previously, I introduced the urban triad as a relatively new component of the US military’s 
IPB methodology, defining urban areas as having three major characteristics: a complex man-
made physical terrain superimposed upon a natural terrain, a population of significant size and 
density, and an infrastructure upon which the area depends.137 Working with this concept in the 
development of this research project, I found it useful, but also lacking in an important way. Here 
I build on this concept to improve this conceptualization of the totality of urban topography, giving 
it greater ability to produce observable variables for both military analysis and conflict research.   
Urban topography, at its most abstract, consists of features that can be expressed as existing 
across two axes. The first is an axis of tangibility. Cities are built upon geographic features and 
 
137 JP 3-06, I-2.  
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consist of natural landforms and manmade structures. These are concrete things that possess 
absolute tangibility. Yet we must also acknowledge the intangibility of other aspects of a city, like 
the ideas, values, and behaviors of its citizens, and its societal institutions. We can shorthand this 
range of tangible to intangible characteristics as a spectrum that spans from “hard” material aspects 
to “soft” ideational components on an urban topography. I previously noted how infrastructure is 
a concept that spans both realms of hard and soft attributes. Within these complex networks, I 
differentiate between installations, an infrastructure’s material components, and institutions, its 
intangible rules-based elements.      
The second axis reflects the fact that each of these components has a quality of discreteness, 
pertaining to its own individuality separate from the rest of the environment. Unique, individual 
elements, like a tree, differ from other large-scale components of the environment, like a forest. In 
other words, is this component specific or general in its basic nature? Do these components exist 
as discriminate elements, easily made distinct from others, or as indiscriminate elements, 
representing general characteristics at the broadest scale? 
These two axes produce zones where we can identify major elements that make up the 
socio-technical topography of a city. Elements that are the most tangible and the most public 
involve geographical attributes, such as the elevation of the city, its position within a mountain 
range or along the coast, or in a temperate or tropical zone. At the far end of the spectrum the most 
intangible and most private elements of a city would reside within an individual citizen’s head, 
within the realm of ideas and motivations for behavior. Infrastructures reside at the intersection 
between the material and ideational, with “hard” interconnected material structures (installations) 
operating according to “soft” or rules-based frameworks (institutions).  
   
 
 74 
A population consists of many individuals with their personal identities and beliefs. Similar 
identities and beliefs aggregate to reflect those of families, communities, and larger groupings all 
the way up to the entire populous. An individual may or may not obey and support the government. 
A critical threshold of many people doing so creates legitimacy for that government, or for the 
rebel group aiming to undermine that authority. Physical elements of an urban terrain may possess 
a singular, or private quality like an individual house, or a general, public component of the 
landscape like a major river system, or the elevation of the foothills that a neighborhood is built 
upon. In between these ends of a spectrum reside more middle-ground elements of urban terrain, 
such as a comparison between the east and west bank neighborhoods of a city divided by a river, 
or the suburban outskirts versus an inner corridor.  
Demonstrating this rather broad concept as a graphic, we see the formation of matrix in the 
figure below (Figure 2.1). This matrix produces four zones that enable us to start conceptualizing 
some fundamental components of a city. We can see how private ideas (held by an individual) are 
different from public ideas (held by a group) and specific material objects can be differentiated 
from general aspects of a landscape.  
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Figure 2.1. Fundamental attributes of an urban topography  
 
 
Building on this basic idea, I incorporate the insights provided by both the urban triad and 
by David Kilcullen’s theory of competitive control. Aiming to explain outcomes in irregular 
conflicts, Kilcullen argues that the “local armed actor that a given population perceives as best 
able to establish a predictable, consistent, wide-spectrum normative system of control is most 
likely to dominate that population and its residential area.”138 Following Kilcullen, we can see how 
actors aiming to control a city may be seeking normative control over the ideas and behaviors of a 
population, or physical control over places and features on a terrain. Efforts to control 
 
138 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 126.  
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infrastructure involve both physical control over installations and normative control over 
institutions – a fight over governance.   
Urban conflict can be summed up as a) contests over the ideas and behaviors of individuals 
and groups, b) efforts to physically control specific objects of property and general territorial 
spaces, and c) efforts to control the provision of goods and services to individuals, families, 
neighborhoods, communities, and entire populations. At the center of these urban conflicts are 
infrastructures, existing as a system of nodes and networks of crucial terrain with both 
installational and institutional components.   
Thus, belligerents may be fighting to achieve their aims across the three areas of the urban 
triad: terrain, population, and infrastructure. When they are seeking to influence the opinions and 
behaviors of individuals and a society, they may be seeking to harness the power of individual 
identity or group solidarity to legitimize their rule as a political entity. Normative control may be 
pursued at the personal level, within small groups, or among greater populations. However, they 
may also be behaving as criminals that profit from the theft of private property or militias that seek 
to establish strongholds in vulnerable neighborhoods so they can then control the flow of goods 
and services in a particular area. The contest over governance, or over the provision of goods and 
services by formal and informal institutions, can take place at a discriminate, or individual level, 
or indiscriminately across wide swaths of the population. The graphic below (Figure 2.2) 
represents my conceptual framework positing the major realms of complex conflict as contests 
over identity, legitimacy, property, territory, and governance.    
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Figure 2.2. Contested features of an urban topography  
 
Each of these contests figured prominently during the Battle for Baghdad, as state and 
nonstate actors used a variety of kinetic and non-kinetic tactics to shape people’s individual 
behaviors as well as sway the opinions of communities, ethnic groups, and broader swaths of a 
population. These combatants also fought to control buildings, streets, bridge crossings, canals, 
vacant lots, and other aspects of the natural and manmade terrain of a city. However, the central 
contest involved fighting over control of Baghdad’s governance infrastructure, and its ability to 
deliver services to a vulnerable population.  
This section continues with an analysis of Baghdad’s urban topography that evaluates 
crucial terrain features and important demographic characteristics before turning to a detailed 
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review of the infrastructural elements central to understanding the trajectory of the Battle for 
Baghdad.     
2.2.1.1 Terrain: a landscape of natural and manmade features 
Constructed on the banks of the Tigris River to serve as the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate 
in the 8th century C.E., Baghdad rose to become the greatest commercial, cultural, and intellectual 
center of the Islamic world. Following destruction at the hands of the Mongols in 1258, Baghdad 
experienced many periods of decline and rebirth until becoming a provincial capital of the 
Ottomans, a conquest of the British Empire, and eventually developing into a modern metropolis 
and the capital city of the nation of Iraq.  
Situated on the Tigris at its closest point to the Euphrates, 25 miles to the west, Baghdad 
sits on an alluvial plain just 112 feet above sea level. Flood control and management of water 
resources is deeply embedded in the history of Baghdad. Periodic flooding of the Tigris, Euphrates, 
and Diyala, which joins the Tigris south of the city, greatly influenced the development of the city 
over its long history. In the 1950s, Baghdad underwent several major civil engineering projects to 
improve flood control and water management under the direction of President Abd al-Kareem 
Qassim. In 1956, the construction of a dam upstream of Baghdad on the Tigris near Samarra 
allowed for significant urban expansion to the east and west. In 1959, the Army Canal connected 
the Tigris and Diyala, intending to produce drinking water for the growing population in 
Baghdad’s eastern districts. Bridge crossings across the Tigris, Diyala, and Army Canal provide 
crucial routes into, out of, and across the entire Baghdad region and served as significant points of 
contention for government and insurgent forces aiming to control flows of traffic.  
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 The province of Baghdad is subdivided into many different units, serving different governmental 
functions or identifying discrete communities. As with most major metropolitan areas, Baghdad has evolved 
from an historical urban hub into a vast network of interconnected population centers. In 2006, there were 15 
major political units within the province of Baghdad, commonly referred to as the nine city districts and the 
six rural qadas.139 Districts and qadas are themselves subdivided politically into neighborhoods and nahias 
respectively. When describing Baghdad province, the terms qada and nahia generally refer to the outlying 
communities, akin to county and township.  
The major districts of the city extend along the eastern and western banks of the Tigris as 
it winds south towards the Shatt al-Arab, the confluence with the Euphrates that discharges into 
the Persian Gulf near Basra, Iraq’s crucial port city. It is common to refer to the entire western side 
of the city as Karkh and the eastern side as Rusafa, even though these are also names of more 
specifically bounded districts within the city. Rusafa consists of the city’s major financial district, 
with longstanding copper, textile, and gold bazaars along Rashid Street. Its intersection with 
Mutanabbi Street is considered the center of old Baghdad, and the famous bookshops there are 
considered the heart and soul of the city’s intellectual community. The riverfront boulevard of Abu 
Nuwas Street served as an entertainment hub for restaurants, hotels, and cafes until a major 
downturn during the difficult times under U.N. sanctions in the 1990s. South of Rusafa proper is 
the Karadah district, partly jutting out as a peninsula following a bend in the Tigris, home to an 
 
139 The usage of the terms qada and nahia in this study reflect a common usage by Coalition and Iraqi officials to 
indicate the outlying areas of suburban Baghdad, even though technically they define foundational administrative 
units within the city and across the rest of Iraq. Common usage also anglicized the plurals of both words, as qadas and 
nahias, instead of the correct Arabic qadat and nahiat.   
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exclusive residential area and the University of Baghdad. North along the Tigris is the Sunni-
majority district of Adhamiyah, one of Baghdad’s oldest neighborhoods and home to the sacred 
Abu Hanifa Mosque. Going east from Rusafa, Adhamiya, and Karadah are the newer 
neighborhoods of Sadr City (Thawra) and 9 Nissan. These vast, sprawling neighborhoods are the 
result of significant urban migration to Baghdad from Iraq’s southern Shia-majority communities.  
Baghdad’s western districts are centered around Karkh. The district included the major 
governmental area that comprised much of the International Zone (IZ), commonly called the 
“Green Zone.” Home of the Republican Palace (the seat of Saddam’s government and then MNF-
I headquarters after 2003) and other sites of monumental architecture, the IZ also included several 
Karkh residential neighborhoods. Leading from Assassin’s Gate, a major checkpoint from the IZ 
into the rest of Karkh, the crucial Haifa Street district houses important governmental, residential, 
and commercial facilities and was the site of significant conflict in early 2007. North of Karkh is 
Kadhamiya, an historically Shia-majority neighborhood and home to the revered al-Khadahimya 
Mosque. Stretching west from downtown Karkh to the western outskirts of the city and the 
Baghdad International Airport, the Mansour neighborhood saw significant development during the 
Ba’athist era and housed a mixed population of affluent and well-connected residents. The al-
Rashid district to the south of the city is an area of light industrial and residential zones that 
connects Baghdad to the agricultural hinterland of date farms and poultry production in the qada 
of Mahmoudiya, the southernmost district of Baghdad’s provincial area, the outlying suburban 
communities that form the governorate of Baghdad.  
The outlying qadas of Bagdhad’s suburban and exurban territory make up the rest of the 
province. To the west, Abu Ghraib serves as the major waypoint towards Anbar and the western 
desert of Iraq abutting neighboring Jordan. To the north, Taji, Tarmiya, and Istiqlal consist of a 
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number of communities along the Tigris. The vast Mada’in area to the southeast has a rich history 
of archeological sites and a Shia community with connections to Iraq’s south and the Iranian 
borderlands.    
2.2.1.2 Population: a range of ethnic, sectarian, and socioeconomic identities.   
The shocking degree of ethnic and sectarian violence unleashed across Baghdad in the 
years following the 2003 invasion produced debates among scholars who saw it either as an 
outgrowth of pre-existing tensions within Iraqi society, or as an historical anomaly brought on by 
the invasion itself.140 This section presents the demographic breakdown of Baghdad’s population 
across ethnic, sectarian, and confessional communities, as well as key socioeconomic factors to 
provide some insight into the dispute mentioned above.  
The major communities of Iraq include Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, and Kurds, with minority 
populations of Assyrians and Turkmen. Under British rule, Sunni Arabs were empowered as 
primary office holders within the state, leading to a closer alignment of that group’s identity to 
overall Iraqi nationalism.141 During its formative decades as a state, Iraq faced rebellions from 
Kurds, Shia-led revolts, and perpetrated a massacre against a discontented Assyrian community. 
These early conflicts differ somewhat from contemporary episodes of inter-communal violence, 
as they consisted of fighting between communities and the Iraqi state, instead of fighting between 
communities over authority of the Iraqi state.142 
 
140 Stansfield, 54.  
141 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge, 2000). 
142 Stansfield, 54.  
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The perception that the Sunni Arab community is more closely aligned to Iraqi national 
identity than other communities is common. However, some scholars of Iraqi history question a 
whole-hearted acceptance of this vertical construction of identity, that ethnic and sectarian 
divisions are the primary building blocks of Iraq. They counter by identifying crucial horizontal 
socioeconomic factors such as class distinctions, urban-rural divisions, and tribal allegiances that 
created more possibilities for identity construction in a rapidly modernizing Iraq over the mid-
twentieth century, aside from traditional confessional and ethnic distinctions.143 A compromise 
viewpoint sees Iraq’s contemporary crisis as the resurgence of older, more-deeply embedded 
traditional vertical identities after the steady erosion of horizontal connections following years of 
dictatorship, warfare, and crippling sanctions. Post-invasion policy in Iraq provided a crucial 
catalyst for modern Iraqi society stripped back down to its traditional groupings, with lethal 
consequences.144       
Estimates and counting methods differ, but a basic breakdown of Baghdad’s population by 
ethnic and sectarian community during the Battle for Baghdad can be seen in the table below.  
 
Table 2.1 Baghdad’s population by ethnicity (est. 2007)145  
 
143 Hanna Batuta, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s Old Landed 
and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba’athists and Free Officers, (Princeton, 1978; reprinted Saqi Books, 
London 2004), 13.  
144 Faleh A. Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes Under Patrimonial 
Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998,” in Faleh Jabar and Hosham Dawood (eds), Tribes and Power: Nationalism and 
Ethnicity in the Middle East (London, Saqi Books: 2003), 69-109. 
145 Dan Bisbee, “Baghdad Governance,” Baghdad PRT Report, 3rd Edition, April 2007.  
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Total population 5-6 million in city, 7-9 million 
including outlying qadas 
Sunni Arab 15% 
Shia Arab 65% 
Kurd 10% 
Assyrian 5% 
Turkmen 5% 
 
 
Distribution of these populations across the city and province of Baghdad are of crucial 
interest for the trajectory of the conflict, particularly as it pertains to the Sunni-Shia sectarian divide 
and the dramatic change in make-up of many residential neighborhoods after 2006.  
The Tigris serves as a major fault line between the Sunni west and north of Iraq, and the 
Shia east and south. Historically connected to the desert routes leading towards Syria, Jordan, and 
Saudi Arabia, the outlying qadas of Tarmiya, Istiqlal, Taji, Abu Ghraib, and Mahmoudiya are 
largely Sunni enclaves with key pockets of Shia residents, notably in southern Mahmoudiya and 
northeastern Istiqlal. To the east, Mada’in has a sizable Shia population and provides routes to the 
Iranian frontier.  
Within the city, Baghdad’s neighborhoods underwent a massive population shift between 
2006 and 2008. Traditionally mixed residential areas transitioned to majority Sunni or Shia 
through violent coercion and voluntary resettlement in a remarkable episode of internal ethnic 
cleansing. Prior to 2006, only a few neighborhoods would have been considered majority-Sunni 
or majority-Shia, while the rest of the city’s neighborhoods would be more easily categorized 
according to wealth or social exclusivity (i.e., members of the regime) and show a mixed sectarian 
makeup. Anecdotal evidence provided by discussions with local Iraqis supports the commonly 
   
 
 84 
held view that Sunni-Shia intermarriage has been a longstanding and common tradition in 
Baghdad, influencing the idea that many neighborhoods should be classified as mixed during this 
time.  
Both the central Karkh and Rusafa districts were mixed between Sunni and Shia 
populations. Beyond those neighborhoods, the general rule that Sunni-majority communities were 
more prevalent west of the Tigris and Shia on the east largely holds, except with two major 
exceptions. Shia-majority Khadhamiya is directly north of Karkh on the west bank and sits directly 
opposite Sunni-majority Adhamiya on the east bank. The Aimma Bridge connects these two 
communities and is the site of an annual religious pilgrimage honoring the famed mosques of each 
neighborhood. In August 2005, the Aimma Bridge was the site of unfortunate tragedy. A panic 
about possible suicide bombers caused a stampede amongst the participants of the Shia pilgrimage 
across the bridge, causing the deaths of nearly 1,000 as the crowd crushed many and forced others 
to jump into the water and drown.146  
The upper-class neighborhoods of Mansour tended to be Sunni, reflecting the makeup of 
favored Ba’athists under Saddam, and al-Rashid leaned Sunni-majority, but with several Shia-
dominated pockets. Moving to the eastern districts, Shia-dominated areas were more prevalent due 
to the massive waves of urban migration undertaken by Shia from the south in the late decades of 
the twentieth century. Sadr City is one such Shia-majority district. Originally named Thawra, or 
Revolution City, this district was renamed in the aftermath of 2003 to the martyred Shia leader 
 
146 “Iraq stampede deaths near 1,000,” BBC News, August 31, 2005.  
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Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr (father of Moqtada). Another district, 9 Nissan or New 
Baghdad, was also established as a home for many new Shia residents moving to Baghdad.  
During the Battle for Baghdad, demographic shifts greatly changed the overall sectarian 
makeup of many neighborhoods across the city. Many mixed neighborhoods became much more 
homogenous, becoming either completely Sunni or completely Shia. In the west, previously mixed 
Mansour took on a markedly more Sunni composition. In the east, Shia districts expanded towards 
the city center, forcing pockets of Sunni communities to consolidate in areas of Adhamiya and 
Rusafa. Notably the Karadah peninsula, with its exclusive riverside housing normally reserved for 
regime favorites, shifted from Sunni to Shia, a reflection of the overall shift in power dynamics 
within Baghdad and in the new Iraq.  
 Where did this Sunni-Shia conflict come from? It is not uncommon to see this divide as emerging 
after the death of the Prophet Mohammed and arising from a fundamental schism between factions that 
supported a hereditary line of succession (the Shia) versus those that did not (the Sunni). However, it is 
important to note that the southern Iraqi tribes only converted to Shi’ism in the nineteenth century.147 Many 
of them converted due to opposition to an Ottoman policy of forced tribal settlement near the holy sites of 
Najaf, Karbala, Kazimayn, and Samarra in 1831, and continued pressure on Shia landowners and tribal 
leaders. Ottoman governance, favoring Sunni Arabs and Turkmen, gave a class-based edge to the sectarian 
divide, instilling in the Shia a deep sense of second-class citizenhood. When the British replaced Ottoman 
control, they continued these policies favoring Sunni dominance, reinforcing this divide.148 
The rise of Ba’athism also created a unique challenge to Shia identity within the Iraqi state. 
The rise of Arab nationalism was primarily a secular movement, and the rallying cry for a modern 
 
147 Stansfield, 60.  
148 Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi’is of Iraq. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 443. 
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politics to replace Islamic custom as the unifying force for nationhood under Saddam left many 
traditionalists within the Shia camp discontented.149 As Iraq’s modern state expanded, it 
encroached upon traditional roles and responsibilities of the clergy, such as justice, education, and 
taxation, weakening the authority of the religious establishment. Cultural connections to 
neighboring Shia-majority Iran put many Iraqi Shia at risk of being in cahoots with the Persian 
enemy, and many were deported on the eve of the Iran-Iraq War.150    
Several major strands of political activism emerged within the Shia community. In the 
1950s, the Shia religious establishment formed Hizb al-Da’wa Islamiyya (commonly referred to 
as Da’wa) to articulate an Islamic, and specifically Shia, position on modern political life in Iraq. 
Da’wa continued as a political voice for the Shia community under Saddam’s regime, wary of 
attempts to challenge Ba’athists too loudly or pointedly. While Da’wa represents a domestic Iraqi 
institution, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) emerged in Tehran as 
an umbrella organization to unite Iraqi exiles and resistance groups into a force that could serve to 
undermine Saddam’s regime during and after the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. The Badr Army was 
formed to serve SCIRI in its efforts and received funding and training directly from the Iranian 
regime.  
The Sadrist Movement is another offshoot of domestic Shi’ism in Iraq. Following the 1990 
Gulf War, a failed uprising and the overall hardships imposed by the U.N. sanctions upon Iraq 
created additional difficulties for an impoverished Shia population. At first seeming to play along 
with Saddam to secure his position as a government-appointed cleric, Ayatollah Muhammed Sadiq 
 
149 Stansfield, 62. 
150 Ibid., 63.  
   
 
 87 
al-Sadr began preaching more critically about the failures of Saddam’s regime and ran afoul of the 
dictator. He was assassinated along with two of his sons in Najaf in 1999, leaving another son, 
Moqtada, to carry on the family legacy.151  
The 2003 invasion provided opportunities for each of these strands to play crucial roles in 
Iraq’s political development. An initial phase saw the US rely heavily upon leaders drawn from 
either the quietist Shia religious establishment, such as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani (who 
survived under Saddam due to his position that clerics should not get involved in affairs of state), 
or exiles with dubious credentials such as Ahmed Chalabi and Ayad Allawi.  
The Iranian-backed groups SCIRI and Badr made plays to secure important positions 
within the Ministry of Interior and other security-related ministries, reflecting the aims of Tehran 
to ensure that a new Iraq, even under US guidance, would not be a threat to Iran. Members of 
Da’wa took important positions of authority as compromise candidates between the other factions, 
building on their institutional longevity and lack of street-level militant force. The Sadrists 
changed strategies several times, ranging from outright insurgency to securing positions of power 
within Iraq’s services and welfare-oriented ministries (aiming to steer clear of as much direct 
involvement with US personnel as possible).  
Following 2003, Sunni politics was in disarray. Authorized by the CPA and aggressively 
pursued by a newly empowered cadre of Shia officials, de-Ba’athification policies posed 
extraordinary difficulties for politically active Sunnis. It was very unclear about where to place 
new political allegiances. As Ba’athism, the dominant political loyalty, was largely a secular and 
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nationalist institution, the only other parties available to a newly vulnerable Sunni population were 
the Communists and Islamic religious factions, former opponents of the Ba’athists. Predictably, 
most Sunnis were left out of the initial political restructuring of Iraq, while Shia and Kurdish 
parties seized the opportunity. A widespread Sunni boycott of elections in 2005 put them at a 
severe disadvantage as the new Iraqi state took shape, and Shia and Kurdish parties offered few 
concessions as Sunni-based political entities, Islamic or secular, tried to rejoin the state during 
later electoral events.    
Understanding the election cycle of 2005 requires an understanding of how victimhood 
animates both Sunni and Shia political identities.152 Shia victimhood stemmed from deep legacies 
of Ottoman, British, and Ba’athist state oppression under Saddam. Sunni victimhood blossomed 
after the 1990 Gulf War and that event’s denial of Iraq’s seemingly positive national trajectory 
since the rise of the Ba’athists and the oil wealth boom of the 1970s. With everything set up for 
their success, Sunni acceptance of any kind of failure seemed like a cruel joke and a miscarriage 
of historical justice. Misunderstanding of both Sunni and Shia perspectives on victimhood led to 
miscalculations by US strategists in several crucial instances during the postwar reconstruction.153 
Notably, the US misjudged the rise of Moqtada al-Sadr. He was underestimated in his ability to 
lead a full-fledged social and political movement capitalizing on Shia victimhood. As for the 
 
152 Fanar Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
153 John Hagen, Joshua Kaiser, Anna Hanson, and Patricia Parker, “Neighborhood Sectarian Displacement and the 
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Sunnis, their lack of participation in the 2005 elections reflected how untethered their political 
expectations for dominance reflected demographic reality.  
A quote I overheard during a briefing in 2006 provides a gross over-simplification of how 
this deep sense of victimization skewed each community’s perception of Iraq’s unfolding political 
future. Suggesting that the sectarian conflict was likely to escalate, the briefer stated that both sides 
fundamentally misunderstood the new reality of the demographic situation in Baghdad. The simple 
fact driving the conflict was that ‘the Sunni still think they can win, and the Shia still think they 
can lose.’ Fomented and exploited by extremists, the sectarian conflict that accompanied the Iraq 
War was not the inevitable outcome of some deep-seated animosity brewing amongst these 
communities, but the result of strategic calculations – and miscalculations – by its belligerents.           
2.2.1.3 Infrastructure: a complex network of socio-technical systems 
This section provides an overview to understanding the critical components of Baghdad’s 
urban infrastructure, and introduces the conceptual framework underlying the methodology of the 
case study analysis. My primary focus is on the provision of public goods and services by the state. 
During the Battle for Baghdad, state and nonstate actors sought to disrupt, corrupt, coopt, 
reconstruct, and replace systems of infrastructure in the pursuit of their aims. For example, the 
production and distribution of electricity to the residents of Baghdad was of crucial importance, 
driving state and nonstate actors to seek ways to influence the provision of this service, either in a 
positive or negative way. But how do we identify and categorize the ways this influence is 
manifested? This section presents a framework for breaking down these complex systems into 
meaningful elements that enable a better evaluation of how these acts of disruption, corruption, 
cooption, reconstruction, and replacement occurred.  
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In the introductory chapter I presented infrastructure as a concept serving a broad 
assortment of fields and as a term with extraordinary malleability. My discussion of its usage made 
three major points. One of these points explained how it commonly refers to large-scale physical 
resources that provide for public needs, such as highway networks, communication systems, and 
electrical grids.154 Another argued that these systems inherently consist of both installational and 
institutional components, with “hard” interconnected material structures operating according to 
“soft” or rules-based frameworks.   
I also pointed out the major overlaps between infrastructure and governance and identified 
my aim to harness the concept of governance infrastructure to my own purposes, despite fears of 
its conceptual nebulousness.155 I suggested that Globerman and Shapiro’s idea of governance 
infrastructure156 should be taken beyond a mere institutional framework to use it to convey a 
complex landscape of networks involving both institutions and installations involved in the 
provision of public goods for a city.  
Here I present such a usage, demonstrating Baghdad’s governance infrastructure as a 
layered set of elements identifying key parts of interconnected socio-technical networks. The main 
unit of analysis is a discrete public service. In this study I have a chosen to focus on a few important 
services like police, hospitals, and oil products. Understanding how services play a role during 
 
154 Frischmann, 3-4. 
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 91 
conflict requires putting services into a greater context of broader governance networks, as well as 
a developing a method for breaking individual services down into several constituent elements. I 
explain my method for observing how individual services can be influenced by both external and 
internal factors.      
I first discuss the major realms of governance infrastructure, articulating how a 
combination of legal, political, bureaucratic, and technical attributes undergird service provision. 
I then address the various sectors of services, commenting on the various ways public goods 
provision may be categorized. Within these sectors, individual services are delivered through a 
combination of two infrastructural types: institutional and installational. Services involve rules-
based organizations as well as physical structures, and either may serve as a target by combatants 
seeking to corrupt or disrupt that service. The architectures of these institutional and installational 
network components are generally designed as tiers, representing differences between production, 
transmission, and distributional activities. Mapping out how all these elements interact enables a 
better understanding of how they present exploitable opportunities for belligerents seeking to use 
them during conflict. 
Articulating the elements of a governance infrastructure enables an understanding of the 
major components of governance, and how they interact. I use the following concepts in this 
assessment of selected services making up Baghdad’s governance infrastructure:  
1) Realms: fundamental components of governance infrastructure,  
2) Sectors: broad categories of public goods and services, 
3) Types: differences between institutional and installational components of a service, 
4) Tiers: differences between the hierarchical components of a service.   
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The fundamental elements of a governance infrastructure consist of four realms, occupying 
territory on a scale between immaterial to tangible reality. First, we start with administrative law, 
consisting of the constitutional or foundational legal architecture for the mandate of a polity’s 
institutions. Moving to politics, we observe the mechanisms by which the factions participating 
within these institutions negotiate differences in preference regarding the allocation of resources 
within these institutions. Another realm of bureaucracy demonstrates how effectively the political 
decisions are executed through the polity’s service delivery systems. Finally, an institution relies 
on technology to delivery material commodities or enable the delivery of a service.  
I use this four-fold framework of governance infrastructure as a starting point in the 
analysis of how governance was weaponized during the Battle for Baghdad. Understanding 
Baghdad’s governance infrastructure during the Battle for Baghdad requires an awareness of the 
dynamic relationships between pre-existing and new institutions, factional conflicts, and changes 
brought on by physical destruction and reconstruction. This study is based on the premise that the 
entanglement of ideational and tangible elements that make up governance in the real world is not 
an intractable obstacle for meaningful study, but an opportunity to harness the inherent ambiguity 
within a concept such as infrastructure to make theoretical and practical insights into complex 
conflict.   
a) Administrative law – the constitutional or foundational legal architecture for an 
institution’s mandate and authority,  
b) Politics – the factional priorities that shape resource allocation and personnel decisions 
for institutions responsible for delivering public goods,  
c) Bureaucracy– an institution’s ability to implement the aims of its political leadership,    
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d) Technology – the physical constraints of the installations that enable or inhibit an 
institution from discharging its directives.    
 
This arrangement of fundamental realms of governance sets the stage for the next phase of 
analysis, a discussion of the discrete systems of governance infrastructure that delivered specific 
public services to the residents of Baghdad. In the introduction, I identified a variety of public 
services and the lack of consensus over a standardized categorization scheme.157  
For this study I have chosen to focus on several key public services serving Baghdad’s 
population. Of course, the governance of Baghdad is far more complex than what can be shown 
by examining a few basic services, but I sought a way to develop a proof-of-concept framework 
that could be expanded in future research. This is not an exhaustive breakdown of every aspect of 
public service but represents an effort to identify a package of systems across different functional 
realms to pinpoint ways to better explain how these infrastructures shaped the conflict in Baghdad.  
 I focus on five specific services within these major sectors of Baghdad’s governance 
infrastructure: 
1) Public order: This category consists of elements of the justice system including courts, 
jails, police, and prisons as well as fire and emergency response.  
a. Police  
2) Transportation: Systems enabling movement of people and goods via ground, air, rail, 
and waterways.  
 
157 Frischman, 4. 
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a. Roads and bridges 
3) Essential services: This category covers critical public services and major utilities. As 
a crucial source of energy for government, business, and private consumption, the 
sprawling system of petroleum products delivers an essential service in Baghdad.    
a. Oil 
4) Expertise services: Iraq, like many states, has a nationalized system for services like 
health care and education. I categorize these as expertise services to identify the major 
service being provided by the government through these systems, namely the expertise 
of professionals trained and licensed by the state. 
a. Hospitals  
5) Entitlement services: Like most states, Iraq’s government provides support to citizens 
according to a variety of criteria, including a monthly food ration basket, welfare 
assistance for widows of the Iran-Iraq War, payments to victims of terrorism, and 
assistance to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).  
a. Assistance to IDPs 
 
In earlier sections I reiterated the importance of understanding infrastructural systems as 
comprising different combinations of hard and soft elements, or installations versus institutions. 
The five infrastructure sectors discussed here provide a sampling of these differences, which I refer 
to as a service’s infrastructural types.    
For example, when referring to a militia’s attacks on the health care infrastructure of a city, 
it is important to differentiate between bombing a hospital (the installation) or intimidating doctors 
(the institution). Building on this concept, I also look at an entire system of public goods or service 
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delivery (such as health care) and indicate to what degree that service is made up of interconnected 
physical networks or interconnected institutional networks. In other words, to what degree is the 
overall system dependent upon primarily installational connections versus institutional 
connections. In the case of health care, a bombing at one hospital is likely to have an impact on 
another hospital due to their institutional connections (the organization must react to reallocate 
resources and patients accordingly) rather than their installational connections. Counter to this 
example would include an attack on a major transmission junction within the electricity system 
that has a major installational effect across that network as other points lose power, but little 
institutional effect within the offices of the Ministry of Electricity.     
Here I present a comparison of the relative degree to which each infrastructural system 
relies upon installations (physical structures and facilities), or institutions (personnel operating 
within a bureaucratic administration). 
 
Table 2.2 Comparison of infrastructural types within sectors  
 PUBLIC ORDER TRANSPORTATION 
ESSENTIAL 
SERVICES 
EXPERTISE ENTITLEMENT 
INSTALLATIONAL  Low High High Low Low 
INSTITUTIONAL High Low High High Low 
  
On one hand, essential services systems are both heavily reliant upon physical components 
of infrastructure such as electrical grids, waterworks, and landfill facilities, and consist of an 
enormous amount of institutional capacity, from political bodies, to engineers, to clerks and other 
administrators, and regulatory agencies. Conversely, entitlement systems have relatively small 
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footprints within a governmental regime, consisting of an administrative network of offices 
capable of identifying and paying deserving citizens. Public order and expertise services are highly 
correlated as systems that have a large institutional presence, consisting of police forces, court 
systems, schools, medical boards, pharmacies, and other bureaucratic elements relative to 
importance of the physical structures that these institutions operate within. This does not mean that 
schools, hospitals, and police stations do not consist of a large amount of physical space within a 
city, but the relative importance of those structures versus the complex technical skills and 
expertise of the personnel operating within them means far less to the overall delivery of those 
services. Finally, transportation networks provide an example of an infrastructural type where the 
physical generally outweighs the institutional. For example, the existence and maintenance of an 
airport runway is a precursor to the effectiveness of any air traffic control institutions intending to 
monitor that facility.         
This shorthand expression of differing degrees of infrastructure complexity leads us toward 
a more granular approach to understanding the vulnerabilities of these systems within a conflict 
zone. It provides insight into how and why these systems become targets of influence by malign 
actors. Asserting control over infrastructural resources in Baghdad included kinetic and non-
kinetic tactics including targeting the physical facilities with bombs, stealing supplies from specific 
depots, coercing individual officials for favorable contracts, or directing resources to factional 
loyalists through legitimate political participation. Each of these actions represents a target choice 
for an actor that results in an impact on the overall excludability of that infrastructure.   
The first insight suggests a degree of target density for each type of system, or category of 
services. There are more targets in highly complex systems, and fewer targets in less complex 
systems. Second, each system type shows a qualitative difference those targets, whether 
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installational or institutional. Systems that are more dependent upon installations of physical 
infrastructures face different threats than systems that are largely institutional. A clearer picture of 
how different infrastructural systems operated within Baghdad will enable a greater ability to 
pinpoint the most exploitable opportunities for these efforts to exert control to succeed. In a later 
section, I return to this analysis to explain how these relative differences influence each service’s 
excludability, or the intrinsic ability to deny its use to a population.   
The final aspect of my framework involves breaking down these services according to their 
tiers, reflecting how each system operates across a hierarchical architecture. These major systems 
consist of individual components, such as a single petrol station, connected to broader arrays of 
petroleum delivery services and bureaucracies, including national pipelines, regional trucking 
patterns, depots, and refineries. I introduce the concept of tiers to describe this hierarchical 
arrangement found within infrastructural systems.  I have imported the supply chain concept to 
illustrate different components of a network or flow.158 This basic concept allows for a 
categorization of specific features of an infrastructure as either an upstream, midstream, or 
downstream element of that system. While the concepts of upstream, midstream, and downstream 
nodes are quite easily grasped when discussing the infrastructure network of commodity services 
such as oil production and distribution, they are also usable with some abstraction across other 
networks within other realms.  
The upstream part of a network deals with the nodes responsible for the generation of a 
flow (such as crude oil production) or at a network’s most macro-level nodes where flows from 
 
158 Christine M. Harland, "Supply chain management: relationships, chains and networks." British Journal of 
management 7 (1996), S63. 
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that location can reach the widest number of potential downstream nodes. Midstream nodes relate 
to a meso-level of analysis, or the in-between linkages of a network. Downstream nodes relate to 
a micro-level analysis, or to the locations that most closely represent the termination of a flow at 
a specific individual. Institutionally, we find parallels between national, provincial, and local 
political bodies.  
In many cases these tiers can be easily shown as political, bureaucratic, or technical 
components of ministries with responsibilities at the national, provincial, or local level. However, 
the complexity of Baghdad’s specific situation bedevils such a clearly delineated scheme in many 
cases, so I have opted to use the abstraction of upstream, midstream, and downstream to capture 
some needed flexibility for my analysis. Innovations in governance structure after 2003 intending 
to promote greater independence for provincial and local authorities across Iraq produced many 
conflicts for service delivery infrastructure. The special status of Baghdad as the capital city also 
created significant problems, discussed in more detail later.159  
Crucial to note is that nearly every service-providing ministry in Iraq had its own 
methodology for organizing its network of facilities, so the creation of new polities at the 
provincial and local level did not clearly parallel the hierarchy of any single ministry’s pre-existing 
(prior to 2003) architecture. For example, prior to 2003, a Ministry of Health office responsible 
for managing health care for the population living in Basra would have been understood as a 
national ministry office operating “in Basra.” After 2003 debates raged to what degree that same 
office should be understood as a component “of Basra,” meaning a component of its provincial 
 
159 Anna Lamberson, “A Capital Law for Baghdad: A Governance Framework for Iraq’s Ancient Capital,” State and 
Local Government Review, 2011, 151.  
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government. Replicating this idea across every national ministry across provincial, district, and 
neighborhood boundaries should provide a degree of understanding of just how difficult the 
implementation of new democratic and decentralized polities upon a traditionally very centralized 
governance system of national ministries.   
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2.2.1.3.1 Public order: Police  The Iraqi Police Service (IPS) faced daunting challenges of 
providing law enforcement services in Baghdad. Under Saddam, police forces were at 
the bottom of the hierarchy of security forces and were often poorly trained and 
equipped, and widely considered brutal and corrupt by the general population.160 The 
Coalition faced significant obstacles in rebuilding the capabilities of the IPS due to 
both the widespread physical destruction of police stations, vehicles, and equipment in 
the wake of the 2003 invasion, and popular misgivings about the legacy of policing 
under Saddam.    
In a centralized state such as Iraq, all police are members of the Ministry of the Interior 
(MoI) and therefore are agents of the national government and not subject to any local 
community’s authority. This changed somewhat with the innovations that strengthened provincial 
government after 2003, with provincial governors gaining some authority over the provincial 
Director of Police (DoP) within their province, but only through a negotiated process involving 
top MoI officials. The selection of the Baghdad DoP became a flashpoint for significant political 
drama in 2005 when the Baghdad Provincial Council (PC) abruptly fired the current DoP, who 
had built a strong relationship with the Coalition elements responsible for training and resourcing 
the IPS in Baghdad.161 
 
160 James L. Jones, et al., The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq (Washington 
D.C.), 93.  
161 Baghdad PRT, “Point Paper: Background and recommendation on PC’s removal of Chief of Police,” Memo from 
Embassy LNO to MND-B Commander, January 20, 2006.   
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Policing in Baghdad suffered from the sectarian-based distribution of cabinet portfolios 
under the new Iraqi state. In 2005, the MoI came under the authority of Bayan Jabr Solagh, a 
former Badr commander who enabled a widespread infiltration of his fellow pro-Iranian militants 
into the various security services, significantly undermining Coalition efforts to build trust and 
respect for the new IPS. Allegations of secret torture cells, kidnappings, and murders by militants 
in IPS uniforms, likely operating under the directives of MoI leadership, darkened the view of 
police forces under Bayan Jabr’s watch and under his successors.162    
The MoI is a complex organization with several bureaucratic divisions. Policing in 
Baghdad resides within the domain of several institutions, from traffic police to border 
enforcement. Police services in Baghdad consist of an infrastructure that accepts and trains new 
recruits, mans and operates police stations across the city, and maintains weapons and equipment 
necessary for law enforcement tasks. Institutional control over police services involves members 
of ministry leadership as well as the Baghdad Governor. Below these figures, we find the Baghdad 
Director of Police and the Provincial Council Security Committee. Major police unit divisions are 
also divided by geographical zones (Karkh and Rusafa) and function (station police, traffic police, 
patrol police, highway patrol). At the downstream level, neighborhood police stations and traffic 
checkpoints form a local level of this service’s infrastructure.   
 
162 “Iraqi Minister Says Torture Allegations Exaggerated,” RadioFreeEurope, November 17, 2005. 
   
 
 102 
2.2.1.3.2 Transportation: Roads and bridges Baghdad is a major metropolitan area with 
highways, railways, river transport, and an international airport bringing traffic and 
goods in and out of the city. Its citizens rely on the ability to transit the city for work, 
commerce, and daily life. Factions that controlled access in and out of the city, within 
its neighborhoods, or with the ability to conduct major attacks against spheres of 
public interaction found leverage in the Battle for Baghdad. Focusing on the physical 
layout of the highways, roads, and bridge connections we see how major highways 
form the upstream component, with the widest possible range of options for flows into 
the city. Crosstown avenues and bridges form the midstream linkages of this network, 
which then leads into specific neighborhoods and destinations within Baghdad. 
Responsibility for the maintenance of these elements fall within departments of either 
Baghdad’s Amanat or the Ministry of Transportation.  
Describing its installational attributes, this network involves several crucial components. 
Three main roads leave Baghdad to the north, two leading to Baquba in Diyala province and one 
through Taji on the way to Balad in Salah ad-Din province. Westward routes out of Baghdad pass 
the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) and head towards Falluja and the Sunni-majority Anbar 
province. South of Mahmoudiya, routes head towards the holy Shia cities of Karbala and Hillah. 
Heading southeast from downtown Baghdad key routes lead through Salman Pak on the way to 
Kut.  
Major routes in, out, and through Baghdad became significant theaters of conflict between 
insurgent groups and the Coalition. Conflicts erupted over control of crosstown arteries running 
east-west over the Tigris river, as well as several of the broad shopping and travel ways running 
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north-south on either the Karkh (west) or Rusafa (east) side of the city. The Haifa Street corridor 
in Karkh is one such route that was highly contested by insurgents.    
Points within specific neighborhoods are the terminal nodes of this network, notably in 
areas cordoned off by the major wall-building projects that sought to curb insurgent freedom of 
movement across the city and provide greater safety to communities threatened by sectarian 
attacks.  
The importance of bridges to the overall functioning of Baghdad cannot be overstated. The 
vulnerability of existing structures and the status of repairs to damaged elements was a primary 
concern of Coalition reconstruction efforts. The map below consists of a typical briefing slide used 
to coordinate efforts among military and diplomatic efforts during the Surge, capturing the 
vulnerability of Baghdad’s transportation network to interdiction at critical bridge crossings. 
 
 
 
   
 
 104 
Figure 2.3 Bridge repairs in Baghdad (circa. 2007)163 
 
 
163 Baghdad PRT Briefing Book, 2007.  
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2.2.1.3.3 Essential services: Oil The Ministry of Oil (MoO) is a sprawling component of Iraq’s 
services infrastructure. It functions as a “fully integrated oil company”164 with 
elements controlling the “1) exploration and production of crude oil, natural gas, and 
condensate, and gas liquids; 2) refining; 3) transportation and distribution of crude and 
finished products; 4) marketing and supply for crude oil or finished products; 5) 
security for MoO assets; and 6) representing Iraq to international bodies, as 
appropriate.”165   
This service epitomizes the upstream, midstream, and downstream model of infrastructural 
systems, with clearly defined echelons of operations. Oil fields and wells form the upstream level, 
producing the raw products that are then sent to the midstream refineries. Refined products then 
move through the downstream elements of the network for distribution at terminals and service 
stations.166 Possessing the third-largest oil reserves in the world,167 Iraq lacked the ability to fully 
take advantage of its oil wealth due to technical difficulties in its refinement capability. Iraq needed 
to export most of its crude product, heavy fuel oil, to neighboring nations to trade for more refined 
products such as gasoline and kerosene to meet domestic demand for those products.168         
This lack of domestic refining capability produced exploitable opportunities for nonstate 
actor intervention. The extensive need for import and export trade made the transit points for these 
 
164 MND-B G5 report, ITG Council of Ministers, G-5-D-6 (Unclassified). 
165 Ibid. 
166 SIGIR, Hard Lessons, 136. 
167 Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Country Analysis Briefs: Iraq,” August 2007, 2.  
168 SIGIR, Hard Lessons, 137. 
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products highly critical territory to control. The ports of Basra, and the major trucking routes north 
to Turkey and West to Jordan became vulnerable to illicit control and created highly profitable 
opportunities for private and factional corruption. Because the movement of product by tanker 
trucks is far easier to corrupt than product moving through pipelines, factions often sought the 
disruption of pipelines in order to increase reliance on trucks. This created seemingly strange 
opportunities for factional rivals like JAM and AQI to find methods to cooperate when presented 
with financial opportunities. This situation is discussed in more detail in a later chapter.   
Gaining illicit control over distribution points formed a large part of JAM’s strategy. 
Downstream control over petrol stations provided extensive profits for militants. The distribution 
of kerosene, the major fuel used for domestic cooking, was conducted by the MoO through agents 
at local councils. Local councils in Baghdad’s neighborhoods operated depots where kerosene was 
delivered to be sold at an official subsidized government rate. Through thuggery or collusion with 
willing agents at these local councils, JAM seized the opportunity to set black market rates for 
kerosene, another lucrative source of income.   
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2.2.1.3.4 Expertise services: Hospitals The Ministry of Health (MoH) is responsible for the 
oversight, policy, planning, and operation of the health care system across Iraq. 
Serious challenges faced Baghdad in the reconstruction of this network, both 
institutionally and in its physical infrastructure. The Baghdad PC strategic plan of 
2007 noted that the city had 79 hospitals, 300 other medical institutions, and 12 
popular medical clinics. 169 Shortages of adequate equipment and medicines stymied 
health care, as well as a brain drain of qualified doctors and medical professionals who 
fled Iraq for neighboring countries with safer conditions and higher salaries. Iraq’s 
pharmaceutical industry lagged international standards following years of war and 
sanctions. Even the showpiece of Baghdad’s medical community, the teaching 
hospitals of Medical City in Bab al-Moatham on the downtown east bank of the Tigris, 
suffered significant shortages of supplies and personnel, broken air conditioners, and 
notoriously bad elevators.170     
Understanding the institutional network of the MoH provides significant insight into how 
legitimate political authority was coopted for a variety of criminal and sectarian ends by the 
Sadrists and Jaish al-Mahdi. At the highest level, Sadrists gained positions within MoH leadership 
positions. This enabled the authority to control selections of the DGs serving at crucial institutions 
across Baghdad, enabling more influence over local hospitals and clinics.      
 
169 “Baghdad Provincial Council Strategy Objectives (draft, English translation).” October 7, 2007, 37.  
 
170 Dahr Jamial, “In Baghdad, Even the Hospitals Are Sick,” Antiwar.com (September 26, 2008). 
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2.2.1.3.5 Entitlement services: Assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs)  The 
Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) is the body responsible for 
developing and implementing policies and programs addressing the care, repatriation, 
relocation, resettlement, and reintegration of Iraqi and non-Iraqi refugees and IDPs. A 
relatively small bureaucracy, the MoDM served largely as a coordination body for a 
variety of Iraqi ministries, United Nations groups, the Red Crescent, and other 
international aid organizations such as the International Medical Corps during the 
massive upheaval brought on by the sectarian conflict in Baghdad.  
Needy populations requested support through a network operating from the local level to 
provincial and national ministry offices. To request aid, IDPs registered their presence in a new 
neighborhood at a local council, where their personal information was collected (names, previous 
residence, claims of violence, injuries or deaths) and reported to the PC Committee for Migration 
and Displacement. The PC forwarded these requests up to the national MoDM office. In 2007, an 
assistance payment to an IDP family amounted to roughly $100. The PC coordinated with the Red 
Crescent and other international aid offices across Baghdad to provide additional sources of 
assistance for registered IDPs.171     
Understanding the provision of this service requires a tracing of how national policies 
directed the MoDM to work with the PC Displacement and Migration Committee to provide 
resources to local councils and Red Crescent offices intended to serve IDP populations.   
 
 
171 Baghdad PRT Report, “Saydiya Support Council Discusses Second Round of IDP Returns,” April 12, 2008.  
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Figure 2.4 Sample IDP tracker for Sunni families displaced in May 2006172  
 
The above document is an example of raw data used to record IDP information at the local 
level during the crisis in Baghdad. International aid workers and members of Baghdad’s local 
councils aggregated this raw data to justify the allocation of resources to needy neighborhoods 
with large IDP populations. Some neighborhoods saw an influx of hundreds of families seeking 
safety, stressing systems of infrastructure already challenged by the conflict.      
 
172 “IMC Summary Chart of Current Displacement and Related IDP Locations,” International Medical Corps, May, 
2006. 
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2.3 The weaponization of governance 
So far in this chapter I have discussed the Battle of Baghdad as an important episode of 
contemporary complex conflict, and the various theoretical and practical issues it presents to 
academic and policymaking fields. I articulated a pragmatic approach to the research questions I 
posed in the introduction regarding how armed actors use different types of urban networks to 
achieve their aims. The logic behind my approach reflects an effort to bring actor-centric analyses 
into more productive conversations with perspectives focused on the environmental aspects of 
conflict. This approach focuses on developing a methodology to demonstrate how the underlying 
governance infrastructure of Baghdad shaped the trajectory of the conflict as a dynamic, and not 
merely static, element of the battlefield. This section continues with a deeper look into how I 
operationalize the weaponization of governance.   
Introducing the Battle for Baghdad, I identified the three most significant belligerents and 
their overarching strategic aims. The Coalition executed a regime-changing military invasion and 
then set about to fundamentally reconstruct a new system of governance for the Iraqi state. The 
reconstruction was opposed by the revolutionary insurgency of al-Qaeda in Iraq, seeking system 
collapse, and by the resistance insurgency of Jaish al-Mahdi, seeking system cooption. While the 
overarching strategies of AQI and JAM fundamentally differed, I explained that their tactical 
behaviors often appeared very similar. To reconcile these differences, I introduced the framework 
of profit, power, and authority as a method to differentiate these behaviors and take a deeper look 
at how these major belligerents interacted with each other and environment. These groups used the 
provision of public services in their efforts to support organizational goals, fight against rivals, and 
challenge the state. How did these groups weaponize governance? In this section I expand on my 
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methodological framework by incorporating some economic concepts related to the provision of 
public goods and services.  
2.3.1 Non-ideal governance during complex conflict  
In basic economic theory, a good (or service) can be said to be excludable if it has 
characteristics that make it possible to deny access to that good or service, and non-excludable if 
non-paying consumers cannot be denied access. The concept of excludability goes hand in hand 
with the concept of rivalry. Goods can be said to be rivalrous or non-rivalrous in their consumption, 
meaning that consumption by one party denies the ability of another party to consume that same 
good. These theoretical concepts produce an idealized typology for understanding different 
categories of economic goods (of which public services are one). However, there are important 
ways that theory differs from reality, and how clear-cut distinctions between these categories are 
often difficult to pin down.173  Conflict scenarios like the Battle for Baghdad present situations 
where theoretical typologies break down, and the goods and services generally falling neatly into 
one or another category instead exist on a continuum across these categories.174 
 
173 Elinor Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems,” The 
American economic review 100.3 (2010): 641–672. 
174 Roy D. Adams and Ken McCormick, "Private goods, club goods, and public goods as a continuum." Review of 
Social Economy 45, no. 2 (1987): 192-199. 
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In the ideal world of basic economic theory, most goods fall into one of four major types.175 
Rivalrous and non-rivalrous goods can be either excludable or nonexcludable. Private goods are 
the simplest type of good to grasp as they are inherently both rivalrous and excludable. Tangible 
items like food or cars fall into this category. I can buy an apple, but if you don’t have money, you 
can’t buy an apple. I can eat an apple, but you cannot eat the same apple. The next category 
involves goods that be consumed simultaneously by paying customers and denied to nonpaying 
customers. These are often designated as toll (or club) goods. Going to see a movie involves 
consuming a good that is excludable but non-rivalrous. We can both pay to go see the same movie. 
Nonexcludable goods, where consumption cannot be denied, make up categories of 
common pool resources and public goods. Everyone may have access to common pool resources 
like fish stocks, but if I catch all the fish, you won’t catch any. This is different from national 
defense, a public good that benefits everybody in a nonexcludable and non-rivalrous way. These 
categories represent an idealized typology of the intrinsic qualities of these goods.  
 
 
Table 2.3 Basic typology of goods  
 
NONEXCLUDABLE EXCLUDABLE 
 
NONRIVALROUS 
 
 
Public goods 
 
 
Toll goods 
 
RIVALROUS 
 
Common pool resources 
 
Private goods 
 
 
 
175 Frischmann, 24.  
   
 
 113 
Recognizing several ways that reality diverges from ideal theoretical conditions, 
economists have introduced variations to this typology. Both excludability and rivalrousness can 
be shown to produce flexible categories in some situations. Excludability is a characteristic that 
can be highly contingent upon other factors within an economy and can be shown to exist along a 
spectrum of “feasibility,” with some goods much more easily denied to consumers than others.176 
Some goods that may be purely non-rivalrous for small groups of consumers become rivalrous 
when large numbers of consumers are involved. This introduces an intermediate category of 
congestible goods. Access to public streets demonstrates the concept of congestibility. There is a 
limit to the amount of traffic that can share the use of these goods in a non-rivalrous way.  
Combining this category of congestible goods with the continuum of feasibility to which 
we can ascribe differing levels of excludability introduces modifications to this basic typology.177 
Marketability represents the ability to make the good excludable. Purity and impurity represent 
degrees of rivalrousness that a good may demonstrate. Theoretically, pure public goods reflect 
absolute non-rivalrousness, or those that are “equally available” to all members of a community.178 
Impure public goods demonstrate some degree of rivalrousness.    
 
 
 
 
176 Adams and McCormick, 192.  
177 Ibid., 194. 
178 James M. Buchanon, The demand and supply of public goods (The collected works of James M. Buchanon, volume 
5), (Liberty Fund, Inc.: 1999), 48. 
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Table 2.4 Modified typology of goods 
 
NOT FEASIBLY 
EXCLUDABLE 
FEASIBLY EXCLUDABLE 
NONRIVALROUS Non-marketable pure public goods Marketable public goods 
 
CONGESTIBLE 
 
Non-marketable impure public 
goods 
Toll goods 
RIVALROUS 
 
Common pool resources Private goods 
 
 
Why does theory differ from reality? In a nutshell, law and order. Conditions of peace, 
order, and good governance are basic assumptions underlying these idealized theoretical 
categories, and reality often presents situations where fundamental legal and political 
circumstances are either imperfect, or in upheaval.179 The invasion, occupation and reconstruction 
of Iraq presents a unique opportunity to investigate how a fundamental upheaval in a state’s 
governance infrastructure influenced the provision of public goods and services, distorting basic 
theoretical categories based on excludability and rivalrousness. A state’s ability to maintain the 
necessary norms of law and order to provide a good’s ideal condition of excludability is 
undermined by both its own weaknesses and the actions of nonstate actors deliberately trying to 
undermine the fundamental stability of these norms.  
Following the invasion, the state of Iraq (a progression of several transitional regimes 
before full sovereignty as the Government of Iraq) faced major difficulties in establishing and 
 
179 Peter Drahos, "The regulation of public goods." Journal of International Economic Law 7, no. 2 (2004): 321-339.  
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maintaining positive norms of law and order, undermining effective governance in Baghdad. 
Challenges to law and order stemmed from several major sources. The dramatic political upheaval 
brought on by the Coalition’s reconstruction efforts served as the primary source of disruption. 
Fundamental changes to the state of Iraq in the forms of constitutional and institutional 
transformation and a series of major electoral events fomented an environment of extreme 
volatility in governance.  
Secondly, factions gaining power over governance institutions did not always operate those 
institutions in good faith, or in a manner that would demonstrate an effort to deliver services 
impartially to the population. Instead, power over governance institutions often served as the 
primary source of resources for these factions.180     
A third source of challenges to law and order were the actions of nonstate actors 
deliberately aiming to undermine its establishment. A last source would include the decrepit state 
of Baghdad’s physical infrastructures and weaknesses in its institutions due to underfunding, lack 
of trained personnel, and other preexisting issues that made the already difficult task of running a 
major city even tougher. Taken all together, these factors upset the normal legal and institutional 
frameworks undergirding Baghdad’s governance infrastructure. What resulted were shifts in the 
feasibility of excludability among goods and services delivered by this infrastructure.  
In the aftermath of the invasion, the inability of the Coalition to provide law and order 
adequately and consistently for large segments of Baghdad’s population led to the emergence of 
 
180 Dodge, Toby, “Back to the Future: The Failure to Reform the Post-War Political Economy of Iraq.” In Political 
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neighborhood militias. Locally based armed groups proved willing to assert their own version of 
law and order within their communities. This assertion of power sometimes extended to all 
members of the neighborhood, but sometimes stopped at the doorstep of a family belonging to the 
wrong ethnic group.   
In this situation we could say that a quintessentially public good, security, both 
theoretically nonexcludable and non-rivalrous, became more feasibly excludable. Some 
consumers were favored over others. This dynamic produced pockets of security across Baghdad, 
referred to by Alice Hills as the “ghettoization of security” in Iraq.181 This provides a notable 
example of how the disruption to the governance infrastructure of Baghdad created a shift in the 
feasible excludability in public goods, creating exploitable opportunities for nonstate actors 
seeking strategic aims.   
Previously, I identified five major services that I intend to focus on during the case study 
analysis. While they are not the only services I examine in this study, I explained how they provide 
me a basic package of infrastructure types. Now I explain their selection within the context of the 
theoretical approach I have outlined above. 
Each of the five services I have selected fall within the categories of pure and impure public 
goods and reflect variations on the spectrums of rivalrousness and feasible excludability as 
presented above. I look at police in Baghdad, falling within the sector of public order, generally 
considered a pure public good and one that in ideal situations reflects non-rivalrous and 
nonexcludable attributes. Following Hills’ analysis, I look at ways that breakdowns in Baghdad 
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made this service more feasibly excludable than it otherwise, under ideal conditions, would be. 
Next, I identify access to roads and bridges, a component of Baghdad’s transportation 
infrastructure. Transportation is generally categorized as an impure public good, and one that 
demonstrates attributes of congestibility. Similarly, the next area of service, hospitals, also reflects 
the congestibility of an impure public good within Baghdad’s governance infrastructure. Looking 
at oil as a crucial commodity produced and delivered to residents as a marketable public good in a 
variety of forms (kerosene, petrol, etc.), it demonstrates a very feasibly excludable element of 
Baghdad’s essential services infrastructure. Lastly, payments to IDPs reflects a unique type of 
service, an entitlement to members of a designated class identified by legislation. Anyone who 
qualified as a member of the class was eligible for the service, making it theoretically non-rivalrous 
but also quite feasibly excludable.        
During the Battle for Baghdad, the lack of requisite norms produced non-ideal conditions, 
affecting the excludability of the provision of crucial public goods and services. Facing intense 
political upheaval and the challenge of insurgent groups, Baghdad’s governance infrastructure did 
not operate according to the logic of idealized theoretical conditions, but instead reflected a messy 
reality.  
Understanding this reality requires investigating the connections between the turmoil 
brought on by the Coalition’s reconstruction policies and the opportunities available to AQI and 
JAM to pursue their objectives in weaponizing governance to achieve profit, power, and authority. 
While the state struggled to provide services, nonstate actors coopted, corrupted, and disrupted 
these services. Looking at the intrinsic nature of a variety of services provides insight into 
evaluating which services were the most difficult for the state to deliver, and which services 
provided the most lucrative targets for nonstate disruption.    
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2.3.2 Provision and denial of services for individuals and groups 
 Here I utilize the economic principles introduced above to create a workable shorthand for 
describing and mapping the patterns that I believe to be fundamental to understanding complex 
conflict. Above I discussed excludability and rivalrousness as intrinsic attributes of the services 
provided as public goods to the residents of Baghdad. The conflict in Iraq produced a wartime 
political order182 of significant complexity, with powerful nonstate actors vying for control over 
elements of Baghdad’s urban topography. Under these conditions, the intrinsic attributes of these 
public goods manifested differently than in theoretically ideal conditions. Nonstate actors 
exploited these non-ideal attributes to influence the production and delivery of public goods. This 
section explains how I intend to operationalize these concepts. 
First, I turn to excludability. Under conflict conditions goods are more feasibly excludable 
than under ideal conditions. Nonstate actors with the intent to control the provision or denial of 
these goods could more feasibly do so. Examining the delivery of specific services in Baghdad 
reveals ways that nonstate actors produced and took advantage of shifts in excludability. In an 
ideal state, these goods would have been produced and delivered to all deserving or paying 
consumers based on some legitimate institutional mandate. During the Battle for Baghdad, I look 
at instances where reality fell short of this theoretical ideal. Capturing excludability provided 
nonstate actors the ability to provide or deny access to services that under normal conditions they 
would not.  
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Excludability is not the same as exclusion. It refers to the ability to exclude, which may or 
may not be exercised. When nonstate actors exploit excludability, they are exploiting an intrinsic 
quality of a service in order to exercise control over that service outside the legitimate frameworks 
of governance. Conversely, every time a service is denied to a deserving consumer by a nonstate 
actor, it does not mean that a control of excludability was exercised. Groups disrupted the delivery 
of service through theft, destruction, and other methods of denial. When looking at the tactical 
behaviors of AQI and JAM, I look at instances of when these nonstate groups influenced the state’s 
ability to produce and deliver public goods. In some instances, they illicitly took control over 
provision of services in a neighborhood to reap illegal profits. In others, they attacked major 
installations of physical infrastructure. The concept of excludability provides a way to compare 
the logic behind these different acts, as different service infrastructures present inherently different 
opportunities to exert control over the provision and denial of different public goods.         
Another way to compare these acts is to assess whether they are directed at controlling the 
provision or denial of a service to individual or large groups of consumers. This adds another 
dimension to my analysis, incorporating the intuition that underlies the concepts of rivalrousness 
and congestibility, that there is a degree to which consumption by an individual can be 
differentiated from consumption by a group.183     
Previously, I identified the contest over control of governance as the central component of 
complex conflict on a metropolitan battlefield. This study presents the Battle for Baghdad as 
fundamentally a contest between state and nonstate actors over the provision or denial of public 
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goods. This provision or denial occurred across a range of critical public services infrastructures 
intending to impact a discriminate or indiscriminate portion of the population. Presenting a 
visualization of these concepts creates the primary typology of tactical behaviors utilized in the 
within-case analyses that follow, as seen in the figure below.  
 
 
Figure 2.5 Competitive control of governance through provision and denial   
 
Categorizing the most significant types of behaviors of the belligerents of the Battle for 
Baghdad creates the following four categories.  
Legitimate provision: Theoretically, states intend to provide public goods in an impartial 
manner according to legal frameworks and institutional mandates that achieve equitable goals for 
the society they serve. The Coalition’s stated aims involved reconstructing an Iraqi state able to 
discharge this ideal type of governance. The reconstruction of Iraq involved a variety of individuals 
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and factions not necessarily aligned with this idealistic objective. Of those engaged in legitimate 
political participation many sought to enable the indiscriminate and equitable provision of services, 
while others used the legitimacy conferred by electoral victory or civil service position to serve 
the goals of factional interest or pursue the individual benefits of corruption.    
Catastrophic denial: Directly counter to the intent of enabling an ideal state to deliver 
services indiscriminately to a population is the intent to indiscriminately deny those services to the 
widest possible segment of the population. Attacks on the ability of the state to produce specific 
public goods undermines the legitimacy of the state and creates vulnerabilities within the 
population that can be exploited for factional aims. Tactics that involve targeting the upstream 
components of infrastructural systems responsible for the production and transmission of critical 
public goods fall within this category. These acts demonstrate an aim to deny the delivery of 
services not just to individuals, but to entire populations.   
Concentrated denial: On a smaller scale, nonstate actors may also execute tactical 
operations that prevent the delivery of public goods provided by the state to be delivered to specific 
individuals or communities. Gaining control over the downstream elements of service delivery 
provided opportunities for factions to pursue several aims. On one hand, we observe the behavior 
of AQI as they sought haven in Sunni neighborhoods. Deliberately cutting off the ability of the 
Iraqi state to provide public goods in some areas served two aims, in undermining legitimacy for 
the state, and in producing demand for the alternative provision of services. On the other hand, the 
ability to control service delivery at the individual level afforded JAM opportunities to pursue 
sectarian goals by denying resources to Sunnis as well as make illicit profits on the black market.     
Illicit provision: When nonstate actors gain the ability to control the consumption of a 
public good and turn the benefits of that control to the purposes of factional aims, this is illicit 
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provision. It is the misuse of a public resource for factional gain. A few examples help to clarify 
how illicit provision may or may not involve those engaged in legitimate governance. JAM 
militants often took control over neighborhood gas stations (a component of the nationalized oil 
industry) and decided that there was one price for Shia customers, and another for Sunnis. In some 
cases, this was the act of a local gang working independently, and in others the takeover was 
abetted by elected Sadrist officials within local and provincial institutions providing connections 
to Ministry of Oil resources. In either case the ability to benefit from the provision of retail access 
to public goods produced by the state forms this category of governance weaponization.  
Alternative provision: The provision of public goods not produced by the state to 
consumers creates this category. Each faction involved in the Battle for Baghdad provided services 
to select residents and communities that did not involve relying on elements of Iraq’s governance 
infrastructure. In neighborhoods controlled by AQI, a denial of public order services that involved 
the adjudication of disputes was accompanied by their offer of an alternative to the Iraqi state 
justice system through the provision of sharia courts. JAM provided social welfare services 
outside of legitimate state authority through offices of the OMS. Another form of alternative 
provision was produced by Coalition units using CERP funds to build service-providing 
infrastructural assets outside the bounds of legitimate Iraqi state authority.      
The typology presented above articulates the major methods involved in the weaponization 
of governance. The array of tactical actions undertaken by the Coalition, AQI and JAM will be 
categorized as legitimate provision, catastrophic denial, concentrated denial, illicit provision, and 
alternative provision. An analysis of these tactics feeds into the overall analysis of how each of 
these factions pursues system reconstruction, system collapse, or system cooption.  
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2.4 Methodology  
Because I am operating in an emerging field amidst a fusion of concepts and techniques 
from many other fields, I have sought to make this dissertation a theory-building exercise to make 
the most significant and novel contribution possible. It is structured as a three-part within-case 
study. Case study analysis is often seen as a preferred method when how or why questions 
concerning contemporary problems are under investigation.184 Because I intend to look at how and 
why certain actors targeted various terrain features of this urban topography, this method is 
appropriate. Because I aim to discover contrasts and similarities across distinct nonstate actors 
within my case, a controlled comparison is the approach utilized.185  
A comparison of the ways that these major combatants used urban infrastructure to achieve 
their aims of profit, power, and authority follows the logic of finding crucial cases for qualitative 
study.186 I have intuited a series of relationships among actors and their environments in a setting 
of high-intensity conflict within a city, and I formalize my findings about these relationships in the 
conclusion chapter. During this research I utilized a trove of recently declassified US State 
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Department cables reporting on insurgent strategies and tactics in Baghdad,187 a set of documents 
collected during my service in Baghdad,188 and a number of other primary and journalistic sources 
and published datasets on the conflict in Iraq.   
I have also integrated several elements of the US Army’s methodology of intelligence 
preparation of the battlefield (IPB), a method for collecting, organizing, and processing 
information relevant to a unit’s area of operations that enables its military decision-making process 
(MDMP).189 Recent operations like the war in Iraq have driven a new generation of revisions to 
doctrine regarding counterinsurgency and urban operations, and intelligence improvements as IPB 
methods continue to adapt to what the US military sees as significant trend lines towards more 
urban, and more complex conflicts.190  
The first within-case study differs somewhat from the second and third. In this initial study 
I focus on the Coalition’s efforts to implement a radical reconstruction of the state of Iraq, and 
how fundamental changes to the governance infrastructure of the state rippled out to impact the 
delivery of public goods and services at the local level to the residents of Baghdad. One might 
regard the challenges of delivering services while fundamentally altering the legal and political 
 
187 Executive Order 13526 mandates that cables automatically become declassified upon the date specified by the 
original classification authority, which in most cases was set at 10 years from the date of publication. (Sec. 1.5), 
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188 These are identified as either personal interviews conducted by the author, Baghdad PRT reports with or without 
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frameworks of service delivery as trying to steer a train as you rip up the tracks. In this component 
of my analysis of the Battle for Baghdad, I utilize the framework of governance infrastructure 
presented above to dissect the major elements of reconstruction policy and how they produced and 
exacerbated non-ideal conditions of law and order. These non-ideal conditions led to major 
challenges in the delivery of public goods to the residents of Baghdad. I demonstrate how major 
legal and political changes in the state of Iraq influenced the day-to-day operations of the most 
critical component of Baghdad’s governance infrastructure, the Amanat Baghdad. The Amanat is 
the institution mandated to provide a range of basic services to the residents of Iraq’s capital city 
and surrounding region. The Coalition’s reconstruction efforts created seismic shifts to the state of 
Iraq that reverberated down to the delivery of basic services at the local level and produced 
opportunities for nonstate actors to exploit this disruption.  
Tracing the impact of reconstruction policy on Baghdad’s governance infrastructure sets 
up the following two parts of the within-case study. In each of these, the tactics of al-Qaeda in Iraq 
and Jaish al-Mahdi to use governance in their efforts to control features of urban topography during 
the Battle for Baghdad are analyzed. Each group is analyzed according to major efforts to achieve 
profit, power, and challenge authority. Their use of governance is assessed according to the 
fourfold typology introduced above, describing tactical actions as taking part in legitimate or illicit 
provision and concentrated or catastrophic denial.  
The within-case study of three major factions, the Coalition, AQI, and JAM enables a 
deeper understanding of how each of these actors interacted with each other and a complex urban 
topography to produce the trajectory of the Battle for Baghdad. Each of these actors were identified 
as pursuing one of three different overarching strategies. The Coalition pursued system 
reconstruction, AQI pursued system collapse, and JAM pursued system cooption.  In the 
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conclusion I evaluate how these strategies were pursued, and what elements of urban topography 
were most enabling to these pursuits.             
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3.0 SYSTEM RECONSTRUCTION: THE COALITION  
Baghdad is a city, a province, and a national capital. In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion 
conflicts over these seemingly trivial descriptive aspects of Baghdad’s status turned into lethal 
contestations. Each of these terms relate to a legal definition of a place that is in no way reflected 
in any material aspect of the city. So how did intangible ideas about a place create very real 
conflict? This question lies at the heart of understanding complex conflict involving governance. 
In this chapter I focus on the Coalition’s implementation of several key reconstruction 
policies in Iraq, and how these disruptions to governance infrastructure produced and exacerbated 
non-ideal conditions of law and order. These non-ideal conditions led to major challenges in the 
delivery of public goods to the residents of Baghdad. I present the major disruptions across these 
following four categories, previously introduced as the components of governance infrastructure. 
a) Administrative law – the constitutional or foundational legal architecture for an 
institution’s mandate and authority,  
b) Politics – the factional priorities that shape resource allocation and personnel decisions 
for institutions responsible for delivering public goods,  
c) Bureaucracy– an institution’s ability to implement the aims of its political leadership,    
d) Technology – the physical constraints of the installations that enable or inhibit an 
institution from discharging its directives.    
 
The Coalition’s reconstruction efforts created seismic shifts to the state of Iraq that 
reverberated down to the delivery of basic services at the local level, including the day-to-day 
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operations of the most critical institution serving the capital city, the Amanat Baghdad. My focus 
on the Amanat’s role during the Battle for Baghdad serves to bring different narratives on the Iraq 
War into conversation. Rarely featured as a primary component of the Surge, I intend to highlight 
the unlikely importance of bureaucracy in shaping the trajectory of this conflict.  
3.1 Fundamental changes to Iraqi administrative law and politics  
In early May 2003, the Bush Administration decided to make a change. A few weeks after 
putting LTG Jay Garner (ret.) and his Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
(ORHA) in charge of reconstruction policy in Iraq, Bush opted to change direction and install the 
more robust CPA under Ambassador L. Paul Bremer. While ORHA had been criticized for 
appearing sluggish to install a new Iraqi government, Bremer is now widely criticized for many 
brash decisions he made during the early months of the US-led reconstruction of Iraq. These 
decisions served an overall aim of transforming Iraq according to a Washington Consensus 
approach of neoliberal reform and targeted three main areas of Iraq’s political economy: the ruling 
elite, the coercive capacity of the state, and the state’s role in the economy.191  
Four days into country, Bremer issued CPA Order 1, De-Ba’athification’ of Iraqi society. 
This decree mandated the purging of government employees who held significant rank within the 
Ba’ath party, removing not only sycophantic supporters of Saddam, but also wide swaths of 
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technically competent administrators needed to rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure.192 Bremer followed 
this with another order disbanding the Iraqi Army, controversially alienating potential officers and 
soldiers with loyalties to the Iraqi nation beyond their fealty to Saddam. While many of Bremer’s 
moves could be seen in the light of serving some broad neoliberal agenda, they also dovetailed 
closely with the aims of both exile and domestic Shia community leadership, many seeking 
personal payback against the Ba’athists who had imprisoned or murdered their families.193  
Over the summer of 2003, an Iraqi Governing Council, a 25-member advisory council, was 
constructed to represent Iraq’s ethnic diversity. Its members consisted of 13 Shia, five Sunni, five 
Kurd, a Turkoman, and a Christian. These members were drawn from exiles and domestic 
representatives of a hodgepodge of Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish groups.194 In September, this group 
divvied up the national ministries responsible for critical aspects of governance infrastructure 
according to the same sectarian mathematics of the Iraqi Governing Council, with Shia parties 
gaining the lion’s share of crucial positions. This should be noted as a critical point in the 
reconstruction of Iraq, as it fundamentally cemented a politics based on a “primordial approach” 
of aligning political identity with ethnic and sectarian identity.195 The die was cast; traditional 
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vertical identities would trump modern horizontal identities in Baghdad. Politics in the new Iraqi 
state would be driven by a three-way contest among Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish constituencies.   
Pushed by Ayatollah al-Sistani, Bremer set a rapid timeline for full transition back to Iraqi 
sovereignty by June 2004. This put key electoral and administrative milestones on the calendar. 
An interim constitution, the Transitional Administrative Law, provided a roadmap for political 
transition and included elections by January 2005 for a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) 
and new provincial councils. Following that event would be a referendum on the new constitution 
(drafted by the TNA) by October 2005. Finally, elections for a new sovereign government were 
set for December 2005.196 A series of fundamental changes shaped the state of Iraq during 2005.  
The Interim Iraqi Government under the leadership of former exile Iyad Allawi (secular 
Shia) took over as the sovereign government of Iraq on June 28, 2004 and governed until the Iraqi 
Transitional Government formed under Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari (Da’wa) in May 2005. 
 In many ways, the Jaafari government proved a lame duck regime during a critical time for 
Iraq’s political development. Knowing that electoral results in another round of elections would 
likely render moot any significant decisions made under his watch, Jaafari played it safe while 
more aggressive factions sought to shape politics in Baghdad. Over 2005, a new constitution was 
ratified, and another round of elections were held, paving the way for the regime of Nouri al-Maliki 
to begin taking over as the first non-caretaker government of a new Iraq in early 2006. 
The wrangling over cabinet positions formed a major element of the political contests 
between factions, as control over bureaucratic territory strengthened factional control over the 
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resources and authority flowing through these infrastructures. Rivalry was most acute over the 
crucial components of the Iraqi state apparatus, such as the ministries of interior, defense, oil, 
electricity, and planning. Other positions were divvied out amongst the factions as a way to build 
alliances.  
3.2 A new plan for local governance in Baghdad  
Under Saddam, governance in Iraq consisted of a system directed by Ba’athist leadership 
that delegated authority to Ba’athist bureaucrats to manage a system run by technocrats, serving a 
quiescent population. National ministries provided services according to the logic that best served 
those ministries, regardless of provincial or local boundaries. Political priorities flowed vertically 
down from higher bureaucratic leadership and then across to the technocratic managers at that 
level of governance.         
After 2003, efforts to decentralize and democratize Iraq introduced political bodies at 
provincial, municipal, and local levels that had no pre-existing authority over the delivery of 
services by national ministries. These innovations developed over 2003 and 2004 as Coalition units 
worked with local Iraqis and the US Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Local 
Governance Program I (LPG I) to create a system of local councils to assist in the management of 
government services in what was intended to be a more decentralized Iraq.  
In the 88 neighborhoods of metropolitan Baghdad and twenty villages in the outlying 
provincial area, the first local councils were formed during small-scale community elections run 
largely with the help of local military units. Representatives from these neighborhood councils 
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were chosen to form district councils, larger bodies that were to engage with officials responsible 
for providing services within their local area.  
These councils were given ambiguous and conflicting authority over the pre-existing 
bureaucratic and technical structures of governance infrastructure. They faced considerable 
challenges in enforcing their will mainly because they did not possess taxation and budgeting 
authority over service delivery in their local communities. That remained within the purview of 
the national ministries. They were intended to introduce democratic input to the governance of 
Baghdad in an “advisory” capacity, influencing how bureaucrats of the national ministries 
delivered services to their communities. Instead, these local councils often relied upon local 
Coalition forces units to fund local reconstruction projects. Coalition units following the dictates 
of counterinsurgency theory proved willing to fund projects that gained them support in local areas.  
This produced one of the underlying paradoxes of Coalition reconstruction policy. Local 
Iraqi leaders were often frustrated by the failure of the legitimate government to deliver needed 
public goods. Coalition units often sought to mollify discontent within their battlespace and 
empower cooperative local leaders. Coalition forces gained trust and goodwill in communities by 
supporting local governance, but these projects did not always align with an overall agenda to 
enable the Iraqi state to produce and deliver public goods to meet the needs of its population. This 
dynamic produced co-dependent relationships between local Iraqi leaders and local Coalition 
units. Reconstruction policy produced several such paradoxes where intended results were stymied 
by faulty incentive structures.  
During this early period of the occupation, fundamental changes to administrative law 
reshaped the landscape of Iraqi governance intending to make it more decentralized and more 
democratic. Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) Article 55 gave the right of each province to 
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form a provincial council, name a governor, and form municipal and local councils. TAL Article 
56 described the relationship of the provincial governments to the national government as one of 
assistance in coordinating the work of the federal ministries. Article 57 gave all powers not 
exclusively reserved to the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) to provincial governments, 
broadly defining the mandate of those governments’ responsibilities.197 
These transitional elements of Iraqi law derived their authority from CPA Order 71, a 
fundamentally important component of reconstruction policy introduced to empower 
decentralization in Iraq. Order 71 had provided the basic blueprint for how a new Iraq would 
function, designating the broad outlines that would reshape the relationships between national, 
provincial, and local entities. Unfortunately, Order 71 was vague in its appreciation of Baghdad as 
the capital city of Iraq, and its unique history of municipal governance. Historically, the municipal 
governance of Baghdad was a primary concern of Iraq’s national government, and key institutional 
relationships reflected this. The broad language of Order 71 put the city of Baghdad on par with 
any other city in Iraq, and subservient to its provincial government. Or at least that was one 
interpretation; other interpretations existed. The fundamental ambiguity of Order 71 rippled 
through the implementation of the TAL articles reconstructing local governance in Baghdad and 
had a lasting impact on the Battle for Baghdad. It produced significant legal and political conflicts 
and dramatically shaped bureaucratic and technical performance in the delivery of services to 
Baghdad’s residents.  
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Under the authority of Order 71, three distinct institutions were created to govern Baghdad 
under a newly decentralized regime. All of Baghdad’s local communities selected representatives 
for either an urban City Council or a rural Regional Council, and then those bodies selected a 
number of members to constitute an overseeing Provincial Council. The City Council would 
oversee the Amanat, the institution providing services in the city, and the Regional Council would 
oversee the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works (MMPW) providing services to the 
outlying qadas. The Provincial Council would possess vague authority over the governor of the 
province and provide general oversight of service delivery to both urban and rural communities of 
Baghdad.   
This plan was largely undone in the aftermath of the 2005 elections. Decisions made in the 
name of expediency, seeking to hasten the disengagement of the Coalition from the responsibilities 
of governing Iraq, put many of its new institutional changes in jeopardy. The ambiguities in the 
new legal architecture of Iraq created an entirely new set of challenges in Iraq, between the 
institutions of legacy and novelty. The governance infrastructure of the partially reconstructed 
state of Iraq consisted of elements stretched between its traditional legal and institutional 
frameworks and those introduced after the 2003 invasion.  
While it may have been a perception that the US-led occupation under Ambassador Bremer 
largely cleaned the slate of Iraqi governance to pave the way for a new order, this was never 
actually the case. Critical tensions existed between Iraq’s legacy institutions and the novel 
innovations injected into Iraqi governance over several years of transitional political upheaval and 
a reconstruction policy that went through a variety of phases. Politicians ensconced in legacy 
institutions competed with those placed into new institutions created under occupation, regardless 
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of any factional allegiance. Reconstruction was also challenged by challenges created by the 
obsolescence, disrepair, wear and tear, and faulty operation of Iraq’s physical infrastructure.   
 
3.3 Dynamic tensions shaping Baghdad’s governance infrastructure   
Here I introduce a second framework for understanding governance infrastructure. I 
initially described it in static terms and operating across realms of administrative law, politics, 
bureaucracy, and technical attributes. I now present its dynamic characteristics. In situations where 
governance is under duress, it is subject to a number of specific tensions. Categorizing these 
tensions help us to understand the difference between governance infrastructure in an ideal state 
and the non-ideal states that exist in any number of conflict scenarios.  
When looking at how the urban topography of Baghdad produced opportunities for 
exploitation by belligerents during the Battle for Baghdad, I present the following categories as a 
series of tensions that describe how the elements of a governance infrastructure are vulnerable to 
shifts from ideal to non-ideal relationships.  
a) Factional tensions When discussing the Iraq conflict, the major conflicts between Sunni, 
Shia, and Kurdish factions have proven to be the most prominent. Factional tensions often 
dominate discussions about political conflict, as most researchers frame conversations about 
conflict as contests between political entities.198 Generally these are inter-factional contests, but 
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the conflict in Iraq also involved major intra-factional contests. The Shia community was divided 
between domestic and foreign elements, the Sunnis between the secularists and the Islamists, and 
the Kurds between two rival factions. The competition amongst and between these factions greatly 
influenced governance in Baghdad.   
b) Hierarchical tensions Systems of governance in Iraq produced an array of vertical 
stovepipes. Tiers of governance delineated the difference between institutions responsible for the 
generation, transmission, distribution, and consumption of public goods. Hierarchical tensions 
between these echelons of authority were exacerbated by national, provincial, and municipal 
officials that did not see eye-to-eye on how best to execute their mandates, even if they were 
members of the same political party. 
c) Horizontal tensions At any tier of an institution, differences emerge to create conflict 
among those responsible for the executive, legislative, bureaucratic, and technical delivery of 
services. Between the various bodies and actors responsible for services at the upstream, 
midstream, or downstream layer of service delivery in Baghdad we find differences between local 
executives, legislative bodies, and bureaucrats at each level. 
d) Temporal tensions Post-conflict scenarios often involve the disruption of systems of 
governance by outside intervention. More focus needs to be put on evaluating the differences in 
governance between the pre- and post-conflict status of these conflicts. In the case of Iraq, I 
introduce the category of temporal tensions to explore these types of governance challenges. These 
are the challenges brought on by introducing novel institutions during reconstruction without fully 
dismantling Iraq’s preexisting, or legacy, institutions. It also encompasses the obsolescence and 
damage facing Iraq’s physical infrastructure. Iraq had a governance system before the 2003 
invasion, and not every element of that system ceased to operate under the occupation. When the 
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Coalition started to wind down its presence in 2005, it introduced tensions between novel and 
legacy institutions within Baghdad’s governance infrastructure. 
 
Understanding how the Battle of Baghdad was fought on a metropolitan battlefield 
involves not just an understanding of specific static features, but also their dynamic interactions 
over the trajectory of the conflict. This chapter continues with an analysis of how these tensions 
shaped local governance in Baghdad. The major electoral events of 2005 rippled through 
Baghdad’s institutions of governance, both old and new.  
At the center of Baghdad’s governance infrastructure of administrative law, politics, 
bureaucracy, and technology, the Amanat serves as one of the most critical features of Baghdad’s 
metropolitan battlefield. It is the institution with administrative authority over basic municipal 
services in metropolitan Baghdad. It is one of the nation’s largest employers, with over 14,000 
employees serving in a variety of departments including potable water, wastewater management, 
trash disposal, urban planning and zoning, road maintenance, parks management, and licensing for 
building permits and street vendors, and other municipal governance functions.199 The centrality 
and size of Baghdad made the Amanat one of the most critical components of the entire Iraqi 
government. Its chief executive is the Amin Baghdad, (the Amin) historically one of the most 
powerful members of Iraq’s government.  
A lack of appreciation for the institutional legacy of this position created numerous 
problems for the Coalition. The Amin was commonly but incorrectly referred to as the “Mayor” 
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of Baghdad by Coalition personnel. The Amin does not hold the same executive authority over the 
police department or other institutions of public order that a typical US mayor usually possesses, 
and even describing the role as a city manager also mischaracterized the office. More accurately, 
the Amin’s role should be understood as the minister for municipal services within Baghdad, and 
as being on the same level as other national ministerial cabinet members in Iraq. 
However, the ambiguity inherent in Order 71 put the Amin at the center of several legal, 
political, and bureaucratic conflicts waged between and among various factions seeking to control 
this incredibly important position. Was the Amin serving in a position of municipal, provincial, or 
national government? This debate played a significant role during the Battle for Baghdad, and 
understanding this nuance produces an understanding of the bigger picture of service provision 
across Baghdad, as its local institutions became an arena for conflicts driven by factional, 
hierarchical, horizontal, and temporal tensions. 
3.4 Intended and unintended consequences of the 2005 elections 
The electoral events of 2005 included elections for national and provincial assemblies in 
January, followed by a constitutional referendum in October, and then a second round of national 
elections in December. These represent major milestones in the democratic development of the 
new Iraq. These events accompanied another significant development in Iraq: retail politics.  
The removal of the Ba’athists produced a vacuum that Shia and Kurdish parties rushed to 
fill, while leaving many Sunni residents unsure of where to place their political allegiances. The 
growth of sectarianism in Iraq’s political landscape after 2003 produced political platforms among 
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the major Shia and Kurdish parties aimed at delivering to sectarian constituencies instead of 
outreach to the broader population. Choices for Sunnis included several Islamist parties, some 
technocratic nationalists, the parties of the former exiles like Ayad Allawi and Ahmed Chalabi, or 
the Communist party. Politics in Baghdad would be driven by several key factional tensions. 
Sunnis balking at participation within a new Shia-dominated system produced one set of 
challenges, while intra-factional rivalries among the Shia to control that system produced another 
set.   
The elections of January 2005 set the stage for major changes to the initial plan to 
reconstruct local governance in Baghdad. These elections were held to select the Transitional 
National Assembly (TNA), the body charged with crafting a new constitution for Iraq. Based on 
the recommendations of the director of United Nations’ Electoral Assistance Division, Carina 
Perelli, Bremer approved plans to run the election on a single-district proportional representation 
system. While technically simpler than other systems, analysts warned of the potential dangers of 
disenfranchising communities and fomenting greater sectarianism.200 Academic studies on post-
conflict state-building provide many examples detailing how elections following interventions 
may increase communal conflict, particularly aggravating situations where levels of trust 
necessary for effective power sharing agreements are lacking, such as in Iraq.201   
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Sunni political leaders, critical of the US and the interim government under Prime Minister 
Ayad Allawi after the intense operations in Fallujah in late 2004, worked to delay these elections 
until a different system could be developed. Failing that, they led a boycott of the elections. Many 
Sunnis followed their lead and refused to vote. However, voter turnout amongst Shiites was over 
70% and ensured an overwhelming victory for a slate of Shia parties which had received the 
unofficial but widely known blessing of Ayatollah Sistani, Iraq’s primary Shia cleric. In the new 
275-seat National Assembly, a 140-seat majority was now in the hands of the parties of the United 
Iraqi Alliance, the leading Shia coalition.202   
While the lack of Sunni representatives on this national body symbolically conveyed the 
increasing sectarian nature of politics in Iraq, this imbalance would soon prove to have very real 
consequences on the ground in Baghdad. Along with electing a national assembly, voters also cast 
votes for provincial councils (PCs), the parliamentary bodies serving each of Iraq’s eighteen 
provinces. The Sunni boycott at the national level also created large Shia majorities at the 
provincial level, shaping Baghdad’s municipal services institutions.  
The January 2005 elections marked the abandonment of geographically defined 
representation and brought about a new PC in Baghdad determined by a single-district party-list 
vote. Voters in Baghdad chose which party they preferred for the National Assembly, and which 
party they preferred for the PC. Defending the choice of the ballot type, Perelli argued that the 
practical concerns facing the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) in managing an 
election with multiple districts drove the decision.203 While far easier to implement than multiple-
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district elections within the province, its simplicity is offset by its lack of transparency on 
individual candidates. After the election, party leaders select the representatives to fill the seats the 
party has won. Due to this party-list system, the new members rarely had any qualifications other 
than their loyalty to their party. They were beholden not to voters but to their party leadership, and 
they did not represent a specific geographic constituency. In the previous Baghdad, PC members 
represented the exclusive Karadah district, or the Sunni enclave of Adhamiyah, or the 
neighborhood of al-Mansour. The new council had members who largely possessed a sectarian 
concept of politics, aiming to serve their community of shared faith and experience of resistance 
to Saddam’s regime.  
The new Baghdad PC saw 45 of its 51 seats go to members of the major Shia parties, with 
28 of those seats controlled by a single Shia coalition.204 Only one ethnically Sunni Arab was 
elected to this council, a member of the Communist Party. The major Shia blocs represented three 
strands of Shia political identity, those with affiliations with the Iranian exile community, the 
domestic Shia reformist parties, and several Sadrist-affiliated independents.   
Leadership of the body went to the Iranian-sponsored SCIRI/Badr coalition. The Supreme 
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (later dropping the Revolution in its name to become 
the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq, or ISCI) was aligned with the Badr Organization. 
Alternatively known as Badr Corps or the Badr Brigades, this group aimed to rebrand its image as 
a paramilitary unit into one of a political party. Members of domestic Shia parties, Da’wa and 
Fadhila, often served as the compromise bloc between ISCI/Badr and the Sadrists. While the 
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Sadrists did not run as an official party during the 2005 elections, a few seats were won by 
independents with Sadrist affiliations. Despite this initial weakness, Sadrists would soon begin to 
rebalance political power in Baghdad, becoming the primary political rival to the ISCI/Badr bloc.   
Whether intending to pursue a sectarian agenda or merely trying to consolidate institutional 
power in an extremely fluid environment, the new Shia-dominated PC embarked on a campaign 
that alienated large portions of the Sunni population, disempowered politically independent 
moderates and technocrats and reinforced sectarian politics in Baghdad.  
In 2005, Baghdad’s population of roughly 7-9 million was approximately 70% Shia and 
30% Sunni, with a small percentage of Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrians. But the sectarian divide 
is especially pronounced when comparing the urban core, which is largely Shia, to the surrounding 
qadas of Baghdad’s provincial hinterland, which is primarily Sunni.205 While in general, rural areas 
are often less served by government services than urban centers, this perception of neglect became 
one of outright discrimination among outlying communities of Baghdad’s periphery. Thus, 
geographical tensions compounded the sectarian divide in Baghdad. The Shia takeover of 
provincial politics in Baghdad added to the pre-existing frustrations of the outlying Sunni 
communities already underserved by Baghdad’s governance institutions. Unfortunately, Shia 
partisans did little to dissuade Sunni citizens of these perceptions of bias and much to confirm 
them.  
Throughout 2005, the Baghdad PC took a broad interpretation of their powers as defined 
under CPA legislation and began to consolidate their institutional authority at the expense of the 
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other councils operating in Baghdad. The PC dissolved the City Council, executing a “municipal 
coup” to seize authority over the Amanat.206 On August 8, 2005, the sitting Amin, appointed to 
that position under the terms of CPA administrative law and a notably secular and nonpartisan 
technocrat, was forcibly removed from office. The PC placed the governor, a former high-ranking 
Badr commander, to fill in as interim Amin until the position was permanently filled with by PC 
member with Da’wa connections. City Council members were physically barred from the Amanat 
by Badr militants.207  
Traditionally, the Amanat had served as an instrument of the national government because 
it provided services for the capital city. Because of the ambiguities in CPA Order 71 regarding 
Baghdad’s status, the provincial government declared its authority over the Amanat and began 
placing party loyalists in key positions. City Council officials appealed to the court system and the 
Prime Minister’s office. The political winds blew in favor of the Shia-dominated PC, allowing 
them to assert de facto control, even if the legality of the situation remained questionable. Despite 
a court ruling in the City Council’s favor, protestations by US State Department and Coalition 
leadership, the PC consolidated its control over the Amanat. The lame-duck national government 
under Prime Minister Jaafari (Da’wa) did little to interfere with the PC’s moves. Within a very 
short time the PC replaced many key technocratic officials within the Amanat with partisan 
loyalists connected to the council, notably dividing the Amanat’s offices between ISCI members 
and Sadrists. As an institution responsible for providing basic services to a quarter of Iraq’s 
population, as well as a source of lucrative reconstruction contracts and enormous patronage 
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opportunities, and as one of the largest employers in Iraq, the Amanat became a major arena of 
intra-factional conflict in Baghdad.208     
While officially forming a minority in the Shia alliance, Sadrist-aligned leaders emerged 
as one of the most potent forces in Baghdad politics. A low-level Sadr City district employee, 
Naeem al-Kaby was dramatically elevated to the position of Deputy Mayor for Municipalities, the 
second-most powerful position in the Amanat, with vast authority over the hiring and firing of 
municipal employees and influence over contracted work for the city.209  
It was widely believed that Naeem’s Sadrist connections to militant forces within Sadr City 
and the broader network of the OMS organization enabled his promotion.210 In turn, OMS 
reportedly gained a crucial foothold in the realm of municipal contracts, as Naeem reportedly 
channeled an enormous amount of Amanat services contracts through the Sadrist organization. 
Whether skimming off the top of a government contract, or getting the inside track on major 
employment opportunities, the Sadrists used the Amanat connections of Naeem and his colleagues 
to further their aims of co-opting legitimate government services for factional advantage in the 
fight for political control over Baghdad.  
US Army civil affairs officers working to assist the Amanat with managing reconstruction 
projects faced a range of challenges as control over the Amanat shifted. Coordination between 
American units was difficult enough, as Army forces spent CERP funds to make improvements in 
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their local areas that were not always properly tied into broader city-wide projects.211 Yet sectarian 
concerns also drove many municipal decisions, as Sadrists and other Shia officials pursued a 
largely “Shia-first” policy, ensuring preferential treatment for projects improving Shia 
neighborhoods.212 
In an episode involving less thuggery but similar results, the PC eventually coopted the 
authority of the Regional Council and expanded its reach over the offices providing services to 
suburban Baghdad. The PC worked to undermine the Regional Council and forbid its leadership 
from serving as the liaison between the largely Sunni qada communities and the officials of the 
national ministries responsible for water, agriculture, housing and other services. This cadre of 
local leaders granted authority over CPA-era institutions were marginalized by urban Shia 
powerbrokers. While not as dramatic as the takeover of the Amanat, the PC’s dissolution of the 
Regional Council provided clear evidence to many in Baghdad that the new political order in Iraq’s 
democracy was not locally based but driven by the Shia parties in charge.  
The PC also turned its sights on the District Councils. An effort was made to initiate a new 
round of elections so the major parties would be able to push out the remaining independent and 
non-sectarian (and often pro-American) members of these local bodies. Logistical challenges and 
pushback from the Coalition prevented these elections. District Councils remained the major 
conduit between MNF-I units and willing Iraqi partners, and the support of the US Army served 
to hold the PC at bay. Despite this victory, members of these CPA-era local councils became 
increasingly alienated from both the provincial and national governments due to sectarian party 
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politics. Uncertainty about the longevity of Coalition support was also a major concern, as the 
electoral events of 2005 were intended to pave the way for a withdrawal from Iraq.      
3.5 Chapter summary: Coalition strategy and the Battle for Baghdad  
In December 2005, the PC held an emergency session during which PC Chairman Mazin 
Makiya (Da’wa) was voted out of office and Mueen al-Khademi (ISCI) was installed. The removal 
of Mazin reflected a new phase in the contest over governance in Baghdad, and between the 
ISCI/Badr bloc and the Sadrists. Factional horse-trading put an ISCI/Badr leader at the top of each 
major institution in Baghdad (PC Chairman, Amin, Governor) and a Sadrist in each of the three 
key deputy positions (PC Deputy Chairman, Deputy Amin, and Deputy Governor).  
A culmination of the events set in motion with the January elections, this event 
demonstrates some of the fundamental dynamics shaping governance in Baghdad prior to the 
major eruption of conflict in 2006. The major Shia parties controlled Baghdad with Iranian-
affiliated ISCI/Badr dominating and the Sadrists (with JAM) on the rise. Even if Sunni citizens 
regretted their decision not to participate in elections, they were now largely locked out of the 
political system.  
After gaining electoral power in the January election that Sunnis sat out, the Shia parties 
consolidated control over Baghdad. They first turned on the CPA-era independents, taking 
advantage of the ambiguities in administrative law to marginalize CPA-era institutions. This 
allowed them to expand their control within key bureaucracies, where they turned on the 
technocrats. Many Sunni, Christian, and otherwise politically nonaffiliated officials serving as 
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bureaucratic managers and technical advisors within the Amanat and other ministries were 
replaced. A great deal of institutional knowledge was lost as the new Shia leadership started to 
clean house. The PC replaced many bureaucrats with loyalists, regardless of technical experience 
or ability. Often presented as serving the aims of de-Baathification, these moves generally served 
partisan agendas of building profitable fiefdoms within the state, controlled by loyalists.  
Fighting over the spoils of Baghdad’s governance infrastructure, these parties then turned 
on each other. ISCI and Badr worked diligently to maintain and increase their hold on power, 
trying to delay new elections or any structural changes that might weaken their position. Previously 
engaged in outright insurgency against the Coalition, JAM was now a part of a political movement, 
as Sadrists made moves to expand their power from the illicit realm of the streets to legitimate 
politics. 
Here I summarize the major tensions that shifted Baghdad’s governance infrastructure 
towards a non-ideal state, allowing nonstate actors to exploit this urban topography for various 
ends.    
a) Factional tensions The elections of 2005 brought a relatively untested cadre of Shia 
parties to power, while leaving the Sunni community without significant representation in 
legitimate government. Secular and technocratic moderates were pushed to the margins of politics. 
Intra-factional rivalry among Shia parties produced intense competition between domestic and 
Iranian-sponsored groups. Control over national ministries provided resources for these factions 
to use in their competition to control Iraq.      
b) Hierarchical tensions Efforts to decentralize Iraq produced uncertainty and introduced 
conflict between national, provincial, and municipal institutions. During the contest over the 
Amanat, officials at the provincial level defied national court rulings while asserting their self-
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appointed authority to dissolve local bodies. Independents in municipal and local government lost 
ground to factional loyalists due to partisan control at the national level.  
c) Horizontal tensions Factional leadership of ministries produced institutional cleansing 
of technocrats in favor of loyalists. Shia dominance in service ministries produces actual and 
perceived grievance in Sunni communities, reinforcing geographic disparities among Baghdad’s 
districts. The changes in institutional mandates and political uncertainty produced tensions 
between local officials serving on councils, the local executives serving under the governor, and 
the bureaucrats within the ministries. When local councils felt like their concerns were not being 
heard through official channels, they often turned to Coalition units. This support sometimes 
created redundancies or conflict with other projects underway by both the Iraqi government and 
with other Coalition units operating according to the concerns of the local communities under their 
purview.      
d) Temporal tensions The sequence of fundamental shifts in administrative law produced 
ambiguities between Iraq’s legacy institutions and the newly created introductions to its 
governance system. With major electoral events on the horizon the lame duck officials of the 
transitional governments proved hesitant to weigh in on important issues affecting governance, 
such as the conflict over the Amanat during the tenure of PM Jaafari. Instead of waiting for 
guidance from the next regime, this induced provincial leaders to take matters into their own hands.  
Tensions among institutions emerged even when controlled by the same party, at the same 
level. Officials within legacy institutions clashed with those in new institutions. The new Baghdad 
PC was empowered to appoint a provincial governor by Order 71. The position of governor was a 
longstanding element of Iraq’s governance system, with traditional powers and responsibilities, 
while the PC possessed a vague and unprecedented mandate. Fairly soon after his appointment in 
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2005, the new governor began to exercise many of these traditional authorities, acting 
independently of the PC to engage directly with members of the national government as a governor 
would have under the Ba’athist system. He also utilized the traditional system of qa’im makams, 
or local mayors in Baghdad’s districts, to exert power and bypass the authority of the CPA-era 
local councils. Both the PC and the local councils objected to this power grab but found themselves 
unable to rein in the governor because the vague language of Order 71 offered little in the way of 
corrective mechanisms for how to deal with such a situation. 213 When it came to respecting the 
authority of new or legacy institutions in Baghdad, the old maxim of “where you stand depends 
upon where you sit” proved entirely accurate.    
In this chapter a review of the major reconstruction polities instituted by the Coalition 
demonstrated ways these disruptions to governance infrastructure produced and exacerbated non-
ideal conditions of law and order. Following the elections of 2005, the most significant changes to 
administrative law began to ripple out though Baghdad’s political institutions, bureaucracies, and 
infrastructures of service delivery. I presented a scheme to categorize how these disruptions 
produced dynamic challenges to Baghdad’s governance infrastructure, identifying factional, 
hierarchical, horizontal, and temporal tensions.  
This discussion of the turmoil within governance sets up the next two chapters, case studies 
on how governance was exploited by the major nonstate actor insurgencies during the Battle for 
Baghdad. An analysis of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s pursuit of system collapse is followed by the system 
cooption methodology of Jaish al-Mahdi.    
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4.0 SEEKING SYSTEM COLLAPSE: AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ  
The previous chapter illustrated the key vulnerabilities in Baghdad’s governance 
infrastructure produced by the non-ideal conditions for public goods delivery during the 
reconstruction of Iraq. This sets up the following review of how governance was exploited during 
the Battle for Baghdad. I now turn to a comparison of the two major belligerent groups exploiting 
these vulnerabilities for strategic aims, starting with al-Qaeda in Iraq. The chapter proceeds with 
a series of episodes evaluating AQI’s efforts to achieve organizational viability, launch operational 
actions against other nonstate rivals, and pursue its overarching strategic goal of inducing systemic 
collapse of the reconstruction and state-building process underway in Iraq. The chapter concludes 
with a review of findings that highlight the role that various elements of urban infrastructure played 
in shaping AQI’s tactical behaviors.     
4.1 Seeking profit, power, and collapse of authority 
In late 2004, Coalition units engaged in the heaviest combat operations since the initial 
invasion. During the Second Battle of Fallujah, Coalition units fought to control the Sunni-majority 
city of Fallujah. Located to the west of Baghdad in Anbar province, the city had become a haven 
for AQI insurgents. Clearing operations pushed AQI leadership and many of its fighters to migrate 
elsewhere in Iraq. This shift in the overall battlefield in Iraq had several major consequences. 
Throughout 2005, AQI repositioned itself to gain new ground in Nineveh in the north, areas of the 
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Euphrates valley in the southwest, and to make Baghdad its central focus of operations.214 AQI 
operative Abu Ayyub al Masri, a specialist in producing vehicle borne improvised explosive 
devices (VBIEDs), worked to forge greater ties with former Ba’athist elements and merged other 
insurgent groups into the organization forged by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,215 discussed above in 
Chapter 2. Greater linkages between the global jihadists and domestic Sunni fighters greatly 
enhanced the ability of AQI to pursue its insurgent aims.  
Zarqawi’s aims of inciting sectarian warfare were enabled in no small part due to the 
activities of Shia death squads engaging in a deliberate campaign of sectarian cleansing across 
Baghdad. Brazenly kidnapping and then executing Sunni residents, often dumping the bodies in 
public spaces, these “death squad” activities were linked to the influence of Shia control of the 
Ministry of the Interior under former Badr commander Bayan Jabr. Badr Corps militants were 
incorporated into the Iraq’s security forces, allowing this sectarian militia to engage in domestic 
terror and murder while wearing the uniform of legitimate Iraqi police service members. Death 
squad murders were reported in Sunni neighborhoods of West Rasheed in March 2005, and in the 
Iskan neighborhood in west-central Baghdad in July and August 2005.216 A secret detention 
facility used by MoI police forces to imprison and torture Sunnis was discovered in November 
2005.217 AQI responded with more suicide bombing attacks, and launched reprisal death squad 
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executions, attacking Shia families and targeting members of the Iraqi government who lived in 
the mixed Saydiyah neighborhood of southwest Baghdad over the summer of 2005.218   
Following the al-Askari mosque bombing in February 2006, the intensity of the sectarian 
conflict in Baghdad accelerated. Unable to prevent the December 2005 elections from taking place, 
AQI set out to undermine the establishment of the Maliki regime as the new prime minister 
prepared to take office in May 2006. AQI launched a series of attacks to seize territory and increase 
pressure on the new Maliki government, which was forced to declare a state of emergency in 
Baghdad in June.219 While heralded as a victory over AQI, the June killing of Zarqawi unleashed 
a competition amongst his followers over potential successors. A series of car bombs during June 
indicated al Masri’s bid for leadership, which was recognized in a tape by Osama bin Laden 
released on July 1. AQI was officially now led by al Masri, also known as Sheikh Abu Hamza al 
Muhajer, and he was encouraged by bin Laden to make Iraq the center of a larger Islamic 
caliphate.220 On July 2, AQI perpetrated a VBIED attack in a Sadr City market, killing sixty-two 
and wounding 120, one of the year’s deadliest attacks.221 The following week Baghdad was 
convulsed with bombings and militia reprisals. Following a car bomb attack at a Shia mosque, 
members of JAM rampaged through the largely Sunni neighborhood of Jihad, pulling people from 
homes in broad daylight and executing between thirty and forty Sunnis.222 Another car bomb 
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detonated outside another Shia mosque to the north of Jihad. Across Shia neighborhoods JAM 
elements erected a series of ad hoc checkpoints to prevent incursions by VBIED drivers, as 
Coalition forces and the Maliki government struggled to cope with the violence.223  
Campaigns of suicide bombings, particularly the massive car bombs detonated in busy 
downtown areas, challenged the authority of Iraqi government authority and Coalition forces. 
Gaining safe havens to assemble and deploy these VBIEDs was of major concern for AQI 
operatives and led to their strategic use of transportation infrastructure to enable this effort.  
Gaining a foothold in several Sunni neighborhoods allowed AQI to extract resources 
through criminality, augmenting any funding they received from international supporters of jihad. 
Local support from a frustrated Sunni population shut out of the new political process and lacking 
economic options provided a source of recruits. The major conflict on Haifa Street demonstrates 
the intensity of inter-factional warfare as AQI and JAM worked to exert power over the population 
of Baghdad and enforce sectarian divisions.  
In contrast to the challenge of the Sadrists, discussed in the following chapter, AQI did not 
overtly take part in legitimate political activities. While suspicions of collusion between members 
of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and AQI were continually leveled by Shia politicians, gaining and 
leveraging a foothold within Baghdad’s governance institutions was not meaningfully pursued by 
AQI. Yet campaigns of assassination, intimidation, and direct attacks against governance facilities 
greatly influenced the delivery of services in Baghdad.  
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Instead of legitimate participation, AQI relied upon a strategy of concentrated denial of the 
state’s provision of public goods and then stepping in to offer the provision of alternative services, 
primarily in the form of austere sharia law, to local residents. While primarily existing in the 
western province of Anbar, several instances within the outlying qadas of Baghdad and within the 
urban neighborhood of Ameriya will also be addressed in this analysis.        
AQI proved capable of significant military-style kinetic operations, demonstrated during 
the battle for Haifa Street in early 2007. A campaign of suicide bombings showed a strategic use 
of catastrophic damage to infrastructure not only for the exemplary effect on the population, but 
also in its instrumental value in severing major arteries of transport for tactical advantage. A review 
of the formation, and eventual dismantlement of a micro-level armed regime in Ameriya shows a 
methodology involving discriminate denial of infrastructures to gain localized territorial control in 
this neighborhood.  
4.2 AQI against the state: Catastrophic denial of public order   
Jordanian terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi formally pledged allegiance to Osama 
bin Laden in October 2004.224 A deal was struck where al-Qaeda leadership accepted Zarqawi’s 
strong anti-Shia stance to gain an official foothold in the prime battlefield of Iraq, and Zarqawi 
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gained access to AQ’s channels of financial and manpower resources.225 Among AQIs aims were 
the removal of the occupying US forces and the establishment of an Islamic emirate based on 
Sunni orthodoxy.  
Between March 2003 and August 2006, 514 suicide attacks took place in Iraq, largely 
targeting Iraqi security service personnel and civilians.226 A hallmark of AQI, suicide bombings in 
Iraq have differed from other campaigns of suicide terrorism. While previous campaigns such as 
those by Hamas and Hezbollah have tended to produce suicide bombers directly from the local 
community, most suicide bombers in Iraq (that have been identified) are not Iraqis but volunteers 
from abroad, coming from nearby Arab countries as well as North Africa and Europe. Suicide 
attacks on fellow Muslims, like those targeting Baghdad’s public markets and gatherings for 
religious festivals, are also a unique feature of Iraq’s terrorism phenomenon, a source of tension 
between AQI and AQ central leaders.227  
Between 2003 and 2006, Baghdad experienced over 200 separate suicide attacks while no 
other Iraqi city experienced more than 50 attacks.228 Zarqawi encouraged attacks on Shia to trigger 
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a sectarian civil war; an attack involving both suicide bombers and mortars targeted celebrants of 
the holy Shia day of Ashura in March 2004 in the Kadhamiya neighborhood of Baghdad and in 
Karbala, killing 181 and wounding hundreds.229 Waves of terrorist attacks in Baghdad often 
coincided with both Shia religious holidays and major political developments; the run-up to the 
elections of January 2005 involved a number of political assassinations and over 50 suicide attacks 
in the span of a month.230   
Particularly hard hit by insurgency attacks were Iraqi police officers. Analyzing the 
information on the over 40,000 deaths recorded from 2003 to August 2006 by the Iraqi Body Count 
database suggests that nearly 4000, or 1 in 10, were Iraqi police.231 Iraqi Body Count figures need 
to be approached carefully due to the extreme variations in reporting across different sources, but 
several general trends emerge from the substantial numbers of police casualties due to the 
insurgent attacks. Police officer was the most widely represented occupation listed in this dataset, 
having more deaths recorded than for politicians, religious leaders, and legal professionals. While 
not all were directly attributable to AQI, the numbers of police deaths due to attacks by insurgents 
form a considerable number. Attack data showing average numbers of insurgent attacks against 
Iraqi police and numbers of casualties, identifies a range between 50 and 100 casualties per month 
over 2004 before spiking to levels between 150 and 250 casualties per month by mid-2006.232 
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Attacks on new cadres of police recruits was a recurrent threat to training programs. On September 
14, 2004 a bombing attack killed 59 recruits and civilians, and on February 28, 2005, a suicide car 
bomb killed 125 police and national guard recruits, and civilians present at the time.233 Despite 
these casualty rates, young men continued to join the Iraqi police as one of the few steady 
employment opportunities available to them.  
4.3 Exploiting transportation: Roads, bridges, and car bombs  
Early on the morning of April 12, 2007 a massive explosion boomed across Baghdad as 
the Sarafiya Bridge, one of the downtown spans over the Tigris River, was destroyed by the 
detonation of a truck loaded with explosives. Unfortunately, such an event was not altogether 
uncommon in Baghdad, but this event would carry enormous significance for the conflict raging 
in this city, and for the country of Iraq. At first glance, the destruction of a key piece of critical 
infrastructure serving the city seemed to fit into a pattern of recent attacks by AQI insurgents, 
following a strategy aimed at disrupting transportation at crucial points around and across 
Baghdad.234 The attack had severed a major transportation artery across the city, complicating the 
lives of cross-town commuters and striking a blow against the economic vitality of the city. 235   
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Yet the destruction of the Sarafiya Bridge was about more than just an attempt to prevent 
cars and trucks from crossing the Tigris. The bridge also crossed between a Sunni-majority 
neighborhood and a traditionally Shia neighborhood. Its destruction reinforced in a tangible way 
the symbolic sectarian divide that AQI aimed to foment within Iraqi society.  
Built in the 1920s, the bridge was treasured as an historical artifact,236 offering tangible 
evidence of “something actually good that the British left for us,” as a member of the Baghdad 
provincial government drolly reflected, referring to an earlier period of foreign occupation and 
post-conflict reconstruction during the British Mandate in Iraq following the First World War.237  
In the aftermath of its destruction, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced a campaign 
committing his government to rebuilding the Sarafiya Bridge. Significantly, the reconstruction of 
this critical piece of infrastructure was one of the first major Iraqi-led reconstruction projects done 
without significant US military or government assistance, a noteworthy moment in his 
administration and in post-2003 Iraq. Despite numerous setbacks, Maliki opened the rebuilt 
Sarafiya Bridge during a ceremony on May 27, 2008. Public support for Maliki strengthened in 
2008 and his electoral coalition performed well in the provincial elections held in January 2009.    
Reviewing AQIs usage of their signature weapon, the VBIED, reveals key elements 
regarding their usage of urban topography to achieve their insurgent aims. The term IED entered 
popular usage during the Iraq War due to the prevalence of the wide variety and lethality of 
improvised explosive devices used by insurgent groups of all types. The relative chaos in the 
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postwar aftermath and dismantlement of the Iraqi Army left depots of unused bombs, artillery 
shells, and other explosives available across Iraq. Taking one or more of these pieces of ordinance 
and rigging it to a detonator of some kind enabled insurgents to build crude bombs they could 
leave embedded along roads where Coalition vehicles were likely to pass, causing damage, injury, 
and death to soldiers and unlucky civilians caught in the blast.238  
Mounting these explosives in a vehicle, anything from a small passenger car to larger utility 
truck, enabled both a greater amount of explosive charge and the bonus of mobility for the device 
to reach its target. The drawbacks include the greater engineering skill and cost needed to produce 
these vehicle-borne bombs, and generally the loss of its driver if it was not left parked and remotely 
detonated. Suicide drivers often commanded these car bombs, willingly or unwillingly, making 
them effective cruise missiles for attacks on checkpoints or hardened entrances to government 
facilities. Although a suicide attack with a car bomb is often labeled as an (S)VBIED to make this 
distinction clear, I intend to use the broader VBIED term to cover all types of attacks.  
While much attention is paid to the Surge strategy shifts under GEN Petraeus in 2007, 
notable credit for shaping the eventual successes in Baghdad started earlier under LTG Ray 
Odierno. As commander of MNC-I (Multinational Corps – Iraq), the Corps element of the 
Coalition and thus the overall commander of all ground forces in Iraq (the “MNDs” or Multi-
National Divisions) Odierno directed the most significant operations taking place across Iraq.   
MND-B was the designation for the unit responsible for Baghdad, and other parts of the 
country fell under the responsibility of other Coalition divisions. Odierno was the first Coalition 
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commander to see the security of Baghdad as a group effort amongst all the divisions, and 
developed plans for the support for MND-B by focusing efforts of the other divisions on 
“interdicting accelerants to violence” traveling from outside areas into Baghdad.239 This was a 
recognition that transportation networks into and out of Baghdad would be considered critical 
terrain for the upcoming fight to secure the capital. However, the Coalition soon discovered that 
Zarqawi had previously already made this a fundamental component of overall AQI strategy. 
On December 19, 2006, a Coalition patrol in Taji began investigating a suspicious car 
parked at a market, causing the men inside to flee on foot, one of them detonating a suicide vest 
after American forces opened fire. An inspection of the contents of the vehicle led to the discovery 
of a laptop computer containing data on AQI operations, and a hand-drawn map of Baghdad and 
its outskirts. The intelligence gained from these ‘Taji documents’ provided a better understanding 
of AQI’s strategy, clearly directed towards establishing and maintain control over the belts of 
Baghdad’s surrounding qadas and using these bases to enable greater attacks in downtown 
Baghdad.240 Cleansing the outer belts of Shia would cut the urban core off from support and 
resupply from the outside Shia regions to the south and east, and enable AQI to put maximum 
pressure on the Maliki government, causing it to collapse and the Coalition effort to fail. Before 
his death, Zarqawi had written the following note, “The most important battle, which is happening 
now, is the Battle of the Baghdad Belt.”241     
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Figure 4.1 The Taji Map showing AQI’s battle plan for the belts surrounding Baghdad242  
 
The map and other intelligence gleaned from the Taji documents indicated that AQI saw 
three major theaters of operation in the belts: east, south, and north. Relatively secure to the west 
in Anbar, AQI needed to expand and maintain control along the communities of these three 
regions. The northern belt controlled access to routes following the Diyala River to nearby Baquba, 
the eastern belt sought to close off the Shia population from supply routes coming in from Iran, 
and the southern belt was of vital importance as a region of safe haven and VBIED production.    
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Crucial to the achieving its aims was AQI’s network of VBIED manufacturing and 
deployment. Coordinated assaults on Shia communities within the belts and in downtown 
neighborhoods were intended to produce waves of IDPs moving into districts known to have poor 
services infrastructure and overwhelm the Maliki regime.243 One of the most notorious AQI 
bombmakers, Abu Nur, was reported to have been involved in over 800 IED and VBIED attacks 
in and around Baghdad.244 Positioned within Rusafa, a community adjacent to his desired Shia 
targets in Sadr City and near a Sunni base of support in Adhamiya, Abu Nur sought to displace 
Shia populations from downtown neighborhoods into more vulnerable pockets in outer 
neighborhoods.245  
In late 2006 and early 2007, Coalition efforts began to get a handle on the extent and 
functionality of AQI’s VBIED industry and started shutting it down. This required careful 
collaboration with Iraqi forces, as the Coalition did not want to be seen as supporting a Shia-
dominated government under Maliki enthusiastically attacking the largely Sunni communities of 
the outlying belts. Maliki attempted to assuage doubtful Sunnis by issuing statements reassuring 
residents of the nonsectarian nature of his campaign against ‘outlaws’ that threatened the stability 
of Baghdad.246  
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Joint operations by MND-B and Iraqi forces conducted a series of patrols intending to 
discover and eliminate insurgent safe havens and weapons caches around Baghdad. One patrol 
discovered 400 mortar rounds at a northeastern neighborhood, and another located several caches 
in the southern Yusufiya village, one with over 1,100 high-explosive rounds. Over the week of 
February 3-9, MND-B units reported finding and destroying sixty weapons caches.247  
Finding weapons caches of hidden armaments buried in farmer’s fields or abandoned 
structures was just the first rung in the ladder up AQI’s VBIED network. The next step led to the 
factories where the bombmaking activities were conducted. A pattern emerged for the locations of 
both parts of this system. Sunni communities positioned along the major highways leading into 
Baghdad from the west, south, and north started to emerge as the major source of bombmaking 
activity linked to AQI insurgents. Raids in southern Arab Jabour turned up car bomb components 
and weapons, including a truck-mounted rocket-launcher.248 Major caches and facilities further 
out along these routes led to smaller caches closer to the city, allowing insurgents to leave and pick 
up weapons and armaments at various points as they travelled in and out of the city.  
The location of Arab Jabour along the banks of the Tigris just south of the city and along 
the major highway route following the Tigris into downtown was a popular haven for AQI 
insurgents. Several Coalition strikes targeted the area to hit a number of car-bomb making cells 
over 2006 and 2007.249  
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Further to the south, the sprawling qada of Mahmoudiya and its central village served as 
essential territory for AQI insurgents, providing safe haven and several car bomb production 
facilities. Largely a Sunni region, but with pockets of Shia in the main village, the area suffered 
sectarian violence from both AQI and JAM insurgents aiming to seize and protect key routes from 
Baghdad to the south.  
From 2004 to 2006, AQI dominated Mahmoudiya through a campaign of terror and public 
beheadings, allowing it to control vital territory to the south of Baghdad and an important corridor 
to Fallujah. Fighters, weapons, and supplies could shift between Fallujah and Baghdad via this 
route, and AQI recognized its absolute importance to its survival. By 2007, JAM began to expand 
its influence into the outer belts of Baghdad province and also sought to control this region, as it 
provided important access to the southern holy cities of Najaf and Karbala and routes to Iran via 
Kut.  
In June 2007, a crucial bridge six miles east of Mahmoudiya was destroyed by a truck 
bomb. While positioned along the main supply route that Coalition forces used to travel between 
Baghdad and Basra, it was likely that this bridge was targeted by AQI as part of a campaign to 
stymie further JAM encroachments onto turf AQI had long held.250 
This attack near Mahmoudiya became the latest in a string of high-profile attacks on 
bridges serving Baghdad in 2007. Of these, the destruction of the Sarafiya Bridge in April, which 
opened this chapter, was the most prominent. This attack was within days of another suicide 
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VBIED attack destroying a bridge across the Diyala River on the route to Baquba.251 After the 
Sarafiya attack, a report compiled to assess Baghdad’s bridge infrastructure showed the 
vulnerabilities of the fourteen major spans across the Tigris, five over the Diyala, sixteen crossings 
of the Army Canal, and seven cross-highway bridges serving the transportation network of the 
capital.252 Coalition and GoI forces worked to secure existing spans, prevent new attacks, and 
develop reconstruction plans to secure these vital components of Baghdad’s cityscape. 
The degree of intergovernmental coordination necessary to conduct bridge repairs amid an 
insurgency was significant. Meetings between Coalition partners and Iraqi officials intending to 
discuss progress on critical repairs could quickly devolve into tense episodes of finger-pointing 
among government engineers, construction contractors, and both American and Iraqi military 
units. Following the destruction of two spans across the Diyala, a meeting facilitated by the 
Baghdad PRT infrastructure specialists in April 2007 was successful only in fostering a multi-
lingual argument over who had responsibility for providing security, who was paying for the 
supplies, and who was actually in charge of the meeting.253  
While the spectacular nature of these attacks on critical infrastructure is worth analyzing 
on its own, these attacks also signaled crucial changes occurring in the Battle for Baghdad. In 
retrospect, these major bridge assaults represented the beginning of the end of AQI’s campaign of 
VBIED usage. Operations targeting the weapons caches and bombmaking factories were 
beginning to effectively dent AQI’s output.  Moreover, the Coalition’s efforts to secure downtown 
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Baghdad with a massive wall-building project that closed down significant travel options for 
residents and insurgents alike prevented AQI from effectively targeting markets and other 
vulnerable public spaces in the city. 
Known as the “Safe Markets/Safe Neighborhoods” initiatives, these massive construction 
projects were a component of the overall Baghdad Security Plan, or Fardh al Qanoon, campaign 
launched with the Surge of 2007. As conceived, they were intended to build protective walls to 
protect both Sunni and Shia populations, but in very different ways. Each sectarian community 
seemed to be facing a different set of fears. Shia faced the fear of suicide bombing attacks while 
out in public spaces during the day, and Sunnis faced the fear of death squads attacking them in 
their houses at night.254 The Safe Markets initiative built protective walls around several major 
downtown markets, and the Sunni neighborhood of Adhamiya was soon surrounded by a perimeter 
of T-walls intending to make it a Safe Neighborhood.255  
There were a few obvious results of this strategy, and a few that were not apparent at the 
time. Travel in Baghdad slowed to a crawl, and the city showed signs of a kind of urban paralysis, 
with gridlocked traffic stuck between checkpoints at regular intervals across the capital. Publicly, 
Iraqi politicians railed against what was seen as an American imposition on Iraq’s sovereignty, 
some even going so far as to compare their plight to that of the Palestinians.256 Privately, many of 
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these same politicians would admit that security within the city did seem to be improving, with the 
walls proving an effective measure.257 
VBIED attacks in downtown Baghdad dropped measurably in the latter half of 2007, due 
in no small part to the reduced opportunities to maneuver car bombs far enough across the city to 
reach an intended target before hitting a checkpoint. VBIEDs were proving only effective at 
attacking checkpoints, or infrastructural sites on major routes like bridges. 258 
The dismantling of AQI’s manufacturing ability and this reduction in viable targets turned 
the group back towards a focus on using SVIEDs, or suicide-vest improvised explosive devices, 
i.e., human suicide bombers. In 2007, the Sunni Awakening encouraged many local Sunni leaders 
and fighters to turn on their sometimes allies-of-convenience, AQI. In return, AQI launched a 
significant number of suicide bombers in retaliation, attacking and killing many prominent 
Awakening leaders.259 AQI also turned to the use of women as suicide bombers, in an effort to 
thwart the more rigorous screening of males at security checkpoints. On Friday February 1, 2008, 
two attacks within 15 minutes and four miles of each other killed over 60 and injured hundreds as 
two women bombers attacked two different markets popular with women and children, a pet bazaar 
in eastern Ghazal and a bird market in central Shorja.260 
 
257 US Embassy Baghdad, “Where is Baghdad headed.” 
258 Eric Hamilton, Backgrounder #24: Targeting the Diyala Suicide Bombing Network. (Washington, D.C.: Institute 
for the Study of War, 2008), 3.  
259 Hamilton, Backgrounder #24, 4.  
260 Hamilton, Backgrounder #24, 4.  
   
 
 168 
While a large component of AQI’s strategy during the Battle for Baghdad included 
indiscriminate attacks on civilians in order to produce a wave of sectarian warfare that would 
render the new Iraqi regime incapable of governing, key attacks on infrastructural elements formed 
a component of their strategy seeking systemic collapse.  
4.4 Catastrophic denial of essential services for collapse… and profit 
 Attacks intending to sabotage major components Iraq’s services infrastructure began in the 
months following the 2003 invasion. During August 2003, a major oil pipeline linking the northern 
oil-producing city of Kirkuk with the Turkish port city of Ceyhan was attacked multiple times, 
severely crippling the CPA’s efforts to rebuild Iraq’s economy.261 Bremer announced that the 
shutdown of the pipeline created losses of $7 million dollars a day to Iraq, and repairs could take 
nearly two weeks, putting the final bill for this one incursion in a remote part of Iraq’s desert at 
$100 million.262 At the same time the repairs to the oil pipeline were getting underway, another 
sabotage attack ruptured a critical water pipeline; the Red Cross reported that it would deprive 
300,000 residents of Baghdad drinking water until repairs could be made.263  
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 These attacks against vulnerable infrastructural components served the aims of insurgent 
groups seeking to undermine the Coalition’s efforts to reconstruct Iraq and induce a collapse of 
the transitional government. Relatively easy and cheap to execute, sabotage attacks on 
installational networks produced outsized indiscriminate impacts in their disruption of services for 
a population. They created enormous challenges for the Coalition, requiring the application of 
resources that could have been used elsewhere. The hardships they produced exacerbated 
vulnerabilities within the population, providing openings for insurgent messaging to denigrate the 
failures of the new government and present their alternative vision for governance of Iraqi society.  
 In some cases, a logic other than pursuing system collapse was at work. While in much of 
the rest of this study the tactics of AQI are shown to be in direct opposition to JAM and other 
militant elements, there were a few cases in which the pursuit of organizational profit trumped 
strategic rivalry, producing interesting cases of collusion between seemingly diametrically 
antagonistic groups. Examining the incredibly complex and lucrative oil industry within Iraq 
reveals such a case.  
 There are two major ways that petroleum products are transported through Iraq, via 
pipeline or by truck. Trucking systems offer far more opportunities for corruption, producing an 
incentive among all like-minded nonstate actors to see pipelines get shut down. The Institute for 
the Analysis of Global Security compiled attacks on Oil Ministry pipelines, facilities, and 
personnel from 2003 to 2008. It recorded 469 attacks, covering areas where both Sunni and Shia 
militants operated.264 Investigations into the widespread sabotage of Iraq’s oil pipelines reveal the 
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incredibly powerful economic incentives for disrupting that infrastructural system to shift the 
transmission of these goods into a different system, where individual trucks and drivers can be far 
more easily coopted into various nefarious schemes. As far back as the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq’s 
national policy of subsidized fuel prices incentivized smuggling of crude and refined products 
across its borders, where favorable price differences could be exploited by entrepreneurial drivers 
and complicit border officials responsible for certifying loads, volumes, and licenses. In the chaos 
following the US occupation, the system expanded exponentially and produced incredible 
incentives for nonstate actors to get their fingers into this lucrative trade.  
 The massive Baiji refinery, located between Baghdad and the northern city of Mosul, and 
responsible for a third of Iraq’s refining capacity, fell within territory largely controlled by Sunni 
insurgent groups and AQI. An attack on pipelines bringing crude to the refinery would make truck 
transport necessary, and therefore taxable by insurgent groups controlling road access. Conversely, 
refined product from Baiji traveling by truck passing through AQI-controlled territory would be 
subject to their protection schemes and other profit-taking opportunities.265 This unique situation 
produced an area of complicit interaction, as JAM-affiliated smugglers would make deals with 
AQI-affiliated militants, and vice-versa, to ensure their respective truckers got their profitable haul 
to the needed location.266 Strangely, each group’s organizational need for profit rested upon the 
same set of tactics against the state, the interdiction of pipeline infrastructure.     
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Despite this odd situation of collusion, the primary relationship between these belligerents 
was one of violent opposition. In the next section, I present an episode that most clearly 
demonstrates the differences between AQI and JAM in the way they pursued control of the same 
neighborhood, at different times, through different means. Over a period of several months in early 
2007, the Haifa Street neighborhood was alternately occupied by AQI, JAM, and eventually 
Coalition forces supporting the Baghdad Security Plan as part of the Surge. In a sense, it is a unique 
case that illustrates how these rival insurgencies compare in the conduct of kinetic and non-kinetic 
warfare as they sought to win leverage in a contest over the population, territory, and infrastructure 
of Baghdad.     
4.5 Rivalry for control: The Battle of Haifa Street 
Directly north of the International Zone in the Karkh district overlooking the west bank of 
the Tigris, a row of high-rise apartments offers fantastic views for lucky residents, and terrific line-
of-sight opportunities for snipers and lookouts keeping an eye on the battlefield below. The Haifa 
Street corridor became prime terrain sought by both AQI and JAM. Both groups vied to seize and 
hold this neighborhood to serve their strategies of competitive control over territory. JAM had held 
the area in 2005 but was cleared out by MND-B units by the spring.267 Following Coalition 
procedures under Gen. Casey’s plan to turn security back over to Iraqis as quickly as possible, US 
forces left Haifa under the control of local Iraqi units.  
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During 2006, sectarian cleansing by both AQI and JAM had dramatically reshaped 
Baghdad’s neighborhoods as the Battle for Baghdad moved into a new phase. With most 
neighborhoods now either majority Shia or majority Sunni, the conflict shifted into contests over 
the fault lines between Sunni and Shia zones. Haifa Street represented one such fault line and 
earned a reputation for being “the most dangerous street in Iraq.”268 Odierno was quite concerned 
about Haifa becoming a sectarian tinderbox.269  
Moving in from the west, AQI sought to expand further into downtown Karkh. Historic 
Shia-majority Khadhamiya to the north served as a base for JAM seeking greater access to zones 
closer to the central IZ. Many of the professional class and wealthier residents of Haifa Street fled, 
leaving abandoned luxury apartments available for whoever could claim and hold them.270       
AQI gained a foothold in several of the apartments and victimized the Shia residents they 
found. Many of these were in fact IDPs who had fled from other neighborhoods.271 In mid-October 
MND-B forces conducting a patrol received sniper fire and grenade attacks from high-rise 
rooftops, and AQI intimidated the Iraqi Security Forces assigned to secure the sector.272 On 
January 6, 2007 Iraqi troops discovered a fake checkpoint in the neighborhood manned by AQI; 
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the ensuing shootout killed 30 insurgents. In retaliation, AQI kidnapped and executed 27 Shia, 
reportedly relatives of the local Iraqi police chief, and dumped the bodies in an alleyway.273 
Emboldened, AQI gunmen roamed freely throughout the neighborhood for the next two days, 
distributing threatening leaflets to warn people away from their territory. The initial Iraqi Army 
unit dispatched to deal with the crisis found themselves overmatched and requested Coalition 
assistance. By January 9, a battle pitting US and Iraqi forces versus AQI insurgents was underway, 
and the complexity of the urban terrain was proving to be an exceptional advantage for AQI. 
Typical floor-to-floor, room-to-room clearing operations proved impossible to accomplish, and 
the AQI fighters displayed unusually effective fire and maneuver techniques during the battle. 
Only after close-air support from Apache helicopters and F-15s, and a barrage precision rocket 
artillery, did the battle swing to the Coalition, leaving a body count of over 50 dead insurgents to 
only 4 US and 2 Iraqi wounded. 274     
Again, the area was left under Iraqi security, but over mid-January AQI returned. MND-B 
and Iraqi forces conducted a second and more thorough round of clearing operations starting 
January 24, receiving mortar fire from across the river and facing more snipers from rooftops. A 
major weapons cache was discovered at a Karkh high school, more AQI insurgents were killed, 
and by early February Haifa Street was once again left under the protection of the Iraqi Army.275     
This time it was JAM that moved in. During February and March, JAM exerted power over 
the local population, but in a much different way than previous AQI landlords on Haifa Street. 
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Utilizing connections within Baghdad’s services sector that Sadrists had accrued over the past few 
years, JAM was able to set up mafia style control over residents’ access to water, electricity, and 
other commodities. JAM forced local businesses to pay for security, and hire militia loyalists, or 
face the consequences of disobedience.276 While presenting a generally intimidating and 
sometimes outright threatening stance similar to AQI’s earlier reign of control, JAM control 
displayed that group’s greater ability to deliver necessary services to a cowed population. This 
ability is examined in detail in the following chapter. 
This moment, illustrating the differences in how AQI and JAM provided services to captive 
populations serves as a useful introduction to the overall shift occurring in the Battle for Baghdad. 
It was precisely at this point that the tide began to turn against AQI, and the Coalition began to 
realize the true extent of the Sadrist challenge to Iraq’s stability. A few blocks from Haifa Street, 
Sadrists posted a banner proclaiming “Congratulations President Moqtada al-Sadr, for executing 
Saddam” hung on the wall of a Children’s Hospital in Karkh, celebrating the recent hanging of the 
deposed dictator after a lengthy and controversial trial.277    
The conflict on Haifa Street provided the backdrop for President George W. Bush’s 
January 2007 announcement of the New Way Forward change in strategy in Iraq that would 
increase the number of US troops in Baghdad and shift their focus towards greater protection of 
the population. While the Surge called for additional reinforcements from US military units, it also 
authorized the Pentagon to extend the tours of Army and Marine units already in country. One of 
those extended units, 1st Squadron 14th Cavalry, “Taskforce Warhorse,” was tasked with taking 
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over the Haifa Street area in April. While 1-14 had recently faced JAM fighters in the southern 
city of Diwaniyah, it did not face significant attacks from JAM at its arrival and did not experience 
a significant attack from any insurgent group for weeks following. However, leadership of the unit 
knew that its efforts to improve services put them at odds with JAM and recognized the 
formidability of the Sadrist effort to control governance infrastructure.278  
The differences between AQI and JAM in their ability to establish and maintain micro-
level regimes within Baghdad neighborhoods is one of the more important factors in the overall 
outcome of the Battle for Baghdad. In the next section I analyze AQI’s attempts to secure a safe 
haven in the Sunni neighborhoods of Ameriya, and its methods of controlling a local population 
and extracting profit for its organizational needs.     
4.6 Concentrated denial and alternative provision in Ameriya 
The growth of sectarianism in Baghdad’s political landscape after 2003 left many Sunni 
residents without reliable champions within legitimate governance. The parties of the new Shia-
dominated regime, both domestic and foreign-sponsored, showed greater concern for winning a 
greater share of the Shia population than performing outreach to Sunnis. The new Iraq offered very 
few options for Sunnis to voice their grievances. Engaging in legitimate politics forced Sunnis to 
choose between the Islamists, the exiles, the technocrats, and the communists.  
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Understanding the trajectory of AQI as a viable faction during the Battle for Baghdad 
requires an appreciation of how Sunni communities construed their relationship to the Iraqi state. 
The initial upheavals of reconstruction put most Sunnis in a dire position. Lacking viable 
alternatives, many proved willing to support or at least acquiesce to local insurgent elements in 
their midst. As sectarian conflict erupted in 2006, communities accepted these insurgents as a 
bulwark against Shia death squads. AQI resisted an Iraqi state dominated by a Shia community 
bent on retribution.  
Eventually, the luster of AQI’s protection wore off and these neighborhoods determined 
that the cost of acquiescence was dearer than what they wanted to pay. The example of Ameriya 
provides enormous insight into the ability of AQI to exert concentrated denial and alternative 
provision of services to exert local control, and how their eventual failure to continue that control 
led to their expulsion in favor of the legitimate state. 
On May 30, 2007, two prominent tribal leaders declared over loudspeakers blasting from 
their mosques that the time had come for the people of Ameriya to rise up against the al Qaeda 
thugs that controlled their neighborhood.279 By the time local Coalition forces arrived to see what 
was happening, small arms firefights had erupted and a band of locals told MND-B units that they 
had already killed several AQI members, and were organizing an effort to rid their neighborhood 
of the insurgent group. Locals eagerly provided intelligence tips on AQI weapons caches, hideouts, 
and leadership organization to US forces. Long known as an AQI haven, this turn of events in 
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Ameriya caught Coalition and GoI by surprise and indicated that the trends that created the Anbar 
Awakening in the tribal villages of the western desert had begun to reach metropolitan Baghdad. 
After their 2004 loss in Fallujah, AQI began to infiltrate Ameriya, a relatively wealthy 
neighborhood in western Baghdad and close to the Baghdad International Airport. Able to find 
safe haven amidst a nervous Sunni community fearful of Shia militants and the direction of the 
Shia dominated government, AQI used this initial foothold to begin shaping Ameriya to conform 
to their austere code of social behavior, enforced with horrific brutality. Targeting the local 
minority Shia community, families were forced to flee. Executions of Shia residents, with the 
bodies bound and mutilated and left in the street, were a common occurrence.280 Bodies were 
sometimes boobytrapped, preventing family members from retrieving the corpses.  
Sunni residents were also terrorized if they did not conform to strict salafi customs. Women 
without headscarves were attacked with acid and disfigured. 281  
Public brutality was a common first step in establishing normative control over a 
population in Baghdad. A study of Ameriya and other similarly occupied neighborhoods in 
Baghdad demonstrate a comprehensive methodology for the establishment and maintenance of 
small-scale territorial control by nonstate actors operating during the Battle for Baghdad.   
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4.7 AQI’s organizational imperatives 
In an attempt to comprehend the threat of insurgent control over local communities, US 
State Department political reporters were tasked to develop a guide to the common tactics used by 
militants to seize and control neighborhoods. Interviews with scores of Baghdad citizens across all 
socioeconomic and sectarian groupings created an extensive picture of the carrots and sticks used 
by these nonstate groups to exert quasi-state authority over localized areas. The situation in 
Ameriya had much in common with several other pockets controlled by AQI across the city, as 
well as a number of Shia communities under the sway of JAM. This guide provided a report 
detailing seven major tactics common to both AQI and JAM. I use this report to produce the 
following framework describing how these insurgent groups achieved their aims through control 
of people, terrain, and infrastructure.282  
Tactic 1: Displace the Other. Demonstrated in Ameriya, the first step to controlling a 
neighborhood was establishing and increasing the desired sectarian majority through forcible 
evictions and public acts of murder and violence. Ameriya went from approximately 25% Shia to 
just a “handful.”283 
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Tactic 2: Intimidate Your Own. Strict traditional salafi codes of behavior were enforced in 
Ameriya, and AQI controlled the economics of the neighborhood by determining what shops were 
allowed to operate and what they could sell.   
Tactic 3: Expel Government and NGOs. Even though relatively wealthy at the outset of the 
war, Ameriya suffered from poor services infrastructure and, as a Sunni community, an 
estrangement from the Shia-dominated municipal government. AQI intimidated local residents to 
prevent them from collaborating with Coalition forces aiming to rebuild local infrastructure and 
foster relationships with Amanat and PC officials.284 
Tactic 4: Provide Services to Dependent Residents. AQI could reasonably claim that it was 
providing security to the community members and protecting them from Shia death squads, as well 
as a general sense of law and order under sharia-inspired rule. Residents of Ameriya reported that 
AQI provided basic commodities to assist the needy, bringing in fuel, water, and foodstuffs. All 
of the banks in the neighborhood had closed, so residents turned to AQI for financial services and 
support at times.285   
Tactic 5: Control Religious and Political Rhetoric. In Baghdad, the clerics associated with 
local mosques served as incredibly vital sources of public information and were seen as trusted 
leaders in their neighborhoods. Militants of all kinds ensured that local imams and prayer leaders 
were reinforcing messages of support for the group’s presence in the neighborhood. Many AQI 
members sought religious sanction for their actions and support from local mosque leaders. 
Traditionalists were often inclined to frame their messages as positive support for AQI’s 
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revolutionary mission.286 Public signage, from political posters to graffiti was tightly controlled by 
militias. Residents also became fearful of discussing politics with friends and neighbors, knowing 
that a misstep might put them in danger of retribution.287    
Tactic 6: Recruit by Offering Money, Membership, and Revenge. Joining a militia provided 
young men with instant material and social benefits, with little training or experience required for 
the job. Local sources explained the attractive deal offered to a new militia recruit, with an average 
starting pay of roughly $200 per month, a $100 signing bonus, and an AK-47 usually thrown in.288 
Previous victims of sectarian attacks made good recruits, as their motivation for revenge could be 
harnessed for the group’s aims.289      
Tactic 7: Foment the Chaos to Perpetuate Dependency. In a slightly counterintuitive sense, 
these groups’ ability to enforce order in these communities was a direct result of their ability to 
produce disorder. By ensuring a general sense of chaos and conflict threatened the community, 
these groups enhanced their standing as the only force capable of keeping other threats at bay. 
Blowing up vital infrastructure, shooting at garbage collectors, assassinating wealthy or prominent 
leaders, attacking schools and hospitals, and other acts of seemingly random violence fit into a 
pattern of sowing discord in order to perpetuate a local community’s dependence upon militia 
control.  
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4.8 AQI’s reckoning: Ameriya pushes back    
Using a combination of the tactics described above, Ameriya stayed under the control of 
AQI into the spring of 2007, when al Qaeda designated it the new capital of its Mesopotamian 
caliphate.290 A series of factors, some local, some driven by broader forces in Iraq, created the 
catalyst for the local citizens of Ameriya to rise up against AQI. While the rise of a nonstate 
group’s ability to exert control across a battlefield is insightful, just as important is looking at the 
factors that put such a group into tactical and strategic retreat. Hitting a high-water mark in 2007, 
AQI faced a series of threats that caused them to fail in their ultimate aim of producing complete 
systemic collapse across Baghdad’s governance topography. This section reviews these factors. 
They include push-back from the population, missteps in maintaining organizational unity, and 
tactical countermeasures taken by the Coalition and Iraqi forces to root out AQI from Baghdad’s 
area of operations. Significant to the overall downfall of AQI was its inability and unwillingness 
to coopt any meaningful sectors of legitimate governance authority to maintain any sort of hold 
over the population once fissures emerged.   
As mentioned above, the Awakening in Anbar saw many Sunni tribal leaders turn against 
AQI members in their midst. On September 9, 2006 Sheikh Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi gathered a 
group of fifty like-minded tribal leaders from villages across Anbar Province to form the Sahwa 
al-Anbar, or the Anbar Awakening, to coordinate their efforts to declare war on the “thugs and 
criminals” of al-Qaeda after years of humiliation and brutality.291 They also sought to reach out to 
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other nationalist insurgent groups, like the 1920 Revolution Brigades, and split them away from 
cooperating with AQI. In doing so, they gambled on winning over Coalition support to help them 
re-establish themselves in charge of Anbar – which they found easy – and making inroads into the 
Shia-dominated state under Maliki – which they found much more difficult.  
Within Ameriya, the same tensions that drove Sheikh Abdul Sattar to form the Awakening 
brought former insurgent Saif Sa’ad Ahmed al-Ubaydi to the same conclusion. AQI notoriously 
planted huge and deeply buried IEDs on Ameriya routes to destroy Coalition convoys, and often 
produced extensive collateral damage, often lethal, to local residents and their property. After AQI 
buried one in front of his house, Saif Sa’ad requested that they remove it, and that was the last 
straw for his acquiescence to AQI.292 Saif Sa’ad formed the Farsan al-Rafidayn, or the Knights of 
the Two Rivers, aka the Baghdad Patriots (names for these local groups often changed or were 
mistranslated). One of the benefits for Saif Sa’ad, and other likeminded Sunni leaders who turned 
on AQI, was the support and relative freedom of movement granted to them by local Coalition 
commanders. Success in Ameriya led to similar events in other Sunni neighborhoods. These events 
were largely welcomed by the Coalition, but raised large concerns for others, notably the Maliki 
regime, JAM, and other Shia groups. 
Other local factors drove the turnaround in Ameriya. As a Sunni-majority community, 
Ameriya qualified as a candidate for the Safe Neighborhood initiative, and MND-B finished 
construction on a series of T-wall barriers around the neighborhood in April. Its relative safety 
made it a desirable refuge for IDPs fleeing from other parts of the city. The influx of a new and 
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even more desperate population, estimated at 4,000, challenged AQI’s already meager ability to 
provide services to the population, and diluted their overall authority. The recent arrest of a 
hardline imam and AQI enforcer also dented AQI’s leadership.293    
The T-wall barrier had another indirect effect on the Ameriya uprising. One of AQI’s major 
revenue sources was kidnapping for ransom.294 With the construction of the T-walls and added 
checkpoints in place, AQI found it difficult to perform snatch and grab operations at will across 
Baghdad, and instead had recently turned to operating within Ameriya itself, kidnapping locals. 
Reportedly, victims included relatives of two sheikhs who then helped lead the uprising.295 At the 
time, Ameriya was one of only three Safe Neighborhoods completed in Baghdad. Noting these 
effects, MND-B decided to launch additional T-wall enclosures at 12 other Sunni-majority or 
mixed communities.296  
AQI fought the Battle for Baghdad largely as a spatial contest, but with a discernable 
methodology concerning the instrumentality of controlling excludability of the public goods 
delivered through infrastructural systems. Catastrophic denial of services at the city-wide scale 
was accompanied by efforts to deny specific services in local areas, producing a reliance upon 
their provision of alternative governance. One of the most effective countermeasures employed by 
the Coalition was in re-shaping the networks of transportation infrastructure that allowed 
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movement across and within the city. A final analysis of AQI’s efforts and ultimate failure to 
achieve their strategic aim of systemic collapse follows in the concluding section of this chapter.    
4.9 Chapter summary: AQI during the Battle for Baghdad  
The episodes above illustrated the major activities of AQI during the Battle for Baghdad. 
In an overall pursuit of collapsing the governance system of Iraq, AQI challenged state authority, 
engaged in inter-factional conflict, and asserted control over local populations for organizational 
imperatives.      
Here I present my findings on AQI’s tactics, highlighting the infrastructural networks under 
review and commenting on the various components of Baghdad’s governance topography. I 
provide a brief compilation of the ways that elements of that topography shaped the tactics of AQI, 
either as an opportunity to exploit, or an obstacle to overcome. I assess these tactics as having a 
discriminate or indiscriminate impact. Discussing discriminate impacts, I address how AQI’s 
tactics related to a very specific component of the overall system or enabled them to shape the 
behaviors of individuals or small groups of people in a local area. For indiscriminate impacts, I 
illustrate how attacking various components of these infrastructures had a relatively large impact 
on the entire system and affected many people within the city.       
Public order: Attacking public order to foment system collapse was a major element of 
AQI strategy. This happened on the small scale of individual neighborhoods that AQI sought to 
use as safe havens, as well as at the broader level of undermining the Coalition’s and the GoI’s 
efforts to reconstruct Iraq.  
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Military-style assaults on local police units and checkpoints produced gaps in Iraq’s 
delivery of police services by creating pockets of territory not protected by official state sources. 
Producing this vacuum, AQI was able to provide alternative services of law and order. AQI 
provided protection to residents from Shia militia attacks and provided legal services such as the 
adjudication of disputes through sharia courts.      
Catastrophic attacks in public spheres like suicide bombings in downtown markets 
produced indiscriminate effects across Baghdad. Attacking the police services infrastructure by 
bombing cadet graduations and assassinating key leaders produced indiscriminate effects on the 
delivery of public order. Comparing the relative importance of attacking police infrastructures 
relative to other services ranks these systems as highly important to AQI strategy. 
Transportation: Another highly important component of AQI’s strategy involved control 
over the network of roads and bridges in Baghdad. Connected to their desire to possess territorial 
control over certain neighborhoods, they focused on shaping the use of critical transportation 
routes providing access and transit to and across specific areas. The employment of IEDs hindered 
the Coalition’s freedom of movement through several neighborhoods. Shaping the behavior of 
Coalition and Iraqi forces enabled AQI’s ability to use specific routes for the movement of 
weapons and fighters within and across theaters of conflict.  
At the indiscriminate level, spectacular attacks on transportation networks produced both 
instrumental and exemplary results for AQI. The ability to sever crucial arteries of travel, such as 
bridges across the Tigris, served AQI’s insurgent aims by controlling routes of attack by state and 
rival forces. These attacks also demonstrated weaknesses in the Coalition’s ability to provide an 
overwatch of security for Baghdad.  
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Essential services: AQI’s efforts to shape the delivery of essential services reflects a great 
ability to deny these services, but little ability to provide alternatives. At the discriminate level of 
local community control, AQI could attack, harass, and interfere with the delivery of services at 
the local level. But this largely worked at odds with their efforts to ingratiate themselves among 
local residents who were already suffering from a variety of depredations. Looking at the delivery 
of oil products, AQI’s tactical behaviors reflect the pursuit of basic organizational aims and the 
need for funding the insurgency.  
Acts of destruction at the indiscriminate level such as the interdiction of major pipelines 
served aims directed at undermining the Coalition’s efforts to reconstruct Iraq, but also boosted a 
secondary system of truck transport of petroleum products. This system proved more vulnerable 
to actors seeking illicit control, including both AQI and JAM. Overall, attacks on essential services 
infrastructures may represent intent to upset the population’s access to basic needs and undermine 
state authority, but generally reflect the pursuit of organizational goals like funding opportunities.  
Expertise: AQI’s strategy of system collapse included an approach to expertise services 
infrastructures like hospitals but it figures low in importance relative to the other services discussed 
here. The primary tactics employed to influence the delivery of health care include attacks on 
facilities and assassinations of skilled officials and workers within the field. Producing an 
environment of threats and insecurity, AQI’s major success in interdicting this type of 
infrastructure was in increasing Iraq’s brain drain.297  The departure of a hugely important segment 
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of the population, involving many skilled personnel in health care298 needs to be considered as a 
crucial component in the analysis of post-conflict governance.  
Entitlement: Based on AQI’s tactical actions it is apparent that its attacks did not intend to 
directly affect the delivery of government assistance to IDPs. While specific bombing attacks in 
various neighborhoods disrupted local governance, the influence of AQI attacks on this system of 
governance infrastructure mostly remained at the indiscriminate level. By inciting sectarian 
conflict, these attacks drove desperate families to seek government support. Forcing Sunni families 
to seek the support of a Shia government complicated the overall environment of governance 
during the Battle for Baghdad.   
 
Table 4.1 AQI’s tactics against services infrastructures   
Public order: Police                   Overall tactical importance: HIGH  
Discriminate: - attacks on officers, units, checkpoints, facilities   
- intimidation of local forces 
- fake checkpoints    
Indiscriminate:  - assassinations   
- catastrophic attacks on training facilities    
Transportation: Roads and bridges                  Overall tactical importance: HIGH  
Discriminate: - local barriers and checkpoints     
- roadside IED attacks on forces   
- need for localized movement, access to weapons, 
supplies, and safe havens   
- freedom of movement for criminal activity    
Indiscriminate: - ability to use for operational movement across theaters   
- catastrophic attacks on bridges for instrumental aims   
- spectacular attacks on population and facilities for 
exemplary aims   
- security threats to reconstruction projects 
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Essential services: Oil                  Overall tactical importance: HIGH  
Discriminate: - murders of city workers and contractors   
- interference with local services and officials  
- security threats to reconstruction projects  
Indiscriminate:  - assassinations of officials   
- catastrophic attacks on pipelines and facilities for 
exemplary effect and profit motive   
  
Expertise: Hospitals                    Overall tactical importance: LOW  
Discriminate: - attacks on facilities   
- interference with local services   
- provision of supplies and aid to dependent local 
populations  
Indiscriminate: - assassinations of specialists 
- general climate of insecurity feeding brain drain   
- security threats to reconstruction projects 
  
Entitlement: Assistance to IDPs                    Overall tactical importance: LOW  
Discriminate: - interfering with local government  
Indiscriminate:  - inciting sectarian cleansing driving need for service  
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5.0 SEEKING SYSTEM COOPTION: JAISH AL-MAHDI  
This chapter evaluates Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) in its efforts to achieve profit, power, and 
coopt authority in a constantly changing Iraq. Individuals operating for themselves as well as the 
greater good of the organization sought ways to extract profit from Baghdad’s citizens and the 
state’s resources. Actions that intended to shape the behaviors of citizens in significant ways, by 
influencing public and private life on Baghdad’s streets and in its neighborhoods, illustrate the 
group’s efforts to achieve power in Baghdad, as illicit and unofficial control over what people 
could do and where they could go. JAM activities supported Sadrist efforts to gain and exercise 
legitimately derived authority within Baghdad’s institutions of governance at the national, 
provincial, metropolitan, and local levels. However, successes in legitimate politics created 
significant tensions between various factions within the organization and created dilemmas for the 
organization. This chapter proceeds with an evaluation of JAM’s efforts to build and sustain an 
organization, fight rivals, and enable the overall Sadrist aim of becoming a significant power 
player in the new Iraqi state and in Baghdad.  The chapter concludes with a review of findings that 
highlight the role that various elements of urban infrastructure played in shaping JAM’s tactical 
behaviors.     
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5.1 Seeking profit, power, and cooption of authority 
On March 23, 2008, the sound of rockets impacting across Baghdad signaled the beginning 
of a new phase in the conflict to stabilize Iraq. Launched from Sadr City, most of the rockets 
targeted the IZ (Green Zone), the walled city-within-a-city in central Baghdad that housed a 
number of GoI facilities and foreign embassies. Over the next few days, JAM fighters launched a 
campaign to overrun Iraqi checkpoints in and around Sadr City. In some cases, firefights broke 
out, but in most there was no shooting as JAM was able to assert control due to the cooperation of 
fellow Sadrist loyalists within Iraqi police units. Reversing a self-imposed cease-fire that he had 
placed upon his JAM forces the previous July, Sadr was embarking upon his most serious 
challenge to the status quo since his failed uprisings in 2004. Not only was Sadr using JAM to 
challenge the Coalition, but he was also throwing down his gauntlet to test the government of 
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.  
The Battle of Sadr City erupted due to factional and political tensions within and among 
the major Shia parties jostling to exert control over Iraq. Its trajectory and outcome serve as a 
starting point for an analysis of the Sadrist Movement’s overall effort to control Baghdad and its 
population across a full spectrum of tactics ranging from armed militant violence and predatory 
government corruption to petty criminality.  
Nouri al-Maliki became prime minister in 2006 as the compromise choice between the 
major parties of the Shia coalition. While sectarian warfare between Shia militants and Sunni 
insurgents threatened to spiral out of control, significant conflict also pitted rival Shia groups 
against one another for power. The Badr Corps, an Iranian-backed militia, fought for turf against 
JAM in the streets of Baghdad while their respective affiliated parties (ISCI and the Sadr Trend) 
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contested each other in the political arena. As the major Shia party without a militia, Da’wa served 
as a buffer between the others, and its candidate al-Maliki secured the appointment. However, 
Maliki proved a far more cunning politician than expected. His ascendancy coincided with the US 
strategic decision to launch the surge and more robustly utilize US military power to stabilize 
Baghdad. While serving to support the legitimacy of the Government of Iraq and the effectiveness 
of its security forces, in many ways it can be seen in retrospect that this enhanced US military 
power was coopted by Maliki to allow his regime to more effectively compete in the intra-Shia 
contest. The Surge gave Maliki access to a militia power that Da’wa never had. That militia was 
commanded by General Petraeus.  
Throughout 2007, the levels of violence in Baghdad and other areas in Iraq (significantly 
Anbar) dropped.299 A major element of the surge strategy was the Baghdad Security Plan (Fardh 
al-Qanoon), the operational framework for the deployment of Coalition and Iraqi forces. 
Commonly known as the “clear, control, and retain” plan, it outlined the strategy of establishing 
joint security stations across Baghdad’s neighborhoods. An initial operation dedicated to clearing 
an area of insurgent elements would be followed by a period of full-time security presence that 
would eventually shift from a Coalition-led to an Iraqi-led mission.300 Significant decreases in 
catastrophic terror attacks by al-Qaeda in markets, streets, and other public areas enabled MNF-I 
and the Maliki government to turn their attention to another source of instability, the threat of 
militia criminality.301 
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Aside from Baghdad, another location served as one of the primary battlefields of 
contestation between Iraq’s major factions, the port city of Basra. Militias and factional mafia-like 
elements jostled for control over the transport of oil and a range of other products through Basra. 
Within this Shia-majority city, the Sadrists had achieved a major foothold. In the zero-sum game 
of Iraqi politics, the Maliki government was in a weak position so long as the Sadrists controlled 
the flow of oil through Basra. Tired of the leverage the Sadrists continued to hold over his regime, 
Maliki decided to launch an assault against any militants who resisted this re-assertion of official 
Iraqi government control over Basra.302 Operation Knight’s Charge was conceived and partly 
launched without MNF-I cooperation. When belatedly informed, Petraeus warned against an ill-
prepared effort but committed US support.303 The initial moves of Iraqi forces toward Basra on 
March 23 was the inciting event that brought JAM to launch its barrage of rockets at the IZ in 
Baghdad. Sadr decided to ratchet up the pressure on Maliki by turning any fight in Basra into a 
two-front conflict that included Baghdad. On March 25, Iraqi forces faced JAM militants in the 
Sadrist stronghold of al-Tamiyah in western Basra and found the resistance much fiercer than 
expected.304 Meanwhile, it was becoming clear that a major confrontation in Baghdad, centered in 
Sadr City, was beginning.  
Highlighting major developments of the Sadrist challenge in Baghdad reveals the full-
spectrum nature of this multi-faceted organization. The events of the Battle of Sadr City in 2008 
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illustrate the capabilities of JAM in conducting military operations and engaging in urban warfare. 
At the same time its political and social welfare wings exerted significant influence over 
Baghdad’s population, as did the criminal elements operating under its banner.   
In each of these realms, the exploitation of vulnerabilities within infrastructures and 
institutions is examined, offering insight into the strategic and tactical choices made by Sadrists 
and those seeking to defeat or defend against them.   
The idea that Muqtada al-Sadr would be able to influence events of such magnitude in the 
spring of 2008 was largely inconceivable to most in 2003. Following the US-led invasion of Iraq, 
this relatively unknown 29-year-old member of the renowned Sadr clan parlayed his family 
connections and the deep-seated resentments embedded in Iraq’s Shia community into leadership 
of one of the most potent entities to emerge in post-conflict Iraq. However, this trajectory was far 
from assured. Sadr faced many setbacks and outright failures yet persisted. External foes, including 
the US military, often contemplated or attempted his removal from the scene while internal fissures 
within his organization produced an entirely different set of threats to his leadership.  
The early months following the invasion and occupation of Iraq brought chaos, confusion, 
and uncertainty to the Iraqi population. Briefly returning to the era of the CPA under Ambassador 
Bremer, I review a few crucial milestones in the transition from occupation to sovereignty and 
demonstrate how reconstruction policy developments directly shaped the evolution of JAM and 
the overall Sadrist movement.    
Bremer’s CPA operated from May 2003 until a transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim 
Government on June 28, 2004. During Bremer’s tenure several controversial acts influenced how 
the Sadrists and other key factions determined their degree of participation in the new state.  
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CPA orders dictating the disbanding of the Iraqi army and the de-Ba’athification of society 
were largely products of Bremer’s reliance upon a cadre of former exiles who had returned to 
transform Iraq according to agendas shaped by their time abroad. Many served on the Iraqi 
Governing Council, an ad hoc creation of the CPA intended to invest the eventual transition to 
Iraqi sovereignty with some legitimacy. This Iraqi Interim Government served from June 2004 
until elections in 2005 created the basis for the Iraq Transitional Government. The Interim Iraqi 
Government was greatly influenced by former exiles such as Ayad Allawi and Ahmed Chalabi, 
who vocally advocated for the removal of Saddam and then parlayed their connections to achieve 
positions to shape the new Iraq. Another important figure to shape Iraq’s political future was Grand 
Ayatollah al-Sistani.  
Sistani served as the voice of the establishment Shia religious leadership in Iraq, securing 
and maintaining his position as an authority figure to Iraq’s restive Shia population since the 1990s 
by acquiescing to Saddam and seeking to avoid becoming a target for Ba’athist persecutions. This 
quietist tradition stood at odds with the more activist Shia strand of the Sadr family. Muqtada’s 
uncle Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr and his father Muhammed Sadeq al-Sadr, both Grand Ayatollahs, 
advocated for government reform and were well-regarded for their compassion for the poor. Both 
were assassinated (along with two of Muqtada’s brothers) for presenting a threat to Saddam’s rule.  
A combination of opportunism by the exile community, acquiescence by an establishment 
clergy, and a firm commitment to a hasty departure by the US all but assured that whatever new 
Iraq the Interim Iraqi Government created it would be beset by debilitating compromises. Left out 
on the periphery and feeling marginalized by the process, many communities faced the difficult 
choice of either accepting this new status quo or actively challenging it. Untrustworthy exiles, 
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foreign powers, and out-of-touch clergy seemed to be dithering about politics as the country was 
slipping deeper into chaos.  
The legacy of the Sadrist family, and the community of largely impoverished or 
dispossessed Shia that it had served in the villages of southern Iraq and the slums of Baghdad, 
provided the platform for Muqtada to voice such a challenge. Muqtada tapped into the frustrations 
that many Shia, and Iraqis in general, felt. In the aftermath of the 1990-91 Gulf War, the United 
States had allowed Saddam to put down Shia and Kurdish challenges, and the United Nations “Oil-
for-Food” program ensured the Ba’athists retained control while the rest of the nation suffered. 
Misgivings about any US plan to play honest broker in a new post-Saddam Iraq was a hard sell for 
many Shia, and the network that the Sadrist clan had previously built became the conduit for 
Muqtada’s anti-occupation resistance movement.    
The core of what would become the Sadrist organization was the Office of the Martyr Sadr 
(OMS), the social welfare institution with a legacy of caring for the poor and providing for the 
needy. The OMS, named to honor the martyrdom of Muqtada’s father, served as an umbrella 
organization that dispersed funds, food, and other goods to its needy constituency. Supported by 
those donating for legitimate charity purposes, it also served to launder funds gained through the 
illicit activities of JAM and corrupt officials within the Iraqi government.  
The militant wing loyal to Sadr became known as Jaish al-Mahdi, or the Mahdi Army. 
With many discontented young men and a surplus of arms and ammunition in Iraq, many 
responded to Muqtada’s appeal to resist the occupation and ensure for themselves the security of 
their families and communities in an increasingly chaotic Iraq. While the US seemed largely 
uninterested in the looting and violence that increasingly beset Baghdad and other areas, 
Muqtada’s call for the Shia population to protect themselves seemed quite logical. However, in 
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some ways it was a self-fulfilling prophecy. Muqtada himself had issued a fatwa, or decree, that 
looters could avail themselves of anything worth taking as long as they paid the requisite one-fifth 
(khums) of its value to their local OMS office and Sadrist-aligned imams.305  
Upsetting both CPA leadership and mainstream Shia clergy like Sistani, Sadr put himself 
on a collision path with US forces in 2004, aiming to seize and maintain control of the Shia holy 
city of Najaf, as well as Basra and Sadr City. While ultimately a military failure for Sadr, the 2004 
uprisings put JAM on the map and motivated Sadr to ensure that his militia would be powerful 
enough to hold its own against rival factional elements (like Badr) but not aim to take on the US 
directly. The lessons of 2004 would turn Sadr towards legitimate political participation in the new 
Iraq.      
While initially disparaging of political participation as legitimizing the occupation, Sadr 
realized the benefit of having a say in how the resources of the Iraqi state were being divvied 
between the various factions. While the decision to enter legitimate politics may have been a 
personal epiphany, other sources indicate that this change in direction towards legitimizing the 
Sadrist legacy was driven by the suggestions of other voices within the movement.306  
In the 2005 election cycle, a loose group of candidates ran as the National Independent 
Cadres and Elites party and earned seats in Iraq’s new national parliament and provincial councils. 
It was widely understood that these candidates were Sadrist-affiliated, although many Sadrists also 
supported the broader Shia coalition endorsed by Ayatollah al-Sistani, the United Iraqi Alliance. 
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 As a major figure of the Shia establishment, al-Sistani struggled to maintain a veneer of 
non-participation in politics, trying to find an appropriate middle ground between the theocracy 
promoted in Iran and the quietism that kept him safe under Saddam. A direct involvement in 
politics by religious leaders also presented potential problems by making them responsible for the 
failures of government to deliver services to the people, a troubling possibility.     
Up until 2005, Sadr seemed to be adopting this playbook, trying to maintain plausible 
deniability between his movement’s clerical and militant power. But by then a critical threshold 
had been crossed, and the decision was made to engage directly in politics. Sadrist-affiliated 
loyalists soon started filling official GoI positions and became such a significant force that the 
Sadrist Trend would soon become a registered political party. This political wing of the Sadrist 
movement serves as the third leg of the overall organization. Following the model of Hezbollah, 
Sadr intuited that the best strategy for his movement was to gain a foothold in the social service 
government ministries.307 This would enable access to crucial state resources that could be divvied 
out to factional loyalists or provided to citizens to gain political clout, while keeping Sadrists out 
of the competition over ministries such as defense or interior that would require significant 
interaction with Coalition leadership. 
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5.2 JAM’s organizational imperatives 
Baghdad witnessed a surge of population growth and urbanization challenges in the mid-
20th century, like many other major cities in developing nations. In 1959, Prime Minister Abdul 
Karim Qassim spearheaded a major development project in northeast Baghdad to cope with the 
growing city’s housing crisis. Originally (and still officially) called al-Thawra, or “Revolution 
City,” this neighborhood rapidly became home to many new migrants from Iraq’s rural south 
seeking a new life in Iraq’s bustling capital. Largely Shia, and mainly underclass, the population 
by 2003 numbered over 2 million, out of urban Baghdad’s roughly 6 million inhabitants (estimates 
vary).308  While typically referred to as a slum, this designation causes some residents to bristle; 
the vast neighborhood (technically split into two separate administrative districts by city planners) 
has a number of pockets where nicer houses, cultural sites, and busy markets serve a population 
of wide-ranging socioeconomic status. In 1982 it was renamed Saddam City, and in 2003 residents 
started referring to it as Sadr City, in honor of the martyred Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr.  
Early on, Sadrists sought to isolate Sadr City from the reconstruction efforts of the 
Coalition, ensuring that the population would need to rely upon the offices of OMS for relief. The 
OMS, the social service wing of the organization, served as the conduit for the distribution of 
largess to needy constituents including payments to widows, jobs for young men, and other types 
of aid, in Sadr-controlled neighborhoods. Militants provided security, a public good not being 
adequately provided by either the Iraqi state or US occupation authorities and were seen to be 
 
308 A common comparison relates the size and density of Sadr City to Manhattan; whereas Manhattan has 1.6 million 
residents in 59 square kilometers, Sadr City has 2.4 million in half of that space, roughly 35 sq. km. 
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responsible for distributing a variety of other beneficial services to quiescent constituents. But in 
many cases, Sadrists went from merely filling a gap to actively trying to create that gap. Sadrists 
tried to undermine legitimate state institutions in many ways.  They took control of local gas 
stations in order to corner the black market in fuel, controlled transport routes of goods, and used 
official posts to collect extra fees from citizens in need of crucial documentation.309  
The business of alcohol sales provides some interesting insight into the oftentimes 
contradictory way that JAM enforced local control within different neighborhoods. Historically, 
Iraq’s government offered a concession to the traditional religious authorities with views on 
alcohol consumption as un-Islamic by developing policies that put alcohol sales in Baghdad under 
the purview of the Chaldean Christian community.310 However, despite official religious sanction, 
beer, wine, and liquor was enjoyed by many Christians, Sunnis, and Shia in Iraq. During the early 
Saddam era of the 1980s, Baghdad’s nightlife scene was notably liberal and cosmopolitan.  
Post-invasion, a new generation of Shia leaders presented a greater respect for Islamic piety 
as a component of their political agenda. JAM militants were called upon to enforce behavior rules 
in Sadr City and other neighborhoods, cracking down on alcohol sales and consumption. Local 
sources reported, however, that in some areas where JAM publicly espoused no-alcohol policies, 
they privately controlled the distribution and sales of that lucrative product, as well as participated 
in its enjoyment.311          
 
309 US Embassy Baghdad, “PRT Baghdad: Office of Martyr Sadr attempting to take over fuel distribution in Baghdad’s 
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Sadrists also resorted to kidnappings, theft, extortion rackets, and other predatory 
behaviors.312 The extraordinary degree of predation performed by Sadrists and Sadr-affiliated 
militant groups not only served to raise revenue for continued operations but also threatened the 
viability of the Iraqi state. Physical and political barriers often stymied efforts by both the Coalition 
and the GoI to repair infrastructure and provide services to Sadr City. US Army civil affairs units 
assigned to oversee District Council activities in the two Sadr City districts went through periods 
of unpredictable contact due to the conflicting agendas of the original, usually nonpartisan 
members of these councils, and Sadrists who eventually wrested control away from them and broke 
off contact with MNF-I elements. Reacting to the illegal and outright thuggish manner by which 
the Sadrists seized control, non-Sadrists sometimes operated shadow councils, aiming to maintain 
relations with MNF-I and Embassy personnel. When reconstruction projects completed under 
Coalition authority successfully improved life in Sadr City, a common ploy utilized by the Sadrists 
was to re-brand that project as an OMS project, ensuring the Sadrists would get the credit in the 
public’s eye for any improvements made in Sadr City.313  
One major source of income for JAM was through interdiction of the government’s system 
of distributing oil products, particularly petrol (gasoline) and kerosene, commonly used in Iraqi 
households for cooking. Iraq’s legacy of state subsidization created opportunities for rampant 
black market manipulation. Reports from local neighborhood council leaders explained the 
widespread practice of local agents selling kerosene at rates above the mandated government price, 
typically due to the agents being JAM members themselves, or under pressure from JAM through 
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protection racket schemes.314 The overall system, with drivers to corrupt, physical deliveries to 
mismanage, paperwork to lose, identities and ration cards to fake, and individuals at each level of 
the process willing to look the other way, served to provide a lucrative source of easy revenue for 
JAM and other militants in the city.        
In April 2004, JAM fighters ambushed a US Army patrol in Sadr City, initiating a sporadic 
conflict that lasted until June 25 when a ceasefire was agreed to with conditions that kept US forces 
largely out of Sadr City for the next few years. In early 2007, with the launch of Fardh al-Qanoon 
operations to secure Baghdad with the Surge forces, MNF-I units were once again permitted to 
launch offensive raids against criminal and extremist elements in Sadr City. As discussed in more 
detail later, this was allowed through the acquiescence of Sadr and senior Sadrist officials – at the 
time struggling to rein in some of the more roguish elements of their organization in order to clean 
house and more effectively seek legitimate political credibility.315 
Defining Sadr City’s southeastern boundary from the rest of downtown Baghdad is the 
(in)famous Army Canal,316 also a component of Prime Minister Qassim’s 1959 urban development 
plan. Connecting the Tigris and Diyala rivers across a stretch of the eastern half of Baghdad, it was 
intended to provide drinking water for the city’s rapidly growing neighborhoods of Rusafa but had 
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fallen into disrepair and stagnancy by 2003.317 With a major highway also running along the length 
of the Army Canal, this boundary serves as an obvious division between Sadr City and the rest of 
Baghdad. Unlike Baghdad’s older, more historic neighborhoods, Sadr City was developed on a 
grid system, with long straight streets intersecting at regular intervals with wide avenues providing 
prominent divisions between different wards. Building height is fairly uniform throughout as well, 
enabling clear line of sight and even travel over rooftops along long stretches of some blocks.  
A few blocks northwest of the Army Canal runs al-Quds Street, one of the major boulevards 
that bisects Sadr City and allow access to one of the most significant pieces of real estate in 
Baghdad, the Jamila Market. This crucial wholesale center is one of the primary locations in the 
capital where goods arriving by truck are re-distributed to a wide range of retail vendors. JAM 
established a firm mafia-style grip over all business conducted at Jamila, extracting enormous 
profits from fees, shakedowns, and kickbacks. Control over Jamila was widely recognized as one 
of the most lucrative of JAM’s criminal enterprises,318 and contesting that control would become 
a major component of MNF-I strategy during the Battle of Sadr City in 2008.  
As with AQI in the preceding chapter, the JAM tactics to exert normative control within 
Sadr City can be reviewed through the lens of the seven major tactics used by militants in Baghdad 
identified through US State Department reporting.  
Tactic 1: Displace the Other. While Sadr City was always a Shia-majority area, JAM saw 
itself in competition with other Shia factions for control, notably Badr. Notable flare-ups between 
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the groups erupted into shooting violence, signaling shifts in the turf wars over Shia 
neighborhoods.    
Tactic 2: Intimidate Your Own. A compelling question for understanding how 
neighborhoods can be controlled by militants is the question of manpower – how many thugs do 
you need to control a neighborhood? Conversations with locals indicated that numbers are not the 
primary factor. One respondent replied, “Some neighborhoods live in terror because of five sadistic 
bullies.”319 JAM certainly did not lack for manpower, but cases of exemplary brutality also enabled 
their control over the population.      
Tactic 3: Expel Government and NGOs. A major component of the Sadrist strategy 
involved the substitution of OMS services for every practicable aspect of aid provided by 
government or NGO groups. Not only did JAM target NGO aid workers directly, but it also 
threatened those seeking aid from NGO groups instead of going through OMS.320   
Tactic 4: Provide Services to Dependent Residents. OMS developed into an extensive 
institution, with a complex infrastructure including components responsible for economic, social, 
and educational services.321 A corollary to this tactic would state that if you cannot provide the 
service yourself, make everybody think you can. On a number of occasions reconstruction projects 
completed under Coalition of GoI authority would be re-branded as OMS projects, a simple but 
effective tactic to bolster the Sadrist enterprise.  
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Tactic 5: Control Religious and Political Rhetoric. The religious credentials of Moqtada 
were not significant when he ascended into the public sphere, but he proved an effective operator 
within the Shia clerical hierarchy and improved his reputation. Mosques within Sadr City aligned 
their messages with Sadrist objectives. To further bolster its religious standing, OMS launched call 
centers out of local husseiniyas (religiously affiliated schools and facilities) that offered help lines 
for citizens in need of social services. As husseiniyas are commonly places for IDPs or other needy 
people to visit, the OMS presence was calculated to provide them some greater religious 
legitimacy.322    
Tactic 6: Recruit by Offering Money, Membership, and Revenge. The appeal of JAM across 
broad swaths of the Shia population’s vast supply of underemployed young men was compelling. 
Many former members of the Iraq’s military forces found new employment within JAM’s ranks. 
College students with little likelihood of finishing their studies found new purpose and a new 
community in JAM.323 The loose-knit nature of JAM’s structure enabled different groups to 
develop their own sense of mission, from basic neighborhood watch duties to a more 
entrepreneurial usage of force to achieve private wealth and power status within their communities. 
Membership in militia groups indeed had its privileges, as members often received special access 
to fuel, electricity, and rations to assist their families. Families of militia members were also 
granted immunity from the typical extortion, robbery, and attacks that many others in the 
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community faced from the group.324 Those with special talents also found a home within JAM, as 
the group showed a knack for music and video production, creating and distributing original songs, 
often accompanying video montages of recent battlefield footage. JAM needed recruits to help 
them engage as social media influencers.325    
Tactic 7: Foment the Chaos to Perpetuate Dependency. Like the activities of AQI in the 
neighborhoods they controlled, JAM actively undermined the efforts of legitimate government 
agencies or the Coalition to engage in meaningful efforts to improve service delivery. Keeping 
legitimate governance out increased the need for the alternative and illicit services that JAM could 
provide.   
5.3 JAM against the state: The Battle of Sadr City 
On October 12, 2008, 60 Minutes aired a segment called “The Battle of Sadr City” detailing 
the tactics employed by MNF-I forces in the weeks following the March 2008 attacks by JAM.326 
The segment focused on details provided by the brigade headquarters of the unit most directly 
involved in the fight and featured an interview with then-commander of MNF-I General Ray 
Odierno. The segment highlighted the two most salient aspects of the operation: the high-tech use 
of UAVs to identify and target enemy fighters, and the low-tech use of concrete barriers to shape 
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the battlefield. This episode has not received a high degree of scholarly scrutiny and rarely figures 
into overall discussions of the efficacy of the Surge, but is recognized by some within the policy 
community as a significant source of insight for the future of urban operations involving irregular 
combatants.327 Here, a review of the kinetic operations centered on Sadr City is followed with a 
detailed analysis of how this period of intense urban conflict in one part of the city dramatically 
affected the rest of the city and its population, a largely underexamined phenomenon.  
Another major element of this chapter involves the follow-on efforts of Coalition and GoI 
entities to re-establish governance and services in affected areas of Sadr City. While a crucial 
component of both general counterinsurgency theory and indeed the actual handbook utilized by 
MNF-I forces during the Surge,328 large gaps exist in the attention paid and the analysis brought 
to bear on these non-kinetic elements of urban warfare. The Battle of Sadr City presents a uniquely 
overlooked recent case through which to explore contemporary urban warfare across a complex 
topography of infrastructures.  
The initial response to the rocket attacks on the IZ in March 2008 arose from a series of 
basic tactical issues. Indirect fire weapons like rockets and mortars have a discrete range and 
require a certain amount of space to launch. Based on the maximum range of the 107-mm rockets 
fired into the IZ, al-Quds street in Sadr City marked the furthest east from which JAM teams could 
be firing. Al-Quds also served as the major thoroughfare to the Jamila Market, the epicenter of 
JAM criminality in Baghdad. This street, codenamed Route Gold by MNF-I, became the frontline 
in the conflict to remove the threat of indirect fire into the IZ and cut off a major source of profit 
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for JAM.329 The Battle for Sadr City began as contest over control over access to the 
neighborhoods between the Army Canal and Route Gold and then became a test of wills as MNF-
I forces constructed a physical wall along Route Gold, separating JAM from both its primary 
source of income and the best launch points to attack the credibility of Maliki regime and its 
American support base.  
The conflict involved two phases. In the first phase,330 US forces attacked into the 
neighborhoods south of Route Gold, Ishbiliya and Habbibya, to find and neutralize any possible 
rocket-firing positions. JAM fighters in prepared positions stood their ground, and resistance was 
heavier than expected.331 Utilizing hidden IEDs and attacking convoys directly with rocket-
propelled grenades (RPGs), JAM took out six Stryker vehicles within the first week of the fight. 
The Stryker units were then reinforced with heavy armor units with M1 Abrams tanks and M2 
Bradley fighting vehicles, in a significant escalation of force. Heavy armor had rarely seen action 
since the early days of the invasion and was widely seen as overkill in conducting the regular 
missions of urban conflict, with limited mobility within the confined spaces of Baghdad’s 
neighborhoods and weaponry capable of extreme collateral damage. However, the greater 
protection afforded by these heavier weapons platforms significantly reduced the effectiveness of 
JAM attacks. By April 6, the initial US operation enabled a follow-on force of Iraqi Army forces 
to fight their way into position and prepare to take over the primary security role in Ishbiliya and 
Habbibya. 
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Concurrent with the fight below Route Gold, Sadrist uprisings and JAM attacks engaged 
Coalition units in the areas west and north of Sadr City. It became clear to Coalition leadership 
that freedom of movement across Route Gold allowed JAM units to coordinate their operations of 
launching indirect fire attacks on the IZ, emplacing IED ambushes, positioning snipers, preparing 
small unit fighting positions, fomenting public uprisings, and maintaining their grip on their 
criminal enterprises at Jamila Market and elsewhere. The BCT commander Colonel Hort directed 
his units to begin construction of a concrete barrier wall the entire length of Route Gold, effectively 
separating Ishbiliya and Habbibya from the rest of Sadr City. This second phase of the battle332 
saw 3,000 T-wall sections emplaced along a path over 2.5miles, under constant hostile fire. Clearly 
recognizing the threat to their operational ability, JAM resistance to the construction of the wall 
was remarkably intense.333 JAM snipers converged to attack the cranes and engineers emplacing 
each 12-ft tall, 9-ton wall section, and US forces responded with a counter-sniper campaign.334 
Technology in unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) has progressed rapidly since 2003, and 
while the criticality of the Iraq theater as a primary US interest ensured the most advanced craft in 
the US arsenal were available to commanders at the highest levels of Coalition leadership, the 
Battle of Sadr City produced unprecedented access to these systems by a brigade commander. 
 While commanding his unit to engage in one of warfare’s oldest techniques of siege 
warfare – the construction of a wall – Colonel Hort was synergizing that effort with one of the 
most technologically advanced methods ever utilized to find and kill enemy forces. Continuous 
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feeds from Shadow drones broadcast surveillance video of daily life in Sadr City to monitors in 
the brigade tactical operations center. Upon a radar or sensor notification of a rocket or mortar 
launch, a Shadow could be sent to the location and then follow the JAM team responsible from the 
point of the initial attack to wherever they went next. Depending upon the mission needs, COL 
Hort’s tactical operations center could coordinate for an Apache helicopter attack or a Predator 
drone strike on the militants. Predators, with the ability to watch and follow groups of militants 
for hours, were highly effective at strikes that hit JAM headquarters facilities. Brigade battle staff 
learned to exercise greater patience and wait to attack militant groups until after they linked up 
with other teams at supply points or command locations.335      
Despite fierce resistance at the beginning of the hostilities, JAM was eventually worn down 
and lost the ability to resist after a few weeks of high-intensity conflict. JAM likely lost over 700 
fighters, as well as significant amounts of weaponry, supplies and ammunition necessary to 
maintain effective operations. US strikes had taken a great toll on JAM’s offensive capability, and 
the presence and commitment of Iraqi forces to secure and restore order in Sadr City had enabled 
a shift in the public’s perception in the effectiveness of the Maliki government and an outpouring 
of sentiment – and useful intelligence – from Iraqis that had grown weary of JAM’s depredations 
on their neighborhoods.336  
On May 12, 2008 Moqtada al-Sadr declared a unilateral cease-fire by JAM, an apparent 
recognition that his gambit had failed, both in Basra and in Baghdad. A large segment of JAM’s 
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tactical leadership had already fled into neighboring provinces or into Iran, and this statement 
enabled Sadr to spin this loss in the best possible way to both the public and his own followers.  
5.4 JAM within the state: Coopting public order and other services 
As it progressed, the Battle of Sadr City raged with both kinetic and non-kinetic warfare. 
During the intense period of conflict from late March until early April, Baghdad PRT officials 
utilized their extensive network of personal connections with Iraqis from all walks of life to 
construct a picture of Baghdad under intense duress. Concurrent with the commencement of major 
hostilities in Sadr City on March 25, JAM militants across Baghdad made their presence felt. In 
Shia-majority neighborhoods, JAM units seized checkpoints and took control of movement 
through major streets and thoroughfares, limiting movement within and between Baghdad’s 
districts. In what appeared to be a well-planned operation, JAM forced the closure of schools, 
markets, shops, and occupied major public spaces within the city.337 Reports flooded in from local 
sources that JAM was implanting improvised explosive devices (IEDs), emplacing snipers, and 
stockpiling weapons and ammunition at various public and private places across the city. 
Coordinated attacks on Coalition bases, Iraqi security units, and the IZ were surprisingly robust. 
The apparent high degree of planning and execution of these operations led many to believe to the 
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main perpetrators were not run-of-the-mill local JAM units, but the so-called Special Groups who 
received more specific training and were better resourced.338 
The intra-Shia conflict dynamic was readily apparent to most Baghdad residents, who 
plainly saw that the Sadrists’ main ploy was to undermine the Maliki government. One of Maliki’s 
recent political maneuvers was to create an alliance of convenience with the ISCI/Badr faction, 
which greatly enhanced his ability to take on the Sadrists in Basra. Sadr was fighting back with a 
powerful strategy of his own: to completely shut down Baghdad.  
Along with the actions of JAM and the Special Groups to seize and control major 
chokepoints around the city, Sadr was urging “civil disobedience” by the population, aiming to 
produce large crowds protesting in the streets and forcing Maliki’s capitulation as the capital city 
became unmanageable.339 While some gatherings appeared in a few Shia-majority neighborhoods, 
most Baghdadis went home, locked their doors, and tried to avoid the conflict. For a period of 
eight days (from the initial attacks on March 23 to April 1) normal day-to-day activities in Baghdad 
all but ceased. Government-enforced curfews and vehicular restrictions kept movement by regular 
civilians to a minimum.340   
Evidence of the full range of tactics Sadrists were employing to undermine Maliki’s 
government was on display when a team of militants arrived at the home of GoI spokesman 
Tahseen al-Sheikhly. They killed several bodyguards and kidnapped al-Sheikhly. Serving as the 
public face of the Baghdad Security Plan, al-Sheikhly was a highly visible member of Maliki’s 
 
338 Ibid. 
339 US Embassy Baghdad, “Baghdad situation report: April 9, 2200 local,” April 9, 2008.   
340 US Embassy Baghdad, “JAM in Baghdad – how strong is it?,” April 4, 2008. 
   
 
 212 
inner circle, well known on media outlets and a popular liaison with US Embassy officials due to 
his fluent English and his outsized personality.341 Al-Sheikhly was released on March 31 in what 
was thought to be quite extraordinary circumstances. His captors, who he described to Embassy 
officials as “a bunch of criminals and mobsters who I have to admit treated me rather well,” 
released him to his brother on the steps of the Iranian Embassy, a few blocks from the popular 
Assassins Gate into the IZ.342 Likely members of JAM, or at least Sadrist-affiliated goons, the 
kidnappers did not receive any ransom money, and said they chose the Iranian Embassy because 
it seemed like the only place in Baghdad they were not likely to be arrested by Americans. Whether 
the kidnap was directed from higher up or presented itself as an entrepreneurial opportunity to the 
gang was never clear, but al-Sheikhly’s release seemed to serve as a gesture of goodwill from the 
Sadrists. Sadr’s rhetoric shifted to a more reconciliatory tone as the battle was clearly starting to 
swing against JAM after its initial successes.343 
Another component of Sadrist strategy was to force the issue of personal loyalty to the 
forefront and make people take sides in the conflict. Public statements to mobilize civil unrest 
were more effective in those Shia neighborhoods where significant JAM presence served to 
motivate the less enthusiastic. Locals witnessing unrest in the 9 Nissan, Khadhimiya, and Shula 
neighborhoods (majority Shia) reported that many residents felt caught “in the middle” of the 
conflict and often declared their loyalties to protect themselves from the wrath of more zealous 
neighbors.  
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Graffiti appearing in public spaces reflected the political tensions affecting the city. Locals 
in Sadrist areas reported numerous additions of anti-Maliki and anti-Hakim (leader of ISCI/Badr) 
messages painted in highly visible locations.344  
Many Iraqi Police in the Sadr City vicinity decided it was wiser to abandon their posts 
rather than face what might possibly be friends and relatives in JAM units. Most likely many of 
them in fact returned to fight on behalf of JAM. Iraqi Army units faced less desertion and stood 
their ground in more cases than the Iraqi Police in eastern Baghdad, although they were more likely 
to request and receive Coalition support. 
Sadrist rhetoric continued to hammer home a nationalist message to paint themselves as 
true Iraqi patriots, and Maliki’s regime as subservient to Iranian and American interests. While 
Da’wa was also a homegrown Iraqi party, the fact that Maliki had decided to team up with the 
overtly Iranian-backed ISCI/Badr faction enabled Sadr to more convincingly label him a stooge of 
foreign influence, under the thumb of both Americans and Iranians.  
Sadr himself was increasingly the beneficiary of Iranian support through its assistance to 
JAM, but he always sought to keep his distance and maintain his “Iraq for Iraqis” nationalist 
position. In private, Baghdad deputy governor Qassim al-Duraji repeatedly painted his fellow 
Sadrists as more nationalistic and “authentically” Iraqi than their ISCI rivals during the crisis.345 
 One of the few top-ranking Sadrists to directly engage with Embassy personnel, al-Duraji 
even went so far as to suggest that the US had chosen the wrong side in the conflict. The US and 
the Sadrists shared “common goals” in supporting the rule of law and limiting the influence of 
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Tehran in Iraqi politics. Al-Duraji explained that the infiltration of the Ministry of Interior by Badr 
affiliates was such an open secret in Baghdad that it must have been condoned by the Americans. 
Therefore, he and many other rank-and-file Sadrists believed that it was obvious the US had merely 
decided to support one militia group over another and picked the Iranians instead of the Iraqis. 
When pressed, he conceded that he and other Sadrists had extensive Iranian connections. He also 
acknowledged JAM’s reputation for criminality, admitting that rogue actors within his movement 
sought to profit from the chaos.346  
Other public officials in Baghdad also willingly or unwillingly felt the need to express their 
loyalties. Notably, one of the more publicity-loving members of Baghdad’s provincial 
government, Governor Hussein al-Tahan (Badr) remained conspicuously silent during the crisis. 
When pressed, his media advisor explained that al-Tahan was choosing to hold his cards close so 
as to not have to take a position that might weaken him politically however the fight turned out.347 
 Baghdad PC Chairman Mueen al-Khademy (ISCI) made a direct appeal to the citizens of 
Baghdad on March 27, asking them not to side with the “criminals and outlaws” destabilizing the 
city. Mayor Saber al-Essawi went on the radio to reassure citizens that the Amanat would continue 
to provide city services to all neighborhoods during the crisis, but that people should have patience 
because Amanat employees were also “suffering” under the curfews and restrictions.348  As 
previously described, a tenuous power sharing agreement between the ISCI/Badr faction and the 
Sadrists in Baghdad provincial politics often reflected, and influenced, the wider national-level 
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contest between these parties. Just a few weeks prior to the Sadr City flare up, the PC (led by 
Mueen and his ISCI majority) made the bold move of firing the Sadrist-affiliated Deputy Mayor 
Naeem Aboub al-Kaby.349 While publicly presented as push-back by the ISCI/Badr faction against 
the brazen abuses of power and corruption perpetrated by Sadrists within the Amanat, it was clearly 
an act of desperation by a faction fearful that they were losing a grip on the resource-rich and 
crucial power center of city hall. The fact that the firing only led to al-Kaby temporarily changing 
titles within the Amanat while the issue elevated to the Prime Minister’s desk indicates the degree 
to which this factional feud was capable of bringing Baghdad to a standstill.   
Beyond the violence perpetrated between its combatants and the collateral damage to those 
unfortunate enough to get in the crossfire, the Sadr City battle took an enormous toll on daily life 
in Baghdad. Prices on basic foodstuffs and commodities rocketed higher across the city. The price 
for a typical package of tomatoes in Sadr City increased by 500%. Markets and vendors across the 
city struggled to stay open with enough products to sell.350 Fuel prices jumped, and scarcity drove 
black market activity. Hospitals shut down services, only admitting emergency patients in some 
cases. Due to the movement restrictions, many Amanat employees were unable to report to work 
and perform basic city services. Mountains of trash piled up across the city. Concerns that the Sadr 
City conflict would confront Baghdad with a dire humanitarian crisis, above and beyond what the 
city was already facing, greatly occupied Embassy and GoI officials.351 Many residents from Sadr 
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City fled their homes to find shelter with friends and relatives in other parts of the city or ended 
up in one of Baghdad’s many already-swelling IDP camps.352  
Sadr had succeeded in dialing up an enormous amount of pressure on Baghdad, but by 
April 1 the tide began to turn against him. Despite repeated exhortations to rise up as one against 
the Maliki government and its foreign backers, Sadr was unable to garner the widespread “public 
disobedience” campaign he had aimed for. Shia-majority neighborhoods continued to roil, and 
Sadrist-backed demonstrations percolated every few days, but most districts saw a tentative return 
to business-as-usual once they saw the commitment of the US military to back the Iraqi 
government. Sunni areas in western Baghdad reported comparative calm, and residents credited 
their local Sons of Iraq militia as providing a sense of safety in their neighborhoods.353  
In an ironic reversal of fortune, several of the fault-line mixed neighborhoods that had 
witnessed the brunt of the sectarian warfare of the previous year were generally now much calmer 
than their neighboring Shia-majority communities. A local reported her preference to avoid the 
Shia areas she once traveled through and instead chose to go through Sunni areas where “nine 
months ago they were slaughtering people.”354 In fact, many began to blame Sadr and JAM 
outright for creating the hardships and anxiety that they had experienced over the previous week. 
Sadr made another bid for a massive show of public resistance by announcing a march of 
“millions” that would bring Baghdad to a standstill on April 8. When the march was abruptly called 
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off, many saw it as sign that Sadr had realized his position was weaker than imagined. Evidently, 
the Sadrists had banked on being able to bolster their numbers by bussing in a crowd of young 
protesters from Iraq’s southern provinces, which Maliki was intent upon disallowing. According 
to a local official in Sadr City, it was clear at this point that GoI pressure was weakening the 
Sadrists.355 The Sadrist challenge to Maliki’s authority would not engulf the entire capital, it would 
stay contained within Sadr City, in a battle that JAM was clearly starting to lose by mid-April. 
 Unlike AQI, the overall Sadrist strategy involved working within legitimate government 
in Baghdad to achieve its aims. The overall complexity of the Sadrist movement meant that direct 
connections to JAM could be overt, in that some officials openly espoused their membership in 
JAM, or covert, in that they deliberately masked any affiliation. Or, in many cases, the connection 
to JAM was only tenuous because participation in Sadrist politics did not necessarily indicate 
membership in JAM, or even complicity with the group’s behavior. JAM itself developed into a 
polymorphous network of variously incentivized and dedicated individuals, cells, and units. All 
said, it is important here to highlight three significant government institutions that enabled the 
overall Sadrist movement, and therefore JAM, to benefit from control over various aspects of 
infrastructural resources flowing through Baghdad.    
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5.5 Exploiting expertise: Coopting hospitals 
The Sadrist takeover of the MoH was one of their earliest, and perhaps most significant 
moves as an organization. Modeling much of their movement off the example of Hezbollah, 
Sadrists sought to gain authority over institutions that would a) provide them the ability to 
distribute largess and social benefit to loyalists, and b) keep them away from Americans, heavily 
concerned with the future of Iraq’s security architecture.356 Even as early as 2004, when JAM was 
taking US forces on directly, Sadrists moved into positions of legitimate power within the MoH. 
From there, they began a campaign of institutional cleansing, similar to that described above in 
the Amanat, where factional rivals, independents, and all others not in line with the Sadrist agenda 
were forced out. Many doctors fled, or were murdered by JAM.357 In 2005, Sadrist control of the 
MoH was cemented through the parliamentary assignments divvied out under the Ja’afari 
government, and hardened again in 2006 when Sadr backed Maliki. Sadrists also infiltrated and 
took control of the state-run company responsible for procuring, importing, and distributing drugs 
and supplies to Iraq’s hospitals, Kimadia.358   
This section evaluates JAM influence over the MoH to demonstrate how this type of 
service is vulnerable to cooption by nonstate actors and can be exploited to exert control over a 
population. The essential quality of this type of service is that it is a public good that relies upon 
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the state’s licensing and support for a certain type of expertise that improves society. The public 
good provided is the expertise of licensed practitioners, with access to a variety of technical 
systems to apply their expertise. This service is vulnerable to denial, in a catastrophic or 
indiscriminate sense when these practitioners and the facilities in which they operate are attacked 
and destroyed. However, its primary vulnerabilities for denial are of the discriminate type, where 
specific locations or individuals are targeted, shaping the ability of practitioners to demonstrate 
their expertise in needed scenarios.  
More lucrative for nonstate actors involves a methodology leading to profiteering from this 
type of service’s structure. Control over the behaviors of the licensed practitioners provided certain 
benefits, but control over the infrastructures producing the substances and equipment needed by 
those practitioners to deliver this public good also provided rich profit opportunities.         
Access to the extensive infrastructure of the MoH and Kimadia provided three major 
elements important for JAM’s fight during the Battle for Baghdad: patronage, preference, and 
profit. Control of the MoH led to control over hiring at hospitals and an enormous opportunity for 
patronage, with Sadrists filling the MoH payroll with JAM members. Estimates put JAM 
employees of the MoH at nearly 70,000.359 Control over hospitals also served a factional agenda.  
MoH leadership made personnel and resourcing decisions that had ripple effects across the 
city, but JAM control of hospitals sometimes took on a more direct, and thuggish aspect. Episodes 
of JAM takeovers at hospitals were regularly reported to Coalition and Embassy personnel, with 
militants showing up after raids with injured comrades and demanding doctors give them priority 
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care. Fearful that even the hospital guards, or FPS (Facility Protection Service), were on the JAM 
payroll, doctors and nurses had no option but to comply. Other cases in which hospitals were 
actually used by JAM to torture Sunni prisoners were reported.360        
Huge profits were skimmed from the government money that flowed through the MoH, 
notably through Kimadia import contracts, as drug sales filled JAM’s coffers.361 Following the 
trail of money flowing through Iraq’s MoH leads to a number of unsettling revelations about the 
international pharmaceutical industry, state-run enterprises, and their intersection with violent 
nonstate actors. In 2017, a suit was filed in the US District Court for the District of Columbia 
claiming families of American service members and civilians killed or wounded in Iraq through 
engagements with JAM militants had a right to sue five major Western pharmaceutical and medical 
services companies for damages under federal Anti-Terrorism Act statutes.362 Plaintiffs in the case 
described the longstanding knowledge of corruption within Iraq’s health care system by these 
international companies dating back to the Saddam era, and a continued willingness to look the 
other way as the Sadrists expanded their political control over the Ministry while receiving direct 
assistance from the terrorist group Hezbollah to train and equip JAM to attack Coalition forces. 
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The suit contended that these companies knowingly paid “commissions” of up to 20% of a 
contract’s total value through JAM agents to win sales contracts within the MoH.363 The companies 
also allowed MoH contracts to contain unreasonable commercial clauses that provided funds for 
additional after-sales support and services but in reality served as a method for corrupt MoH 
officials to build slush funds for JAM.364 According to an MoH insider, Kimadia was the goldmine 
that JAM used to finance their empire in Iraq.365 
Despite the obvious wealth that was flowing through the MoH, local health care officials 
often appealed to US forces and the Baghdad PRT for assistance in meeting the significant needs 
of a city in crisis. As national control by Sadrists consolidated within the MoH, local health care 
officials interacting with US government officials reported on important trends present within the 
health care system, and often related stories of bureaucratic mismanagement at all levels. 
 Local doctors criticized bottlenecks in their system created due to the unawareness of MoH 
officials in understanding the true needs of the medical staffs working within their units.366 
Requests for US financial assistance due to apparent gaps in Iraqi budgeting for medical services 
were common. Meetings with the chairman of the PC’s Health Committee revealed the extent of 
confusion over how budgeting by the Iraqi government would impact local service provision in 
Baghdad, as this official expressed complete unawareness of crucial services being provided by 
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Coalition entities providing prosthetics for victims of terrorist acts.367 Health care officials at the 
Medical City Morgue reported on the challenges of keeping up with the arrival of an average of 
150 new bodies per day. Providing identification services for family members and other forensic 
duties produced a workload that far outstripped the capability of the facility and its personnel, 
according to a report in May 2008.368   
While the strains on Baghdad’s health care infrastructure were not merely the result of its 
political takeover by the Sadrists, it is important to see how widespread the impact of cooption 
within legitimate institutions can be, from the multimillion dollar contracts with international 
corporations to the ability of local doctors to provide needed services in their neighborhoods. In 
one such example, a Sadr City gynecologist reported that JAM threatened him, telling him male 
doctors were no longer permitted to treat female-related health concerns.369 Vulnerabilities within 
the Baghdad’s health care system demonstrates the complex array of threats to the provision of 
expertise services.  
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5.6 Exploiting entitlement: Sectarian violence for profit   
While not as significant as the Amanat or the MoH in the overall scheme of Baghdad’s 
institutional topography, the system by which IDPs made claims and received aid is important to 
review, to see how and why it could be manipulated by insurgents such as JAM. 
The IDP crisis in Iraq added immeasurably to the complexity of the conflict. While 
refugees are a common result of warfare, the scale and rapidity with which a full-blown crisis 
emerged in Baghdad is remarkable. On March 12, 2006, the Baghdad PC reached out to Embassy 
personnel to inform the Coalition of the scope of the problem that was just beginning to emerge 
across Baghdad’s neighborhoods following the Samarra bombing of a few weeks prior. The PC 
memo consisted of a five-page list of names and home districts of families that fled their homes.370 
US and international aid organizations, Coalition military units, and every layer of Iraqi 
government struggled to cope with an issue that far outstripped the abilities of any single entity. A 
small institution, the MoDM became the epicenter of a truly daunting catastrophe.   
The essential components of this infrastructural system boil down to a few key items, 
categorized as a) methods of individual identity verification, b) methods of household 
identification, and c) methods of providing assistance to the entitled parties. Seemingly simple, 
these elements prove much more difficult to manage in a city in the throes of a brewing sectarian 
civil war. JAM found ways to exploit the weaknesses of all three components of this system. 
The difficulties of identity verification reflected the overall destruction of Iraqi government 
effectiveness over the past years and even decades. Legacy systems had out of date census data, 
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and ID cards could have been lost or stolen, and replacements unable to be procured. Fraud was 
rampant within the IDP assistance program, as the difficulties in verification provided greater 
incentives to double dip, or make false claims, or forge documentation. The PC IDP Committee 
chair estimated in February 2008 that of the 130,000 IDP claims she had processed, she suspected 
25% were fraudulent.371 While many false claims came from individuals, local contacts reported 
that JAM had elevated the process to a science. JAM also intimidated and stole aid from NGOs to 
push them out of the aid game and make more room for OMS.  
JAM also had an interest in destroying records of home ownership, as homes vacated by 
Sunnis put JAM in the real estate business, gaining houses for loyalists or becoming landlords over 
new Shia tenants arriving from other parts of town.372 While not a direct aspect of the IDP process, 
this incentivized the willful destruction of documentation at government facilities that proved 
personal identity or property ownership. The role of real estate entrepreneurship as one of the 
driving forces behind sectarian cleansing in Baghdad is worthy of greater attention in conflict 
studies literature.  
5.7 JAM’s reckoning: Sadrists caught between politics and predation    
In the previous chapter, the failure of AQI to achieve its ultimate aim of collapsing Iraq’s 
governance system demonstrated how push back from a population, organizational failures, and 
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the Coalition’s counterstrategy of controlling transportation infrastructure put that group back on 
its heels and largely out of play during the final phase of the Battle for Baghdad as the events of 
2008 played out. In the case of JAM, a quite different type of group failure played out. In many 
ways this can be seen as a strategic success for the overall movement that JAM served. The Sadrist 
leadership indeed achieved success by becoming a significant player in Iraq’s legitimate political 
landscape.  
However, this political success was derived through a weakening of JAM’s illicit power 
on the streets of Baghdad, caused by several factors. Like AQI, the predations of JAM produced 
backlash within populations tired of militancy overreach, and Sadrist leadership saw advantage in 
cutting some ties with their more thuggish elements, offering them up for removal by the Coalition, 
serving both parties’ aims.373 
Returning to the events of early 2007, and tracing internal JAM politics up to the Battle of 
Sadr City which began this chapter, exposes how the internal fissures within the Sadrists were 
exploited to induce shifts in the organization’s political leadership away from militancy towards 
legitimate political participation. It retraces some of the episodes presented in previous sections 
but puts the internal dynamics of JAM at the forefront to produce unique insight into how dynamic 
factors on the battlefield changed the strategic logic for the Sadrist movement, to the detriment of 
JAM’s tactical position within the conflict. Coalition strategy sought to produce incentives for 
Sadrist elements to support legitimate participation, and disincentives for JAM militants to stay 
outside the system.  
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In January 2007, Muqtada issued an order for JAM forces to stand down rather than fight 
Coalition forces. The likely explanation is a fear of a replay of the setbacks of 2004, as well as a 
gambit to enable his leadership cadre to re-establish central control over JAM and to punish or 
expel those who had engaged in gratuitous violence or were unduly exploitative of the Shiite 
population. Several distinct factions of JAM had very different reactions to Sadr’s calls for a 
ceasefire.  
According to Marisa Cochrane, the “first group included mainstream JAM led by the 
Najaf-based clerical leadership and the Baghdad-based political leadership. This group believed 
the movement had been heavily infiltrated by criminal elements and Iranian influence.”  374 While 
mainstream JAM “generally obeyed Sadr’s orders to stand down,” other parts of the movement 
were much more unruly.375 Consequently, the leadership formed a review committee and 
“established an elite group of fighters to purge rogue members of JAM — often violently.”376  
 Sometimes called the Golden Battalion or Golden JAM, this group was set up to restore 
discipline by punishing or eliminating rogue elements.377
 
The leadership in Najaf reportedly 
dispatched Golden JAM to Baghdad to “hunt down, punish, and even assassinate rogue members 
of the militia before [Coalition Forces] can capture and interrogate them.”378  
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A second group of loyal Sadrists began to work with US forces to get rid of the unruliest 
elements in the movement. According to Cochrane, the group, “known as ‘Noble JAM,’ opposed 
the criminal gangs and death squads” and believed that JAM could most effectively be purged of 
these elements by seeking “Coalition assistance.”379 This collusion between the Sadrists and the 
Coalition emerged after a series of back-channel negotiations that neither side desired to publicize, 
according to General Petraeus’ counterinsurgency advisor David Kilcullen.380 However, both sides 
saw pragmatic benefit to the new opening and warily pursued parallel strategies serving different 
agendas.    
A final group, criminal gangs, also ignored Sadr’s call to stand down. Fighters with large 
personal stakes in the criminal rackets they had worked long and hard to establish, and which 
generated substantial income through exploitation of local populations, saw little reason to adhere 
to such a stand down. Consequently, they became prime targets of Coalition Forces and “Noble 
JAM.”381 By the end of 2007, the traditional Sadrist leadership had made serious efforts to re-
establish control over JAM but had only partially succeeded. Criminal activities and inter-militia 
rivalries continued, especially in Basra. The Special Groups with their pro-Iranian agenda had not 
been purged but had become overtly independent from JAM.   
The US military was now explicitly differentiating between irreconcilable rogue members 
of JAM and others with whom they could engage. One colleague suggested in jest that there were 
“many flavors of JAM” operating in Baghdad. The Coalition sought out methods to determine 
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ways to discern those who could be integrated into the political process from irreconcilable 
elements which were “as bad as AQI” and “criminal elements that use JAM as their cover.”382 
Enabling this purge, Muqtada extended the ceasefire he had put into place in August 2007 to last 
until February 2008. But a month later JAM was the target of a major offensive by the Iraqi 
government and Coalition forces.  
In March 2008, faced with continuing militia unrest in Basra, Maliki launched a military 
offensive to take back the city. The offensive initially appeared to be a debacle, with many 
government forces deserting rather than fight their fellow Shia. Facing the possibility of a high-
profile defeat in what was the first major Iraqi security initiative since the 2003 invasion, “Maliki 
and the Iraqi government flooded resources into the city.”383 Assisted by US surveillance and air 
power, the tide gradually turned in favor of government forces. JAM resisted vigorously but was 
significantly weakened by the time a truce was brokered.384 The ultimate outcome was a significant 
reduction in JAM-influenced crime and violence in Basra, as well as an enhanced stature for Maliki 
and the Iraqi security forces.    
The battle of Basra was soon followed with the offensive in Sadr City. This phase was 
provoked by the persistent rocket fire attacks launched at targets within the IZ in Bagdad, mainly 
from the Special Groups.385 Despite strong resistance, about 700 JAM militiamen were killed and 
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Sadr requested another ceasefire.386 A week later Iraqi forces moved in to take control over Sadr 
City. The battle had reduced JAM’s military strength, removed a safe haven for the militia, and 
severely undermined both JAM’s social control and its dominance in criminal markets.  
The military defeats in 2008 were the result of many factors. The increasing effectiveness 
of the Maliki regime in harnessing the Iraqi state’s security apparatus, aided by Maliki’s deal-
making with the other Shia factions with militant capability, was one factor. Coalition firepower 
against JAM also proved decisive. Coupled with the ongoing Coalition strategy to target various 
irreconcilables with Sadrist affiliations, 2008 proved to be a turning point for Sadr and his 
organization. Whether out of necessity or out of choice, the military defeats of JAM allowed him 
to disengage from those militant parts of the movement where he lacked control and to re-energize 
other elements such as his social and religious programs. 
In June 2008, a Sadrist cleric read a letter from Muqtada providing guidance that JAM 
would largely be transformed into a civilian movement dealing with “religious, social and cultural 
affairs.”387 Weapons were to be restricted to “an armed force of experienced fighters labeled the 
special companies… and pointed exclusively at the occupier.”388 The letter promised continued 
resistance to the occupation while also promising to disown “anyone in the Mahdi Army who 
disobeyed” Sadr’s new commands.389 In November 2008, Sadr created the Promised Day Brigade 
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as his personal militia, although one that was also permitted to fight against US troops. Sadr sought 
to maintain his anti-occupation and nationalistic credentials but pursue an agenda that emphasized 
the social, religious, and political aspects of his movement. 
While JAM was effectively diminished from its high point as a significant threat to stability 
within the new Iraq, the Sadrist goal of coopting large parts of the state’s governance system for 
partisan aims was achieved.   
In the months before the March 2010 elections, Sadr played up his nationalistic side, urging 
Iraqis to participate at the polls to end the foreign occupation.390 Given the battlefield setbacks the 
Sadrists had previously suffered, they did remarkably well in the elections, winning 40 of the 
National Iraqi Alliance’s 70 seats in the 325-member Parliament, proving the Sadrists had 
significant political power relative to the rest of the major Shia factions. After the departure of US 
forces in December 2011, Sadr took notable steps to position himself as a leader with broad appeal, 
speaking in favor of social justice, the rule of law, and against sectarianism.391   
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5.8 Chapter summary: JAM during the Battle for Baghdad 
Here I present my findings on JAM’s tactical exploitation of systems of public goods 
provision. Like the preceding chapter, I highlight the type of infrastructural network under review 
and present a brief review of the ways that JAM exploited this element of Baghdad’s topography. 
When practical I discuss the ramifications of exploitation at discriminate and indiscriminate scales, 
or specific vulnerabilities at upstream, midstream, and downstream components of these 
infrastructural networks.  
Public order: JAM engaged in significant military operations against Coalition and GoI 
forces, presenting a number of threats to public order. Initially filling a perceived gap in police 
services provided to local neighborhoods following the initial invasion, militant groups expanded 
their ability to control areas like Sadr City and worked to prevent the re-establishment of authority 
by legitimate police forces and opposed the presence of Coalition units.  
On the broader indiscriminate level, the population’s respect for and cooperation with 
police units was challenged by a widespread perception that militants had infiltrated the MoI, and 
police forces served mainly to pursue factional objectives, not the impartial protection of 
Baghdad’s residents. JAM operated fake checkpoints and conducted death squad operations 
wearing IPS uniforms. Assassinations and kidnappings of rival political leaders and key officials 
such as judges by JAM operatives further undermined the delivery of law-and-order services.     
Transportation: Connected to the efforts to undermine the legitimate security forces of Iraq 
and their Coalition supporters, JAM engaged in tactics to control access to Baghdad’s network of 
roads and bridges. Focused on denying Coalition access to Sadr City and other key Shia enclaves, 
JAM employed upgraded IEDs with explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) along key routes. 
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Developed by Hezbollah and brought to Iraq through Iranian networks, EFPs posed a significant 
threat to Coalition forces. More than just a modified bomb, the superheated explosion of these 
devices produces a metallic dart capable of penetrating even the most advanced armor systems of 
Coalition vehicles.392 Shaping the usage of major routes by Coalition forces enabled JAM to 
reposition and reallocate forces within and across theaters of conflict.  
Responding to a new-found ability to express their religiosity, the Shia community 
expanded the scale and scope of their traditions. The number of public holidays skyrocketed under 
the new Shia leadership in Iraq. Often involving the use of public spaces and routes between 
different shrines, JAM displayed tactical motivations related to control access to crucial 
transportation resources.  
Essential services: Control over essential services played a major role in JAM strategy. 
The ability to exploit vulnerabilities in Baghdad’s governance structure enabled JAM to exert 
influence at the downstream, midstream, and upstream components of oil services infrastructure, 
providing enormous opportunities for organizational profit. Militants in local neighborhoods 
operating independently or with the collusion of willing or coerced officials gained control over 
the illicit provision of gas stations and kerosene distribution, creating lucrative black-market 
opportunities.  
Gaining a foothold in black market activities, JAM militants were incentivized to make 
further incursions and disruptions to oil delivery services. Assassinations of local officials and 
 
392 Robert Bryce, “Surge of danger for U.S. troops,” Salon.com, January 22, 2007. 
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disruptions of repair and reconstruction projects exacerbated the non-ideal conditions of 
governance that produced the demand for products through the black-market economy.  
Joining the legitimate political process afforded the Sadrists more opportunities to channel 
state resources for factional aims. Contesting for control over the Amanat, Sadrist politicians with 
JAM affiliations used access to contracting and patronage to enrich themselves and loyalist 
partisans.        
Expertise: The political takeover of the MoH by the Sadrists was a critical turning point in 
the Battle for Baghdad, enabling the movement’s turn towards gaining a foothold in legitimate 
governance. Control of the MoH provided enormous resources through access to a large 
bureaucracy with contracting and patronage opportunities, especially through the pharmaceutical 
division. This upstream control was gained in parallel to JAM’s targeting of hospitals at the local 
level through concentrated denial and illicit provision. JAM denied access to care for sectarian 
purposes and normative control of neighborhoods and used intimidation to secure the usage of 
facilities for factional purposes.  
Like AQI’s campaigns of intimidation and assassination of Iraq’s professional class, 
JAM’s activities against doctors and other health care workers contributed to the brain drain crisis 
in Baghdad. Expertise services were especially hard hit by the activities of extremists seeking to 
exploit and exacerbate vulnerabilities in Iraqi society.    
Entitlement: The ability to exploit this service for factional ends seems to represent a target 
of opportunity for entrepreneurial members of JAM. Taking advantage of this infrastructure 
providing cash payments to specifically entitled recipients required a similar skill set as the 
corruption of other commodity-based services. Either through intimidation or collusion with 
officials responsible for its distribution, JAM proved able to control this service through 
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concentrated denial and illicit provision. Fraudulent identifications enabled the channeling of these 
government funds to factional loyalists or profit-hungry militants.  
At the indiscriminate level, JAM was responsible for exacerbating the conditions of 
sectarian conflict that produced the society’s demand for this service. This demonstrates one 
example pointing to the double-edged difficulty of bringing factions like the Sadrists into 
legitimate political participation in post-conflict scenarios. On one hand the political wing of such 
a movement may be advocating in good faith for legislation promoting an entitlement to support 
the needy. Meanwhile its militant wing may in fact be responsible for causing the need in the first 
place, and also possess the capability to divert those payments to factional aims.      
 
Table 5.1 JAM’s tactics against services infrastructures  
 
Public order: Police  Overall tactical importance: HIGH  
Discriminate: - attacks on officers, units, checkpoints, facilities   
- intimidation of local forces 
- fake IPS checkpoints    
Indiscriminate: - assassinations/kidnappings of key leadership figures   
- terror operations disguised as IPS 
- infiltration of police units     
Transportation: Roads and bridges     Overall tactical importance: HIGH  
Discriminate: - local barriers and checkpoints     
- roadside IED/EFP attacks on forces   
- need for localized movement, access to weapons, 
supplies, and safe havens   
- freedom of movement for criminal activity   
- influence on ability to launch death squad attacks    
Indiscriminate: - need for larger operational movement across theaters   
- critical terrain for inter-factional conflict   
- access for religious celebrations crucial to faction 
  
Essential services: Oil Overall tactical importance: HIGH  
Discriminate: - murders of city workers, contractors 
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- interference with local services and officials   
- rich source of profit for individual and factional 
corruption   
- security threats to reconstruction projects   
Indiscriminate: - massive theater of conflict among rival factions      
- officials within legitimate offices enabled illicit 
provision at local level   
- ability to control sectarian distribution of services 
  
Expertise: Ministry of Health Overall tactical importance: HIGH  
Discriminate: - attacks on facilities   
- interference with local services   
- illicit provision to dependent local populations  
Indiscriminate: - deliberate strategy leading to brain drain of qualified 
personnel   
- legitimate political takeover leading to massive 
corruption of state resources  
- ability to shape sectarian distribution of service 
  
Entitlement: Assistance to IDPs  Overall tactical importance: LOW  
Discriminate: - interfering with local government   
- fraudulent claims for factional corruption  
Indiscriminate:  - inciting sectarian cleansing driving need for service 
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6.0 CONCLUSION 
I stated out the outset that one of my primary objectives in this study was to build bridges 
between those who understand cities and those who understand conflict. Incorporating new 
approaches in academic and policymaking studies to the study of urban environments and political 
violence, I focused on how the Battle for Baghdad was shaped by dynamic relationships among 
its belligerents and a complex urban topography of territorial, demographic, and infrastructural 
features. I assembled these elements into a usable framework and tested its applicability to 
understanding a metropolitan battlefield: a complex conflict scenario in an urban environment 
where systems of governance form a major component of how the conflict is waged. Driving this 
study were my two underlying research questions: 
1) What factors produce vulnerabilities in governance systems during complex conflict?  
2) How are these vulnerabilities exploited by actors pursuing different strategies?  
 
The framework I developed to answer these questions rested upon several theoretical 
insights drawn from different perspectives on conflict, urban studies, and governance. Pulling from 
these different fields I sought to construct an approach that engaged with both the agents of conflict 
and the environments in which they fought. My underlying assumption was that I could contribute 
to the study of conflicts like the Battle for Baghdad by deliberately seeking to balance a focus on 
its belligerents with a focus on its battlefield, developing a methodology to capture both static and 
dynamic elements.   
The case of the Battle for Baghdad offered a unique episode for study based upon previous 
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personal experience, which presented a grounding for the theoretical insights I hoped to 
demonstrate. In this conclusion, I seek to evaluate the value of this study in two parts. First, I 
reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology utilized in its pursuit as I present my 
findings in the case study. Second, I offer practical recommendations for application of these 
concepts to improve US military approaches to interventions and urban conflict.   
6.1 The weaponization of governance 
Previously I asserted that new approaches to the understanding of governance in urban 
environments are likely to improve our overall understanding of complex conflicts. These conflicts 
feature an array of different actors using their ability to provide or deny services to a population, 
or the weaponization of governance, to pursue a variety of aims. The approach I utilized for this 
study begins with the proposition that a city represents a socio-technical system across a 
topography of population, infrastructure, and terrain. Aspects of this system exist along spectrums 
of physical tangibility to ideational intangibility, and from specific individual components to 
general elements. Infrastructure plays a unique role on this topography as it encompasses both 
physical installational components and rules-based institutional elements.  
Conflicts in a city therefore consist of competitions to control elements of this topography, 
whether specific or general, material, or ideational. Belligerents fight to control things and places, 
and to control the behaviors of individuals and groups. They may also be fighting over systems of 
governance, which provide connections between these four other realms of conflict. Control over 
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aspects of governance provide methodologies for states and nonstate challengers to assert control 
over populations.  
This established the weaponization of governance by belligerents as the central element on 
a metropolitan battlefield. From this basic observation I turned to developing the methodology I 
pursued in the case study analysis. To examine the weaponization of governance, I proposed a 
scheme for understanding the basic elements of governance, and how disruptions to these elements 
produced exploitable vulnerabilities.  
First, I introduced the concept of governance infrastructure to illustrate the 
interconnections between administrative law, politics, bureaucracy, and technology in the 
production and delivery of public goods. This concept proved very useful in demonstrating the 
ripple effects that specific events, like the 2005 elections, may produce across an entire system of 
institutions and physical networks. Along with this static concept, I presented four major dynamic 
tensions as a useful way to categorize the interactions between various components of governance 
infrastructure. While most studies on political violence focus on factional tensions as a driver of 
conflict, I proposed several alternatives. Conflict can erupt between hierarchical components of 
institutions, among elements organized horizontally, and even temporally, as evidenced by the 
contests between Iraq’s legacy institutions, the CPA-era councils, and the post-2005 government. 
Next, I turned to the identification of specific services to determine how a deeper 
understanding of the logics of public goods provision could improve this study. The lack of 
consensus around categorization schemes presented an initial problem, but I believe that my focus 
on public order, transportation, essential services, expertise services, and entitlement services as a 
useful grouping of public goods permitted effective comparisons among these different types. 
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Understanding the intrinsic nature of these goods provided additional insight into the 
tactics and methods used to exploit them in the pursuit of factional aims. Along with the exercise 
of mapping out the underlying infrastructures responsible for delivering these services, I believe 
that a much more comprehensive view of the ways governance systems were disrupted and 
coopted was possible. This led to my overall categorization scheme of identifying tactics as 
catastrophic and concentrated denial, and legitimate, illicit, and alternative provision.   
While typically conceived of as a pure public good and therefore ideally nonexcludable, 
public order was disrupted in notable ways during the Battle for Baghdad. Excludability of police 
services was enabled by the territorial control of neighborhoods by insurgent groups. Both AQI 
and JAM achieved something close to monopoly control over the use of violence in specific areas 
over certain time periods. With state authority pushed out through concentrated denial of police 
services, each of these groups then engaged in alternative provision of law and order, albeit 
incomplete versions. This was the case for AQI in Ameriya and JAM in sections of Sadr City. A 
competition over territorial control during the battle over Haifa Street demonstrated similar 
agendas between these groups, but with different forms of implementation.  
The intrinsic congestibility of transportation as an impure public good served a role in 
enabling and constraining insurgent tactics regarding the control over roads and bridges in 
Baghdad. AQI was able to create mass disruptions to day-to-day life for Baghdad’s residents 
through campaigns of catastrophic denial of bridges and access to downtown zones of commerce. 
During the 2008 Battle of Sadr City, JAM was also able to assert control over transportation 
networks by using militant forces at critical concentrated points to dramatically shut down traffic 
across Baghdad. Both AQI and JAM shaped access to certain areas of the city through campaigns 
of IED attacks against Coalition and Iraqi security forces.  
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The complexity of oil infrastructures in Iraq offered a variety of ways for each of these 
groups to disrupt and coopt this service. The tangibility of oil products gave them a high degree of 
feasible excludability, setting the conditions for exploitation by both AQI and JAM. Attacks on 
pipelines and other methods of shifting product movement through trucks enabled both groups’ 
opportunities to engage in the concentrated denial and illicit provision of goods for organizational 
profit. JAM possessed a greater ability to control this service, and other essential services, first 
through campaigns of intimidation and collusion with local services offices and then though 
legitimate channels as the Sadrists expanded their reach into politics.  
Hospitals provided opportunities for both AQI and JAM to assert control over local 
populations through concentrated denial of this expertise service. Because this type of service is 
largely based on human capital in the form of the knowledge and experience of skilled 
practitioners, it was exceedingly vulnerable to the threat of brain drain. Assassinations and 
intimidation of workers formed the major tactical methodology for disrupting and coopting this 
type of service, by both AQI and JAM. However, again JAM gained a greater ability to shape the 
legitimate and illicit provision of this service through entry into the political arena. Political control 
over the Ministry of Health by the Sadrists enabled an extensive takeover of the resources of a 
critical bureaucracy in Baghdad.  
The entitlement payments to IDPs, consisting of a largely institutional infrastructure and 
several installations, faced concentrated denial through the basic use of violence and intimidation 
to prevent the interactions at local offices where the good was distributed to its consumers. Yet the 
fungible nature of the good, as a cash payment to an identified individual, provided incentives for 
JAM militants to devise ways to coopt the service. Coercion or collusion at these distribution sites 
enabled JAM to fraudulently channel these payments in an exercise of illicit provision.  
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Incorporating the final element of my framework involved connecting tactical behaviors to 
broader operational and strategic aims. In the introduction to the case, I pointed out several notable 
ways that studies on the Iraq War described and categorized the various factions like AQI and 
JAM. A major difference was presented in their overarching objectives as system collapse and 
system cooption. With these different objectives identified, a natural assumption about the tactical 
behaviors each group would engage in would put AQI pursuing system collapse only through 
methods of denial, and JAM pursuing system cooption only through tactics leading to illicit 
provision. Wanting to explore the full complexity of the conflict and not relying on preconceived 
assumptions about these groups, I introduced the element of my methodology that would enable 
me to compare and contrast tactical behaviors as aiming to challenge the state, compete with rivals, 
and extract resources for organizational benefit. Breaking down the behaviors of AQI and JAM in 
this way enabled several unique observations about the trajectory of the Battle for Baghdad, 
demonstrating ways that groups pursuing very different objectives often use very similar tactics.        
 AQI’s strategy of seeking system collapse is most clearly seen in its campaign of bombings 
targeting major elements of Baghdad’s public order and transportation infrastructures. Attacks on 
the Iraqi police at local checkpoints, key leadership positions, and the pipeline of new academy 
recruits intended to completely disrupt the state’s ability to provide this service to its population. 
Destruction of bridges and disruption of major arteries of travel inflicted indiscriminate harm on 
the economic life of the city, stymied Coalition and Iraqi efforts to provide security, and produced 
widespread doubt about success for the post-conflict reconstruction agenda. 
At the local level, AQI favored a methodology that did not see them take illicit control of 
the state’s public services, but instead sought to deny them in order to provide alternative services. 
AQI leaders replaced state-produced public order with alternative versions that brought versions 
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of sharia jurisprudence to discriminately controlled territories.       
 The ability of JAM to project significant militant power in Baghdad during the early 
months of the occupation provided the overall Sadrist organization the clout to pursue a parallel 
political agenda, gaining them access to crucial components of Baghdad’s legitimate state 
institutions. Gaining power at the upstream, national level of the health ministry provided 
significant opportunities to indiscriminately influence the delivery of this expertise service across 
its infrastructural network. Seeking political control over the Amanat’s delivery of essential 
services to Baghdad formed another major component of JAM’s agenda. The importance of this 
institution in serving the overall Sadrist aim of gaining the ability to coopt control of a significant 
chunk of Baghdad’s governance topography cannot be understated.       
 JAM tactics at the local level involved an enormous effort to disrupt and corrupt the flow 
of the state’s legitimately produced public goods to use that control over excludability to produce 
illicit profits and affect individual and community behavior. Taking advantage of the economic 
opportunities produced by state policies subsidizing kerosene, petrol, and other oil products, JAM 
found multiple ways to shape the delivery of legitimate goods for illicit ends. However, JAM also 
utilized alternative provision in places like Sadr City, where the offices of OMS provided welfare 
in the form of basic goods and cash payments to needy Shia families.  
This brief rundown of the major activities of AQI and JAM provide broad support for 
seeing system collapse as primarily directed at catastrophic denial, and system cooption directed 
at illicit provision. However, looking the methodologies these groups used to control local 
neighborhoods and gain organizational resources there are similarities in their tactics, and even 
collusion in some cases. Both used concentrated denial to pursue sectarian aims, forcing massive 
internal displacement of Sunni and Shia families caught in the wrong neighborhoods. Both 
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engaged in the pursuit of black-market profits in Iraq’s oil economy. Both engaged in campaigns 
of kidnapping for profit, and in shakedowns of local businesses for the purposes of extortion. 
The major distinction in behaviors, as noted numerous times above, was the pursuit of 
legitimate political engagement by the Sadrists. This dramatically increased their power to shape 
governance in Baghdad and solidified their role as a major player in Iraqi politics as the Battle for 
Baghdad ended. From this comparative analysis of AQI and JAM, I turn to a commentary on some 
of the lessons learned about the Coalition’s role in the fight over governance in Baghdad.    
6.2 Evaluating the reconstruction of Iraq 
It can be said that the US-led effort aimed for hitting a trifecta of reconstructing, 
democratizing, and decentralizing Iraq. In reality, progress in each of these aims undermined the 
efforts to achieve the others. Optimistically, the best that should have been hoped for was two out 
of three. The technical necessities of reconstructing Iraq’s infrastructure to effectively satisfy its 
population ran counter to the political innovations of democratization and decentralization that 
gave hope to regional, provincial, and local governance bodies and their constituents that they 
would have greater autonomy from the central state. A state with one major revenue source: oil; a 
commodity inherently inclined to benefit centralized power. The inability to overcome this 
fundamental paradox at the heart of US reconstruction policy produced a political environment 
rife with sectarianism, corruption, and ineffective governance.  
The challenges faced by the Coalition in stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq were incredibly 
daunting. Critical immediate security concerns were constantly pitted against longer-term 
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development objectives. Initial Coalition efforts that sought to radically decentralize governance 
in Iraq and significantly alter previous institutional arrangements were often at odds with later 
efforts that sought to stabilize an Iraq veering towards civil war, aiming to prop up whatever 
seemed to be working at any given time. State-building efforts were in direct tension with the 
expediencies of counterinsurgency.  
This source of tension can be clearly seen as the plan to radically decentralize Iraqi 
governance ran into obstacles. Locally created councils were supposed to democratize the local 
delivery of services. As Baghdad’s institutions were merely branches of a network of centralized 
national ministries, these councils failed to influence the degree that factional elites with interests 
far removed from local concerns would have on Baghdad’s services systems.  
The political priorities of the elites in charge of the national ministries were wholly 
disconnected from those of local leaders attempting to give voice to local concerns. Mid-level 
ministry officials, who actually had the most ability to improve Iraq, kept their heads down trying 
not to run afoul of party elites, militants, and angry demagogues in the local councils, if they hadn’t 
already been replaced by less competent party loyalists. Governance paralysis emerged when turf 
wars between new CPA-era institutions and traditional Iraqi bureaucratic institutions erupted, 
leaving gaps for actors to exploit the uncertainty.     
US counterinsurgency efforts primarily focused on local security conditions and high-level 
deal-making: the street and the elites. This left the middle level of Iraq’s governance bureaucracy 
constantly buffeted by policy shifts driven by either bottom-up or top-down factors. The inherent 
difficulties of reconstructing a mid-level sector requiring technical expertise and a degree of 
insularity from partisan politics during a period of instability and institutional ambiguity 
contributed to the overall dysfunction of Iraq’s new democracy. 
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A primary example of how top-level decisions about government architecture influenced 
downstream effects within services infrastructures is found in the realm of public order.  
Reconstituting the security sector so Iraqi forces could effectively take on the responsibility of 
protecting and defending the nation and its citizens became the primary focus of US reconstruction 
efforts, and there are numerous lessons to be taken from this experience. Specifically, notable 
instances where the security mission took priority over rule of law efforts – while understandable 
in the context of the extreme violence faced in Iraq – can be seen to have paved the way for a turn 
towards greater authoritarianism in the absence of significant US restraints on extralegal behaviors, 
as seen in the behavior of the Maliki regime following the successes of the Surge.  
Apparent victory in the Battle for Baghdad over both AQI and JAM solidified control for 
the Maliki regime, which went on to win convincingly in the elections of 2009. However, during 
his tenure Maliki displayed increasingly authoritarian tendencies and constructed a vast patronage 
network that, with the withdrawal of US forces in 2011, hollowed out the capability of Iraq’s 
security forces through extensive corruption.393 Despite all the good intent that supported Maliki 
during the Surge, his regime was largely responsible for fomenting the vulnerabilities in the new 
Iraq that led to the rise of the Islamic State insurgency of 2014-2015.394 
While AQI appeared to be largely defeated by 2008, it had merely gone to ground for a 
few years and re-emerged when the Arab Spring incited the civil war in Syria. The sectarianism 
and ineffectiveness of Maliki’s government provided an opening for the Islamic State to take up 
 
393 Dan Bisbee, “Iraq: The Rise Fall and Persistence of the Maliki Regime,” in Michael Dziedzic, ed., Criminalized 
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the mantle of revolutionary upheaval in Iraq. This time, they would embrace the idea of governance 
provision in ways that earlier AQI fighters had not.395  
Concurrently, after Sadrist leadership seemingly disavowed its roots in militancy in favor 
of legitimacy, the fervor that had animated JAM took hold in other groups. Shia militancy emerged 
again in an array of other Shia factions not beholden to legitimate state structures. While AQI and 
JAM were effectively disempowered as groups during the Surge, the forces driving their initial 
creation and development were still present. 
Understanding this later dynamic in Iraq’s trajectory requires a return to several initial 
conditions in Iraq following the invasion of 2003, and how the failure to provide conditions 
enabling comprehensive public order and the rule of law fundamentally undermined Coalition 
objectives.  
The early decision to disband the Iraqi Army and security services under the CPA and 
reconstruct a new Iraqi army as primarily a border patrol of 44,000 soldiers without tanks or 
artillery reflected the US intent to ensure that Iraq would not soon replicate its ability to destabilize 
its neighborhood and flout international norms.396 Over 2004, however, the growing Sunni unrest 
in Anbar and the Sadrist militant challenge in the south changed the strategic logic of the US, 
driving the formation of the Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) 
responsible for rapidly and expansively increasing the combat potential of Iraqi forces. Spending 
 
395 Colin P. Clarke, After the Caliphate: The Islamic State & the Future Terrorist Diaspora (Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press, 2019). 
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over $24.5billion to rebuild its military forces, the US oversaw a re-militarization of the Iraqi state 
in which, by 2012, roughly 933,000 people were employed in the security forces of the MoD, MoI, 
and the Prime Minister’s Counter-Terrorism Force.397  
Overseeing the rapid growth of the Iraqi security forces from mid-2007 to mid-2008, US 
Army LTG James Dubik commanded MNSTC-I during the crucial surge phase. Significant strides 
were made in fielding Iraqi forces and improving the capacity of the MoI and MoD to perform 
their institutional mandates. However, Dubik has since identified a lack of coordination between 
his efforts at MNSTC-I and the overall rule of law capacity building efforts as an important gap in 
US reconstruction plans.398 Rule of law responsibilities between State, Justice and Defense 
departments were not clearly delineated and a paucity of capacity within the civilian agencies left 
Defense with an outsize role in managing rule of law efforts.399 In many cases, this ensured the 
“short-term security necessarily took priority over long-term realization of the principles 
underlying the rule of law,” 400 notably during the period of the Awakening. Political bargains 
brokered between Sunni tribal leaders and the Iraqi government by Coalition forces saw arrest 
warrants against former insurgents not served in order to secure these reconciliation 
accommodations. Mass transfers of detainees, mostly Sunnis, from US detention centers to Iraqi 
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facilities also occurred during this time, but in circumstances that did not comply with Iraqi judicial 
process, a seemingly expedient compromise of rule of law integrity in the service of security 
objectives.401    
This turmoil afforded opportunities for AQI to take advantage of the ambiguity in this 
governance situation and expand their influence by shutting out legitimate governance and offer 
alternatives to captive local communities. The mission to reconstruct Iraq came into direct 
competition with the mission to fight a revolutionary insurgency like AQI.  
The US strategy in Iraq was always trying to catch up with the realities on the ground. 
Understanding both the deeper history of the Sadrists and its internal organization could have 
enabled more effective strategies to counter its influence earlier. At the outset of the occupation, 
there was little understanding by US officials of the key role of the Sadrists in Saddam’s Iraq. This 
included the sacrifices the family had made as well as the popularity and legitimacy enjoyed by 
Sadr as the heir to this tradition. Nor was there much understanding of the intra-Shia rivalries that 
positioned the exiles who had returned to Iraq after the collapse of the regime as an opposition 
force to those who had stayed and incurred the wrath of Saddam.  
While Sadr was unlikely to ever overtly support the occupation, his hand was strengthened 
when security conditions rapidly declined, and Shia communities felt a need for local protection 
that the Coalition was proving increasingly unable to provide. Sadr’s narrative of grievance 
stemming from US actions and UN sanctions prior to the invasion was easily converted into one 
of grievance and resistance to an apparently ineffective post-intervention occupation.   
 
401 Ibid., 329. 
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A major lesson to be drawn from the case of JAM is the need to examine the make-up of 
potential spoilers, identifying possible political fissures or organizational differences within such 
groups and how they may be disaggregated into elements that may be reconciled and brought into 
the political process and those likely to remain irreconcilable. Encouraging and exploiting such 
fissures can provide important opportunities. In the case of the Sadrists and JAM, this was made 
easier by the damaging consequences for the aspirations of the leadership of its loss of control over 
rogue and criminalized actors and the obvious overreach with which zealous and militant elements 
engaged in extraordinary predation upon wide swaths of the Iraqi population.  
In many post-conflict environments, stability is often achieved through the negotiation of 
elite bargains between the most potent factions. In the case of Iraq, these elite bargains provided 
the conditions that drove the nation’s trajectory towards kleptocracy instead of democracy. 
Through the political bargaining that made up the formation of national unity governments in Iraq, 
notably in 2006 and again in 2010, parties winning electoral support were rewarded control over 
ministries in an effort to give them a stake in the governance of the nation. With nearly exclusive 
control over the bureaucracies they won, parties treated their respective ministries as fiefdoms 
from which to extract rents and reward loyalists. A purge of technocrats and independent civil 
servants in favor of inexperienced party loyalists, followed by efforts to bloat payrolls and increase 
the patronage possibilities of each captured ministry office dramatically, and negatively, affected 
governance and undermined citizens’ trust in the state.  
In theory parties can place checks on rivals’ behaviors ensuring that a system while rife 
with patronage can still be held accountable and weed out the most egregious offenders. The Iraqi 
parliament dithered for eight years to repeal an article of the criminal code that, in essence, gave 
each party exclusive domain over corruption prosecutions within the ministries they controlled, 
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allowing a minister to prevent investigations of political appointees within their administration.402 
Despite great pressure from inside and outside of Iraq since 2003, the law was only changed in 
2011, evidence that closing such a loophole was not of primary interest to political factions who 
clearly preferred to turn a blind eye to rivals’ malfeasance as long as the favor was returned.   
Elite political bargains that seek to build national unity through shared governance, such 
as those seen in Iraq, must be crafted with an open eye to the incentive structures of the political 
factions engaged in the bargain and how their control over bureaucracies can be utilized in ways 
that undermine the stability of the state. Capacity building efforts in Iraq intending to improve 
ministerial effectiveness and accountability have been extensive, with major initiatives launched 
by USAID and other international partners to improve Iraqi state functioning. The USAID-
sponsored Iraqi Administrative Reform Project, Tarabot, provided a package of initiatives aimed 
at improving Iraq’s national ministries and provincial administrative institutions in planning, 
regulatory reform, public policy, education policy, procurement, project management, and a range 
of other assistance initiatives.403   
Despite the years and billions of dollars spent on these programs, significant doubts about 
the effectiveness of these programs have been raised. The overall report card on US reconstruction 
efforts in Iraq has been dismal. Of the $61 billion spent by the US for reconstruction from 2003 to 
2011 (representing only a portion of the overall amount of $213 billion spent by the US, other 
nations, and Iraq), most went to the rearming and training of Iraqi security forces, and much of 
 
402 Al-Ali, The Struggle for Iraq’s Future, 200. 
403 USAID, Tarabot program. http://tarabot-iraq.org/ 
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what was left was lost to profiteering, waste, and fraud, or to projects launched for short-term 
counterinsurgency purposes by local commanders.404  
Iraq’s recent history has been one of extraordinary political and social upheaval, war and 
foreign occupation, insurgency and terrorism, and crime and communal violence. To better 
understand this history, I developed this research project focused on identifying and explaining the 
vulnerabilities of governance systems on a metropolitan battlefield. During the Battle for Baghdad 
belligerents exploited opportunities presented by the complexities of urban terrain to exert 
influence over the city and its people. May any lessons gleaned from my endeavor to better 
understand this conflict enable efforts to mitigate or avoid others in the future. Ne Frustra. 
 
 
 
404 Catherine Lutz, “Reconstructing Iraq: The last year and the last decade,” Watson Institute for International Studies, 
Brown University, March 8, 2013.  
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